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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Objectives of the dissertation 
 
The beginning of 2014 Hungary has arrived at the verge of a significant decision, strongly 
determining its development for the next 50-100 years. The doubling of capacity of the Paks 
Nuclear Power Plant, through its planned expansion, has generated political and 
communication waves beyond the frames of the energy policy. Giving priority to nuclear 
energy development exercises its effect on the general economic, social and political setup of 
the country. The complexity of the issue allows for and explains cause of differing analyses of 
various dimensions: including discussion of financial, environmental, scientific, technological 
and ethical aspects of the use of nuclear energy as well as issues related to the desirable 
energy policy and country development model. 
 
Use of nuclear energy is a reflection of the complex social, economic and political setup of a 
country, giving an insight into the state, the ambitions and the aspirations of a given society. 
Conventional analysis of the use of nuclear energy focuses on its scientific aspects, 
discussing, among others, its physical and technological features. In these cases 
communication usually spotlights increase of capacity and efficiency, decrease of operational 
risks and implementation of technological developments. These discussions place the actual 
operational aspects of nuclear power plants in the center, where the connection between an 
NPP and its environment is described in an input - output context. 
 
The current dissertation adopts a different approach: it builds on the presumption that a 
complex set of links exists between an NPP and its environment. In fact, due to its size and 
characteristics, a nuclear power plant is closely interrelated with its physical, social and 
natural environment. Decisions on nuclear energy, including capacity increases, life cycle 
extensions, development or cessation plans imply a range of consequences. Consequently, 
strategic decisions on nuclear energy cannot be made without thorough consideration of 
possible aftereffects the changes in the nuclear agenda may bring.  
  
Analysis of the social dimensions of reliance on nuclear energy has been traditionally 
overlooked; therefore limited understanding is available regarding the effect nuclear energy 
has on the development of the society. Nuclear energy is an integral part of a complex social 
economic political system of a given country. The current dissertation claims that the social 
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discourse on nuclear energy provides a reflection on the state of the society. Communications 
and behavioral characteristics can be discussed from a general approach and researched from 
a broad perspective. Deeds and words that are expressed in relation to nuclear energy can be 
considered as reflections of general attitudinal attributes. 
 
The current dissertation places social dimensions of nuclear energy in the focus. Through the 
identification, analysis and understanding of actual social discourse the complexity of the 
issue is represented. Priority is given to analysis of the communication processes as 
reflections of actual power relations. Study of the actual dominant actors, stakeholders, 
narratives, argumentations, interpretation of the layers of the content and the actual 
proceeding of the communication process help understand and describe power relations. It is 
also expected that as a spin-off of the dissertation, an insight be gained into the operation of 
the Hungarian political system, the economic and social processes and to the representation of 
stakeholder interests.  
 
Study of the nuclear agenda may prove representational to what factors influence social 
discourses in general. Validity of the topic, the interdisciplinary nature of the topic and the 
underrated social dimensions of the issue give impetus to the choice. 
 
Validity of choice is granted primarily through its topicality. The development of the use of 
nuclear power in Hungary indicates that by early 2014 the country has arrived at a turning 
point. Political decisions have been made for the expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant. 
Consequent discourse arrived at a stage where argumentations about the risks and benefits 
have become explicit, and indicate that different cohesive narrative structures exist and 
provide basis for detailed analyses. Findings of the current research may further contribute to 
the extended discourse through providing information and identifying new angles for a 
continued discourse. In order to deliver research findings with actual contributory potential, 
the author has taken the approach of an impartial observer, providing analysis of the social 
dimensions of the planned extension. 
 
The interdisciplinary nature of the research is a reflection of the characteristics of the issue: 
the actual topic of the use of nuclear energy and of the planned extension of the Paks plant 
can be assessed from a range of aspects. Once the complexity of the issue is acknowledged, 
the range of dimensions evidently results in a complex discourse. Argumentations are difficult 
to match as they focus on different dimensions. Again, this reinforces the prerequisite 
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approach of an impartial observer that is looking at the overall processes, searching for the 
key dimensions of the ‘big picture’. The intention of the current research is to cross traditional 
boundaries of disciplines and professions, and to contribute to the development of a new 
approach by incorporating a range of views, disciplines and narratives. Relevant answers 
cannot be given through the simplified dimension of any one discipline. This approach of 
synthesizing various disciplines, however, raises certain methodological challenges. These 
challenges are handled during the unfolding of the research. 
 
Social dimensions create the framework for the dissertation. Studies indicate that social 
dimensions of the use and development of nuclear energy are underrepresented in its 
discourse. Economic, political and technological dimensions dominate the discussions leading 
to a negligence of considerations of the social context. Bearing in mind both the validity and 
the interdisciplinary nature of the issue, it is especially important to bring attention to the 
social dimensions. Acceptance, use and effects of electricity generated through nuclear power 
have a clear effect on the present and the future generation of Hungary. Views analyzing and 
reflecting the attitudes, fears, interests, hopes, beliefs and values need to be considered, as 
important inputs to the formation of the social environment of nuclear power. 
 
1.2. The hypothesis 
 
Upon the study of the social context of nuclear energy, the following hypotheses are tested. 
 
1. Political and technological narratives dominate the discourse about nuclear development 
in Hungary. The complexity of the issue and the existence of various dimensions and 
narratives is not reflected in the discourse. Instead of actual discourse, parallel realities live 
by, where narratives do not interact with each other.  
 
2. The majority of the population does not have information neither expresses interest in the 
discourse; therefore it remains on the level of experts and politicians. This is generated by 
non-interest of the dominant forces in widening the discourse as well as by the inability to 
build connection between the nuclear narrative and the everyday concerns of the public. 
 
3. Due to non-interest in the issue, unbalanced access to information and dominance of 
political narratives, the validity of the public sphere theories is limited. Due to the perceived 
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political nature of the nuclear issue, public interest remains finite and leads to overlooking 
dimensions that would affect everyday lives and perspectives. 
 
4. Analysis of the communication processes in the context of perceived risks and benefits 
offers a framing to interpret differences in narratives and to understand the European context 
of the nuclear issue. Perpetual risk - benefit assessment would facilitate optimization of 
decision making. 
 
5. Public interest in discourse could be raised through involvement and engagement, where 
participants gain ownership of the project. An engagement model would encourage discourse, 
and would lead to the development and comparison of alternatives that better reflect the 
attitudes and ambitions of a significant part of the public. Development of the engagement 
model and the consequent democratization of nuclear discourse could contribute to 
discussions contributing to the development of the public sphere in modern societies. 
 
1.3. Dimensions of the research  
 
The focus period of the dissertation is the four-year span of January 2010 - December 2013, 
with a further few additional months covered. The full period from April 2009 to March 2014 
starts with the parliamentary resolution on starting preliminary preparations for building new 
nuclear reactors at Paks NPP, and ends with the signing of the government agreement and its 
parliamentary approval to expand Paks NPP through Russian involvement.  
 
Geographical scope of the current research is a further reflection of a broad approach. While 
the actual focus in on the Hungarian nuclear agenda, the discourse needs to be interpreted in 
coherence with its international context. In a globally interconnected world, issues of energy 
and environment cannot be discussed from a purely national perspective. Long term and 
sustainable models cannot be based on the limited approach of national views. Especially in 
the case of a country with a relatively small geographical spread and limited reserves of 
natural resources; these issues are better analyzed in an international context. The dissertation 
builds on the assumption that certain core questions and issues related to nuclear energy show 
cross-border patterns. Study of nuclear discourses in other countries allows for identification 
of standard motives as well as differing national characteristics. Matching developments in 
selected European countries allows for better understanding of argumentation. Exploration of 
international parallels facilitates understanding and interpretation of local processes. 
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Developing relevant answers to energy, climate and environment challenges may show 
standard templates in the various countries.  
 
Finally, through this approach the dissertation aspires to contribute to developments in other 
fields of highly complex nature, involving the vested interests of various stakeholders and 
with a need of understanding and support from the public. Highly complex, business driven 
issues, that build on a strong scientific - technological focus and may arrive at the focus of 
political interest, need further impetus for gaining understanding and developing their social 
environment. Discourses on issues such as nanotechnology, informatics, biotechnology, 
genetic modification and space research are all in the forefront. Unless these industries are 
able to understand, incorporate and handle social dimensions of their discipline, their success 
will not be granted. Political and business interest may provide them backing, but lack of 
public understanding and support will always jeopardize development by containing elements 
of risk. 
 
1.4. The methodological approach 
 
The methodology reflects a holistic approach to the research topic. Various layers and 
dimensions of the discourse on nuclear energy are analyzed through a range of methods, 
including, to various extents, content analysis, frame analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, 
participant observation, statistical analysis, polling, analysis of power structures, social 
geometry as well as risk - benefit analysis. Information is collected from a range of sciences 
and practice areas, referring to political, economic, technological, science, communication, 
social, environmental and philosophical aspects. The complexity of methods and dimensions 
admittedly reflects the perceived multi-disciplinary nature of the nuclear agenda. Clarification 
of actual methodological tool is provided within each chapter, to support understanding of 
relevant findings and statements. 
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CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Communication and the public sphere 
 
The existence and operations of the public sphere form the cornerstone of liberal democracy 
(Habermas, 1962). Habermas argues that it is through the public sphere, building on critical 
publicity, that members of society, the bourgeios1 (‘Bürger’) share their opinion. However, in 
modern societies, in the social-welfare state critical publicity shows limited validity. 
Traditional critical publicity is confronted or often subjugated by publicity of manipulative 
purposes.  
 
In fact, one of the key criteria - and consequence - of a liberal market economy is that of an 
open public sphere, where the individuals feel responsible for expressing their opinion on 
issues that matter. The ‘reasoning public’ takes part in forming public opinion, through 
representing their individual views. Members of the society find expression of opinions an 
important tool to represent the separation of public sphere and the state. 
 
Due to political and business pressures and influences, primarily deriving of ownership 
structures and interests, media loses its ability to convey and represent the discussions of 
members of the society. It rather contributes to the creation of staged or manipulatively 
manufactured public sphere, where manipulative publicity serves the possibility to obtain 
legitimization (Habermas, 1962). All this creates a public sphere where concurrent narratives 
exist, and the occurrence of the winning narrative is decided by their possibility and power to 
influence. 
 
It is argued that in fact, since the beginning, the dominance of the liberal public sphere 
encompassed an exclusionary effect (Fraser, 1990, Eley, 1992). Bourgeois (men) considered 
themselves to be the only and universal class; therefore their narrative became the dominant 
account of the time. Their self-representation was extended to the overall representation of the 
society. The ability to have a dominant role proved significant for their mental and spiritual 
formation, and this is reflected in their perception about themselves, their self-representation. 
                                                
1 Habermas uses the term ‘Bürger’ which, depending on context, could be translated as bourgeois or citizen. For 
ease of use the current dissertation uses the term ‘bourgeois’. 
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Habermas is further challenged by claims that the formation of the discourse of the dominant 
authority naturally goes together with exclusionary mechanisms, including exclusion of 
prohibited words, the division of madness and the will to truth. This is especially true when 
groups play a critical and constitutive role in the formation of a given publicity. Use of words 
are critical as those taking part in the publicity do not share language with those who are of 
disapproving or protesting positions (Foucault, 1966). 
 
2.2. The importance of language 
 
Significance of words in creating sharp differences is argued further (Szabó, 2006). Szabó 
states that conceptual use of language contributes to the construction of political aliens. 
Development and use of differing language structures create and reinforce differences and 
create categories of differentiation or discrimination. Language structures turn supposed 
intentions into determined actions. Categorization through language structures results in 
social categorizations and provide interpretational framework for actions. It is also important 
to recognize that in modern societies, narratives describing significant differences in opinions, 
often use metaphors related to power: war, enemy, alien. Holders of politically contrasting 
views are described as political aliens, who can be dangerous, irrelevant or unknown. 
Perception of difference ensues actual differentiation: ‘the political alien is primarily a 
communication alien, who is alien because of our own perception and that defines our 
relation to them.’ (Szabó, 2006:30) 
 
Facts are especially important upon the study of a subject. Language forms the bridge 
between facts and the actual text corpus. Language as such therefore is an active agent in 
constructing social realities. The use of language has an impact on the interpretation of facts 
and consequently becomes part of the reevaluated, reinterpreted reality. Facts are therefore 
not a set of objective conditions, structures, institutions, events or activities but ‘an objective 
reality interpreted in the mind, the language and in the text. Empirical is a construction.’ 
(Szabó, 1998:282) 
 
Identification of meaning behind words is a core area for research. Critical discourse analysis 
examines what relationship exists between casual use of language and social determination 
(van Dijk 1991, Fairclough, 1995). It is argued that the element of power is essential in the 
analysis of the actual discourse. Actual discussions always include a power element therefore 
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they can not be approached irrespective of the social structures they represent. Verbal and 
written language needs to be analyzed in its social context. Claims prevail that the influence 
works in both directions: language is a representation of the social structures and language 
exerts strong effect on social structures. 
 
The previous argumentations imply that issues of potential discourse can be looked upon from 
two different perspectives. First, they can be the subjects of critical publicity about which 
individual members of society express their opinion, or they can be the subject of 
manipulative purposes and serve as a tool of socialization of issues. This possibility reinforces 
Habermas’ claim that the ‘sine qua non’ of public sphere is the strong division between state 
and society. However, as Habermas noted some sixty years ago, the emerging 
‘societalization’ of the state, parallel to the growing ‘stateification’ of society, gradually 
destroys the basis of the bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1962). The state becomes the 
master of publicity and turns it away of its original function. This results in the state 
becoming an active influencer of the societal affairs. Social affairs are not any more governed 
by their own bourgeoisie, but become influenced and then subordinated to interventionism. 
The re-politicized social sphere brings along the falling apart of the public sphere.  
 
As noted before, ‘corporatization’ of society can be added to its ‘stateification’. Through their 
advertising power, corporations become prime influencers of media editorial content. 
Corporate power structures become dominant and media develops into a representational tool 
for corporate interests and power structures. 
 
2.3. The changing nature of media 
 
More and more, media is looked upon as a possible object of investment where owners expect 
a yield on their investment (Habermas, 1962). First press and later media, including radio and 
television have become tools for economic activities, where advertisers place and pay for 
information they want to share with the public. Advertising content is decided by the 
advertisers, while editorial content is not left intact either. Editorial independence is 
jeopardized and, in many cases, violated by external influence. The most common factor 
behind dispensing pressure on editorial material is the consideration of interests of actual or 
potential advertisers. Influence on content damages editorial independence, and results in 
selecting, omitting, dedicating preference or disfavor to certain subjects. Along with financial 
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influence, political influence or simply the desire to please circles considered influential, 
might disorientate the original editorial intentions. 
 
The upset of separation and balance between state and society results in the decline of the 
liberal market economy. The growing dominance of the state and corporations consequently 
means that the dominant narrative is that of the state and corporations, the ‘stateification’ of 
the society becomes stronger, centralization and management of opinions takes the place of 
exchange of opinions. Consequently, ‘manufactured publicity’ gains a growing role primarily 
in the field of political communication but also in other areas of public discourse. No longer is 
the public sphere the ground of exchange of opinions, rather it is the terrain where constructed 
realities are formed. 
 
Editorial bias can also be noted and is supported by the existence of certain filters (Chomsky 
and Herman, 1988). It is argued that distortion of editorial content produces in fact a 
‘propaganda model’. Not only ownership and profit orientation of the media, but also 
privileged sourcing of media news, fear of retaliation and negative responses, as well as a 
perceived mission may all act as filters. Editorial independence becomes biased and media 
owners agree to distortion of reporting to protect claimed public interest and safeguard favors 
from government and corporations. 
 
Along this process the original position of media changed significantly. In its original form 
press served as a platform to share vital financial and business news. Information was 
essential for the actual planning and decision making of economic activities related to finance, 
trade and, later, industry. Access to information through press guaranteed ability to be part of 
economic activities and was essential in the maintaining of balance between supply and 
demand. Growth in influence of the state resulted in a manipulated public sphere taking the 
place of bourgeois public sphere. More and more, media serves as a means to maintain 
influence, instead of maintaining balance. 
 
Clear demarcation lines between public and private, and between state and society become 
blurred. The bourgeois public sphere transformed into a world marked by increasing 
interweaving of state and society, which ultimately resulted in the influx of the modern social 
welfare state. The transformation of the media implies that, instead of a series of independent 
units, it becomes an interwoven complex structure where the primary focus is on exercising 
influence and keeping power (Benson, 2009) 
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2.4. Content creation versus consumption 
 
It is argued if media content provides a fair reflection of discourse on a given topic. 
Ambiguities may conflict with common perceptions on how media agendas are formed. The 
agenda setting theory (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) claims that media does not simply have a 
descriptive role, but through the selection mechanism of deciding on what it covers, it takes 
an active role in actually forming reality. From tool of collecting pieces of information, the 
media message turns into a purposeful mechanism for influencing the public. Especially in 
the cases where the majority has no first hand experience, the media becomes a significant 
actor in the construction of reality. Furthermore, it is noted that editors themselves become 
active producers of news by accrediting news value to certain issues (Tamás, 2000, Török, 
2001). Juxtaposed, a contradiction appears between shrinking editorial independence due to 
influence of current and potential advertisers on the one hand, and the existing ability of 
media, through its editors, to determine and influence the media agenda and, consequently, 
the public sphere. It is challenged therefore if independence or dependence of editorial work 
prevails. 
 
However, this contradiction is superfluous, and it rather forms two sides of the coin. True, 
editorial content becomes strongly influenced by the existential considerations and, 
consequently, existential considerations therefore influence the public. Media keeps its ability 
to influence but moves in the direction of losing ability to create independent content. Media 
is not any more a forum of exchange of ‘critical publicity’ of the liberal market economy, but 
it rather serves as a tool for ‘manipulative publicity’.  
 
Fowler (1991) elaborates further by stating that ‘anything that is said or written about the 
world is articulated from a particular ideological position’ (Fowler, 1991:10). He claims that 
independent, unbiased, factual reporting does not exist; the social construction of news is 
based on bias and not on representation of facts. Identification of elements of bias can be 
noted by systematic semiotic analysis of text corpuses. This implies that media content 
analysis would have very limited use in the analysis of actual events, but it would rather give 
indication how actual events are represented and interpreted by the media. Credibility of 
reference media is achieved by building on ideas, values and beliefs that, often unconsciously, 
are carried by the audience of the given medium. This leads to outputs that build on abstract 
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propositions, which are ‘not necessarily stated, and are usually unquestioned, and which 
dominate the structure of presentation’ (Fowler, 1991:2). 
 
Selection mechanisms appear not only from the editorial perspective but also from the 
perspective of the public. According to the selective exposure theory (Klapper, 1949) the 
receiver regularly makes a choice between messages. People favor those messages that 
reinforce their existing opinion and avoid contradictory argumentations. Selection mechanism 
gives a tangible framework for text reality to become fact reality, external information 
consequently serves internal reinforcement. Selective exposure unfolds on three different 
levels. Selection of sources prioritizes between points of disseminating information. Members 
of the public tend to follow sources, the information from which is not contradictory to their 
existing beliefs. Selective perception refers to not noticing other types of information than 
those that match the existing frame of thinking. Exclusion mechanism automatically 
eliminates information that would contradict to existing beliefs or knowledge. Finally, 
selective retention refers to forgetting those pieces of information that may have contradicted 
to the prevailing line of thought.  
 
Argumentation of Klapper does not entail discussing preconditions of selective exposure. The 
current dissertation represents the standpoint that certain critical characteristics determine 
extent of individual selection mechanisms. The dissertation claims that in complex, multi-
layer issues selective exposure prevails more than in simple, linear issues. Also, personal 
experience is a decisive factor: selection exposure of information from media is more 
dominant where there is a lack of personal involvement and observations, than in those where 
first hand information is at hand. Furthermore, geographical and chronological distance also 
presumably increases the probability of selective exposure: the further away the given issue 
is, the more probable is the existence of selection mechanisms.  
 
Klapper could not take into account that changes in and the effects of technology that turn the 
direction of a prevailing trend. With the exponential growth of internet and social media, the 
vision of the global village (McLuhan, 1962) becomes reality, and a growing number and 
proportion of people can connect into and become part of issues of large geographical 
distance. 
 
Significant changes characterize the primary function of media. Along the commitment to 
inform, the need and the possibility for entertainment emerge. Sharing information and 
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providing entertainment results in a new structure of content that allows entertainment 
elements abound over commitment to inform. Members of the public sphere are not any more 
the creators of information, but become the consumers of traditional media content.  
 
2.5. Internet, social media and the parallel realities 
 
Developments in the field of media deconstruct the classic structure of the Habermasian 
public sphere of liberal democracy. It is argued (Thompson, 2008) that in the end of the 20th 
century, mass media, in its original concept, does not exist any longer. Instead of masses there 
are niche segments, where each group have their own specific communication needs and 
interests. Thompson (2008) furthermore believes that media are not any more devices to 
convey information but are instruments that create new forms of action, interaction and 
relations between individuals. Focus on the interactional characteristics of media support 
views that the rise of social media is not part of a linear development of the communication 
sphere, but is part of the reframing of the traditional media construction. While the principles 
of the Habermas’s theory on public sphere still bear their relevance on the criteria for a 
possible discourse on nuclear issues, however, the actual setting in which the original 
principles have been framed do not any longer seem relevant. 
 
The arrival and development of new communication technologies pose further significant 
challenges to the validity of classical public sphere theories (Heller and Rényi, 1996). 
Developments lead to transformation of role of information: with its power to provide 
organizational framework to society, information turns into a subject for both sociology and 
communication theory. Public sphere communication becomes a dominant force for 
delivering structure to society. 
 
In this process, the exponential growth of internet and social media brought along significant 
changes. New elements appear, where the base for content creation widens and consumerism 
of media content is less apparent. Social media and traditional media represent different 
characteristics, and the issue of authority needs to be reiterated. Exponential rise of the 
internet and social media brings the opportunity to create, share and indulge individual 
content. Proliferation of media creates new forum of public sphere, where the difference 
between creator and consumer of content becomes blurred. Segmentation of the public results 
in the emergence of issue related multiple publics, where various issues each have their own 
public, with their levels of interest, knowledge, awareness, and, often differing, views.  
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It can be stated that these changes exceed the characteristics of organic change and 
consequently result in the realization of new structures. The level of technological, 
organizational, cultural and social changes related to the emergence and exponential 
expansion of new media reaches the extent of categorization of “communication revolution” 
(Mansell, 2002). It can be argued that the effects of these changes contribute to the 
restructuring of the social systems, and drive the creation of a new societal structure system, 
that of the network society (Castells, 2009). The restructuration process of the society in the 
post-industrial stage is driven by the technological changes and primarily affects the 
communication processes. With communication having a close connection with the power 
relations, Castells claims that power relationships are the essence of a society and that “power 
relies on the control of communication, as counterpower depends on breaking through such 
control” (Castells, 2009:3). Technological changes and the development of network society 
bring fundamental changes to the media setup of the industrial society. Interactivity becomes 
primary in allowing, next to traditional media companies, individual actors to become creators 
and distributors of information. Mass self-communication is experienced in the proliferation 
of communication tools with which individual actors can diffuse information over the internet 
and through mobile technologies, resulting in a massive change in amount, content and 
structure of shared information. The newly emerged mass self-communication, together with 
interpersonal communication and mass communication are of complementary character and 
their coexistence is perceived in the future (Castells, 2009). Nevertheless, its role has had a 
strong impact on mass communication and resulted in the decrease of the influential power of 
mass communication.  
 
It is argued that the focus of Castells on the individual user can be extended from the human 
individual to the organizational individual as well. Organizations, including government, non-
governmental, for-profit and not-for-profit, each vie for access to communication with their 
specific groups and individuals. Consequently, mass self-communication, facilitates 
empowerment and creates the framework for all stakeholders of the nuclear issue to express 
views, share information and be part of the communication processes. 
 
Rise of social media gives place to a new kind of relationship between media and their 
consumer. Through actively taking part in the creation of the content a strong sense of 
ownership develops. Traditional media represents a one sided structure between a product and 
its consumers, where the only possibility to influence the media is through changing actual 
 22 
consumption habits. Social media blurs the line between ownership and consumption of the 
information. Through the involvement of generating content, actual ownership of the media is 
shared. Engagement results in a strong sense of attachment where members of the public 
express ownership over a given subject or topic. 
 
In spite of the changes, remarkable similarities still exist between traditional and social media. 
Members of the public are selective in what they read, watch or listen to, and accept those 
sources and contents that fit into their individual constructions of reality. Selection 
mechanisms prevail in social media: contribution and engagement is represented through the 
selection of social media sites and forums. Well into the internet era, choice of media 
continues to be representational about the actual member of the public. 
 
Consequently, any media as a source of information is selected upon its ability to reinforce 
one’s existing view. Reassurance is sought to reinforce oneself by avoiding mentally 
conflicting situations. The cognitive dissonance reduction theory (Festinger, 1957) underlines 
avoidance to review topics that would require disproportionate energy and time, all leading to 
creation of considerable inner tensions. This leads to the situation where members of the 
public look for sources of information and type of content that fit into their existing 
conceptual framework. Inclusion of new information is only possible as long as it does not 
break existing frameworks of beliefs and knowledge. This explains the phenomena that ‘first-
hand’ information gains considerable importance, and that social media, a symbol of first-
hand access to information becomes a trusted source of information. In the quest for search 
for information as well as entertainment, new media, including internet sources and social 
media, not only surpasses but may possibly totally replace traditional media in supplying 
information. 
 
Based on the combination of constructing reality and selective exposure theories, highly 
complex issues, lacking personal experience and consisting of various geographical and 
chronological layers, are interpreted through the construction of parallel realities. Parallel 
realities strive for the right to represent and gain dominant status in the interpretation of the 
same facts. As their objectives, parallel realities have construction of reality and the setting up 
of a valid interpretational framework.  
 
Parallel realities reflect significant phenomena of today’s world. With the complexity of 
subjects to examine, the micro-segmentation of the society and the considerably differing 
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needs and possibilities to access information, members of the society have differing views on 
a vast range of issues. In fact, across countries and cultures, people are strongly divided on 
issues that relate to their individual beliefs, values and aspirations. With the exception of 
certain meta-level issues and certain basic notions of ethics, morale, law and personal 
behavior, views on any given issue differ. As underlined before, this is especially true in the 
case of issues on which most members of the public do not have personal, first hand 
information, and that are distant in geographical or chronological terms. In case of lack of 
personal experience, views are generally in line with those who are in a similar group of the 
society, and usually reflect the interests of the group. Personal, individual value systems are 
of lower importance in these cases.  
 
Individual construction of reality is influenced by a range of factors. Physical distance, 
availability of first-hand experience, complexity of the issue are all factors that influence the 
emergence of ‘personal virtual worlds’. Nevertheless the majority of the public constructs 
reality based upon media information and cannot compare this reality with own direct 
experience. In the case of complex issues that include a flow of consequent events, where 
media comes across a modified role: it becomes selective, the balance between representation 
and interpretation of events changes, its role in independent representation grows and 
therefore actively takes part in the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966). 
 
2.6. Perceived risks and the public sphere 
 
Risk perception forms a dominant element of discourse. As the issue of safety gains 
prominence in modern societies, perceived risks are lighthouses that set directions for 
communication, interaction and behavior. Risk becomes the dominant descriptor of modern 
societies, therefore risk taking ability and risk perception are key factors in social survival and 
development (Beck, 1992, 2006). It is claimed that survival chances of societies could grow 
through focus on distribution of risk, instead of distribution of wealth. Arguably, 
interpretation of risks should not be limited to their technological and natural science 
contexts, but their social, cultural and political relevance should also be admitted. In order to 
handle ‘civilization costs’, science needs to go hand in hand with political, economic and 
ethical considerations. The concept of risk society builds on the notion of imagined 
communities (Anderson, 1983), as Beck identifies the factor of risk as the key bonding 
material of modern communities. This argumentation may challenge the notion of the 
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‘political alien’ (Szabó, 2006), where the discursive differentiation is the prime factor of 
distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Beck emphasizes the universal relevance of belonging to 
a society based on risk. Risk in his argumentation affects every single member of the society, 
while the concept of ‘political alienism‘ (Szabó, 2006) would imply that some people are 
affected by risk, while others are not.  
 
The dissertation offers unraveling of the contradiction, by suggesting that recognition of risk 
creates strengthened community feelings, while detailed interpretation of risk, with hiding its 
causes and results, reinforces inclination to differentiate and even antagonize differences. The 
latter approach lacks the acceptance of shared responsibility and shared consequences, where 
creation of risks as well as managing its consequences affects every member of the society. 
 
The interrelation between the issue of risk and alienism is demonstrated if groups of people 
start to become perceived as alien groups, the discourse on dangers and risks intensify. 
Alternatives are not any more discussed as possible actions with equal chances for decisions, 
but are differentiated as a clear choice between ‘our’ alternative that brings benefits and is in 
the interest of people with whom empathy is expressed, and ‘their’ alternative that brings 
dangers, risks and the outcome of which can not be foreseen. It may well be that ‘their’ 
alternative serves the interest of groups that are unclear or even diabolic. Consequent fear 
strengthens further the perception of fear from actors whose intentions are unknown and 
should be rightly feared of. Differentiation between the known and the alien further intensify 
developments of selection mechanisms and construction of parallel realities. 
 
The phenomenon of alienation extends beyond the socio-political dimension, and also 
includes the social - technological dimension. Contrast between safe and secure on the one 
hand, and unforeseen and full of risks on the other hand becomes an overriding concept for a 
wide range of technological areas, such as innovations, investments and development models. 
The social sphere of life is also dominated by preference to what is considered safe and 
secure: preference for choices in arts, sports, education, health care - or even political parties - 
is often based on the concept of safety and security. 
 
Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that perception of risk differs considerably. Experts and 
lay people have contradicting perceptions of risk (Vári, 2009). Experts base their risk 
assessment on correlations of statistical data, where numeric values provide probabilities of 
the occurrence of certain outcomes. Nonprofessionals base their judgment on contextual 
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characteristics, such as the level of fear and level of notoriety. Risk perception is relative and 
acceptance of risk depends primarily on the trust expressed to the institution managing the 
given risk (Slovic, 2000). 
 
Fears related to technological progress do not only relate to perceived risks. Awareness exists 
in the public that technological innovations always bear social consequences as well. 
Innovations therefore have both a social and a technological dimension. Contrast between 
these dimensions increase tension and contribute to reluctance to accept or adapt to 
technological innovations (Felt, Wynne, 2007) 
 
2.7. Public sphere in the 21st century 
 
Dahlberg (2005) argues that the Habermasian concept of the public sphere is built on the 
notion of rationality. Dahlberg furthermore claims that the fulfillment of certain criteria is 
needed in order to have a reasoned and balanced discourse. However, accommodating such 
discourses raises issues related to discrimination, because of exclusion of groups that are not 
able to participate in these exchanges of ideas.  
 
It is also discussed what criteria need to exist to have a reasoned discussion (Dahlberg, 2004). 
Six criteria are listed as ‘normative conditions of the idealized public sphere’ (Dahlberg, 
2004:13): 
 
- thematization and reasoned critique of problematic validity claims 
- the ability for reflexivity 
- ideal role taking 
- sincerity 
- formal and discursive equality 
- autonomy from state and corporate power. 
 
Existence of these criteria ensures reasoned argumentation and contributes to the value of 
communication. It needs to be challenged if the basic conditions of these criteria, restrain of 
power and acceptance of the dominance of common interest can actually prevail. More 
probably, with the ultimate goal of any communication having the ability to influence, the 
factor of power cannot be underestimated. Power means better access to information and to 
information channels, and the ability to represent interests more efficiently. The power 
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dimension is highlighted strongly in the concept of Critical Discourse Analysis (van Dijk, 
1989). CDA supports the notion that communication, power dimensions and the actual social 
setting have a strong interference. Consequently, it supports the previous thought that 
participation in the public sphere is limited and ability to take part is deprived of for many 
stakeholder groups. 
 
In conclusion, analysis of social discourse on a complex issue needs to be addressed through 
an interdisciplinary approach. Taking a broad perspective allows for interpretation of 
processes that lay in the background, and may give explanation to why and how certain things 
happen the way they do. Similarly, in order to interpret actual meaning of communication, 
analysis of narratives needs to address hidden layers. Along the analysis it needs be born in 
mind that actors all have agendas they would like to achieve, and to this end are ready to build 
on the systematic, often manipulative use of language and media. Spread of the internet may 
create certain limitations to manipulation efforts, however individual selective mechanisms 
will ensure that parallel realities continue to prevail. Selection mechanisms will exert 
influence on perception of risks and this, together with the prevailing notion of alienism, will 
further contribute to the fragmentation of the society. Signals warn that a fully fragmented 
society may not be able to handle issues of risk, and this poses threats to the future 
development of societies. 
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CHAPTER III: ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY 
IN HUNGARY 
 
3.1. Nuclear energy and the public sphere 
 
Various reasons explain why owners and operators of nuclear energy installations have 
always avoided being in the forefront of public discussions. First, in technological terms, a 
possible link exists between use of nuclear power for energy production and for military 
purpose. The belief is that the less the public knows about nuclear energy, the lower the 
chance is of military or of other adverse purpose abuse. This in itself is a major driver of 
limiting transparency of nuclear operations. Second, establishment of a nuclear power plant 
requires exceptionally high allocation and concentration of financial resources. Usually, due 
to its strategic significance and exceptional financial needs, the state plays a critical role in 
relation to nuclear installations. In light of the increased safety measures and consequent costs 
following the Fukushima accident, the role of state has become incremental on all levels: 
planning, preparation, financing, providing guarantees, control of building and operations, 
regulating supplies and waste management as well as training. Complex participation of the 
state, and especially the need of budgetary commitments, explains political implications of 
nuclear projects, and has a strong impetus to drip feed information. Finally, due to potential 
vulnerability, the creation, operations and maintenance of nuclear plants are issues for the 
security of the state. Full control needs to be exercised to ensure safety of operations and of 
people.  
 
Avoidance of being in the focus of public discussions has a further possible explanation. Due 
to the dominance of the political - technological narrative, it is ‘trendy’ to belong to an 
exclusive group. It comes naturally to make a distinction between those who have the 
knowledge about nuclear energy on the one hand, and those who are excluded of it, on the 
other hand. A knowledge ownership aristocracy emerges that bears strong resemblance in its 
behavior to those who, in political terms, consider everyone else ‘political aliens’. Knowledge 
and conviction in the superiority of technical and technological expertise generates a further 
limitation in transparency. This significantly contributes to the notion of nuclear energy being 
the most exclusive form of energy, the privilege of a selected group of countries, politicians 
and experts. 
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In line with the hypothesis of the dissertation it is believed that as the majority of the 
Hungarian society has no access or interest in first hand information on nuclear energy, any 
relevant discourse is based on constructed realities. Discourses themselves also contribute to 
the creation of social realities. Members of the public lack direct empirical knowledge, 
therefore reality is replaced by a constructed space, and defined primarily by claimed or 
authentic experts and decision makers. In the construction of virtual space for nuclear energy, 
media plays an essential role. 
 
As a consequent phenomenon, a significant part of the public has an opinion about the use of 
nuclear energy, without actually possessing information about the use of nuclear energy. 
Forming opinion without information reflects intensification of role of beliefs and attitudes. 
Opinion is not any longer formed based on information, but is a reproduction of the attitudes 
expressed towards other issues, such as the significance of technological and scientific 
advancement, attitude and confidence in the state, the general level of trust in institutions and 
people, as well as environmental awareness. 
 
In summary, social discourse about the use and future of nuclear energy is based on 
constructed realities, where, together with the indifference of the majority of the public, 
various actors shape their own interpretation of the situation. Their goal is to position 
themselves as competent experts, who are then in the position to influence and make the 
relevant decisions. It needs to be confirmed whether value preferences have a role in defining 
personal attitudes regarding the use of nuclear energy. The correlation between personal value 
choices and the views on nuclear energy are sought, to decide whether sympathizing with or 
refusal of the use of nuclear power is a reflection of personal value systems. 
 
Finally, it is also important to define who has an actual interest in the nuclear issue. The 
stakeholder concept defines stakeholders not only in the context of curiosity but, in view that 
the outcome, operations or possible successes and failures of the given organization or 
program have a strong influence on the given person or group. Stakeholders form a particular 
segment of the public who have the curiosity as well as the vested interest in the given 
subject. Differences in the interpretation of nuclear energy are a reflection of the complex 
structure of stakeholders. It may be argued that stakeholder groups today are a representation 
of the Habermasian citoyens (bourgeois, Bürger) of the liberal democracies. The significant 
difference may be that stakeholder groups have the vested interest in the issue with differing 
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levels of power to exercise influence on the given subject, while the citoyens used to be key 
influencers and actors in the field of social-political representation of interests. 
 
3.1.1. Paks Nuclear Power Plant and the public discourse 
 
In Hungary, the issue of nuclear energy2 has never been in the focus of public attention or 
center of debates. The four reactors of the Paks NPP were built between 1969-1987, in the 
period of a single party rule, with the last reactor being inaugurated a few years before the fall 
of the communist system in Hungary. In that period, discussions on strategic issues were not 
overtly encouraged from the dominant political powers. No element of the nuclear life cycle, 
development and operation of nuclear power plant or handling of the nuclear waste was ever 
the crystallization point of public debates or anti-nuclear movements. Even events like the 
Chernobyl disaster in 1986 did not bring to surface any differing views. The only notable 
exception relates to the issue of uranium mining in Hungary. In the Mecsek mountains3 
significant extraction of uranium deposits took place in the period 1957-1997, and reports 
depicting serious health hazards reached public awareness. Nevertheless due to the significant 
economic benefits on the one hand, and limited possibility for any dissent on the other hand, 
hardly any public questioning of the nuclear agenda appeared. 
 
The fall of the communist system in 1990 and the development of a parliamentary democracy 
prompted a new setup, where conflicts between or matching of differing interests could 
develop channels to reach public awareness. The issue of nuclear energy could have been one 
of the issues for widespread public discussion as nuclear energy is one of the alternatives for 
meeting the growing energy needs of the economy and society. Apart of the limitations 
described at the beginning of the chapter, no legal barriers emerged to stop public discussion 
on use of nuclear energy. As an issue with potentially contradictory aspects, there was a 
strong chance that it would become an area of intense discourse. 
 
However, for the first 20 years of parliamentary democracy and pluralistic media, it can be 
demonstrated that the issue of nuclear energy and the Paks NPP did not meet public interest. 
By and large, public sensitivity about nuclear issues did not prove significant. The only 
                                                
2 In Hungary, there are a number of further installations using nuclear energy, including a smaller reactor for 
educational purposes at the Budapest University of Technology, a research reactor for scientific purposes at the 
Hungarian Academy of Science as well as various health care institutions. During the dissertation, unless 
indicated differently, use of nuclear energy always refers to generation of electric power through nuclear energy 
at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant. 
3 Low laying mountain range in the Southern part of the country 
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exceptions to general disinterest were periods that followed nuclear accidents, catastrophes or 
breakdowns. The periods following the Paks NPP breakdown in 2003 and especially after the 
Fukushima accident in 2011 are notable exceptions to general disinterest (MKIK, 2011). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that even in this case reactions in terms of increased interest and 
higher refusal rate of nuclear energy, proved temporary only. 
 
3.1.2. Developments in the nuclear public sphere between 2010 and 2013 
 
In April 2009 the Hungarian Parliament brought a resolution to start preparatory steps for the 
expansion4 of the Paks NPP. A mandate was given to the government to start investigations, 
to become better positioned to come to a well-founded decision, once expansion is 
recommended. Following parliamentary elections in April 2010 the new government pursued 
the mandate granted by the previous parliament. 
 
The following chapters provide an overview on the nuclear discourse in Hungary in the period 
of 2010-2013. In the detailed study, special focus is directed on the planned expansion of the 
Paks NPP. Along the analysis, special attention is given to the followings: 
 
- identification of stakeholders and key actors 
- description of prevailing narratives 
- apperception of framing 
- recognition of argumentation structures 
- description of confrontation of narratives and development of discourse 
- use of communication tools 
- confirmation of existence of interpretational layers 
- providing feedback on the issue of manipulative public 
- signs of reasoning public vs. manufactured publicity 
 
In order to analyze the prevailing narratives in Hungary in the period 2010-2013, three layers 
of public discourse are analyzed. First, the study of texts of parliamentary debates aim at 
identifying dominant political narratives related to nuclear energy. Study of parliamentary 
discourse allows for an in-depth analysis and a thorough apprehension of individual 
argumentations, as well as overview how narratives may change over periods of time. Second, 
conflicting professional narratives are studied in texts and information related to the 
                                                
4 The dissertation distinguishes the expressions of extension and expansion. Extension is used for the life cycle 
extension of the existing reactors, while expansion refers to development through addition of new reactors.  
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proceedings of the Aarhus roundtable, a UN originated initiative, promoting transparency of 
issues with strong environmental relevance. Study of these texts allow for understanding 
relations and interaction between differing narratives of experts and representatives of 
stakeholders. Third, the analysis of media articles provides reflections on how the selection 
mechanism of media operates in the context of nuclear energy, and how differences in 
political orientation of media are represented in their perception about the nuclear agenda. 
Analysis of narratives appearing in the media facilitates in-width understanding of the topic, 
and an understanding of how the media implements its intermediary role. This part also 
includes a section on the role social media plays in the nuclear discourse. 
 
Synthesis of findings facilitates a comprehensive study of communication processes. 
Examination of various layers of public discourse not only allow for a detailed analysis and 
understanding of key players, narratives, arguments, perceptions of interpretation and 
characteristics of actual discourse, but grant better understanding of processes and how the 
interpretation of the issue of Paks NPP manifests longitudinal changes.  
 
3.2. Political discourse on nuclear energy 
 
Parliaments as institutions offer a formalized framework of political discussions. Analysis of 
parliamentary discussions provides opportunity for the study, identification and 
differentiation of argumentations and narratives of key political actors. Members of 
parliaments as well as political parties are representatives of different electorates and stand for 
the interests of a range of stakeholder groups. Consequently, analysis of these narratives gives 
insight to the various layers and dimensions of the nuclear issue. Access to parliamentary 
debates is granted through online streaming, live TV coverage and the availability of detailed 
transcripts of the parliamentary sessions. For the purpose of study of argumentations, 
transcripts of sessions dealing with nuclear energy have been examined. Overview of a period 
of over 3 years allowed elimination of overrepresentation of eventual factors and facilitated 
the diagnosis of overall trends. 
 
3.2.1. Methodology 
 
Plenary sessions of the Hungarian Parliament of the period October 2010 - December 2013 
have been analyzed, using the tools of content analysis. Transcripts of parliamentary plenary 
 32 
sessions5 were coded and analyzed to study nuclear energy related political discourse. All 
texts have been considered that included the term ‘nuclear energy’ or ‘nuclear’6. First, all 
transcripts were categorized according to their elements of identification. Identification 
allowed quantitative assessment of the political discourse through affirming critical numbers 
and distributions among speeches.  
 
Identification coding was done according to the following criteria: 
- name of MP 
- MP’s party affiliation 
- date of speech 
- law on the table 
 
Identification was followed by contextual analysis to specify the presence and meaning of 
nuclear energy related terms. Contextual analysis allowed for the qualitative assessment of the 
individual and the aggregate text corpuses.  
 
Contextual coding was built on the following criteria:  
 
- reference made in speech to the speeches of MPs from other parties 
- key words 
- key message 
- risks mentioned in relation to the expansion of the Paks NPP 
- benefits mentioned in relation to the expansion of the Paks NPP 
- specific reference implying relation to power 
 
3.2.2. Trends in addressing the nuclear issue 
 
Discussions on bills related to nuclear energy 
 
Deliberation on nuclear energy took place in relation to discussion of relevant bills, or 
through the raising of direct questions. Most frequently the contributions were made when a 
law, directly effecting and regulating nuclear issues, was discussed (Table 1). The 
                                                
5 Transcripts are available and researchable from the website of the Hungarian Parliament: 
http://parlament.hu/internet/plsql/internet_naplo 
6 In Hungarian these are covered by 2 distinct terms: atomenergia and nukleáris. Technical contributions, such 
as the speaker of the house reading out the name of the legislation before voting, were omitted. 
 33 
modification of the nuclear law in 3 stages, the modification of the energy law in 2 stages, the 
debate and elaboration of the national energy strategy and the reports of the safety aspects of 
the use of nuclear energy dominated the scene. A significantly lower number of comments 
were recorded when the social - environmental setting of nuclear energy was regulated. These 
references included the proposal on the public access to information in relation to the planned 
Paks expansion, modification of the law on mining, the national framework strategy on 
sustainable growth and the modification of law on spatial planning. 
 
name of law name of law in Hungarian registry 
number 
dates of 
discussion 
number of 
addresses 
modification of law on 
nuclear energy 
Az atomenergiáról szóló 1996. évi CXVI. 
törvény módosítása 
T/3288 6/8-27/2011 21 
energy strategy A nemzeti energiastratégiáról H/3839 9/13 - 
10/3/2011 
17 
report of safety of nuclear 
operations 
Az atomenergia 2009., 2010. és 2011. évi hazai 
alkalmazásának biztonságáról szóló jelentés 
elfogadásáról 
H/9949 2/12/2013 16 
law on nuclear energy Az atomenergiáról szóló 1996. évi CXVI. 
törvény módosításáról 
T/9235 11/27/12 10 
law on nuclear related 
issues 
Az atomenergiával, valamint az energetikával 
kapcsolatos egyes törvények módosításáról 
T/11101 11/27/12 9 
modification of certain 
energy related laws 
Egyes energetikai tárgyú törvények 
módosításáról 
T/13055 11/19/13 5 
public access to 
information on Paks 
expansion  
A paksi atomerőmű bővítésére vonatkozó 
döntésben való társadalmi részvételről és az 
előkészítéssel kapcsolatos adatok teljes 
nyilvánosságáról 
H/4114 11/14/11 4 
mining law A bányászatról szóló 1993. évi XLVIII. törvény 
módosításáról 
T/6589 4/11/112 4 
modification of certain 
energy related laws 
Egyes energetikai tárgyú törvények 
módosításáról 
T/9245 11/27 - 
12/09/12 
3 
strategy on sustainability A Nemzeti Fenntartható Fejlődés 
Keretstratégiáról 
H/9064 2/26/13 3 
modification of law on 
spatial planning 
Egyes törvények területrendezéssel összefüggő 
módosításáról 
T/12910 11/27/12 3 
energy law modification Az energetikai tárgyú törvények módosításáról T/1941 12/21/2010 2 
Table 1: Proposed acts related to nuclear energy 
 
Distribution of addresses 
 
In the parliamentary term studied, the following parties were represented in the Hungarian 
Parliament: Fidesz (government, conservative), KDNP (government, conservative), MSZP 
(opposition, socialist), Jobbik (opposition, national radical), LMP (opposition, green) and 
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PM7 (opposition, green). Representatives of each political party contributed (Table 2) to the 
parliamentary discourse on nuclear energy8. 
 
party number of addresses 
LMP 46 
Fidesz (government) 28 
Jobbik 26 
Fidesz 24 
MSZP 23 
KDNP 9 
KDNP (government) 4 
PM (independent) 2 
TOTAL 162 
     Table 2: Number of parliamentary addresses on nuclear energy 
Of the 162 addresses dealing with the issue of nuclear energy, MPs of LMP commented most 
frequently (46 occasions), followed by government representatives (28), Jobbik (26), Fidesz 
(24) and MSZP (23). Comments were most frequently made by Bernadett Szél (LMP, 18), 
Benedek Jávor (LMP), István Józsa (MSZP) and Lajos Kepli (Jobbik) (12 each), while other 
advocates included János Fónagy (government, Fidesz) and László Szilágyi (LMP) (11 each).  
 
name year of birth* profession*  party number of 
addresses 
critical / 
supportive to 
Paks expansion 
Bernadett Szél 1977 economist, sociologist LMP 18 C 
István Józsa 1953 engineer MSZP 12 S 
Benedek Jávor  1972 biologist LMP 12 C 
János Kepli 1978 engineer Jobbik 12 S 
János Fónagy 1942 lawyer gov. (Fidesz) 11 S 
László Szilágyi 1965 teacher LMP 11 C 
András Aradszki 1956 lawyer KDNP 7 S 
Pál Kovács  1963 engineer gov. (Fidesz) 7 S 
János Bencsik 1965 theologian, sociologist  Fidesz 7 S 
István Göndör 1950 economist MSZP 6 S 
Ferenc Tóth 1950 engineer Fidesz 5 S 
Zoltán Balczó 1958 engineer Jobbik 5 S 
János Bencsik**   government +4 C/S 
Benedek Jávor**    PM +2 C 
    113  
Table 3: MPs contributing most frequently to the discussion of nuclear issues 
* Source: www.parlament.hu 
** The 31 December 2011, State Secretary of Energy János Bencsik left his government position, while in 
February 2013 Benedek Jávor quit LMP and became co-founder of PM 
                                                
7 PM was formed In February 2013 following breakaway from LMP. Its deputies became independent members 
of the Hungarian Parliament, as members could not form faction. 
8 In the case of parties in the government, there is a separate indication to addresses made as the party 
representatives or delivered on behalf of the government. 
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Analysis of the background of frequent proponents of nuclear issues allow for certain 
observations. It is worthwhile noting that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and State Secretary of 
Environmental Protection Zoltán Illés touched upon the issue of nuclear energy only once 
each. The political discourse on nuclear energy is dominated by engineers (41 speeches of the 
119). The contribution of economists and sociologists is also significant, while the profession 
of biologists, teachers and theologians is represented by one person each. The politicians of 
LMP show a cohesive pattern of criticism in relation to nuclear energy. LMP politicians are 
younger than the average, are of social science, humanities, economics and natural science 
background, and it ranks the only active woman politician of the nuclear discourse. These 
numbers have indicative significance and do not grant authenticity to quantitative 
conclusions. However, based on these indications, women, younger people and those with 
social science, humanities, economics and natural science background seem more likely to 
express critical views against nuclear energy than the older generation, men and with 
engineering background. Furthermore, their critical approach is broader, and looks at the issue 
of nuclear energy not only from an operational perspective, but considers it to be part of a 
complex socio-environmental framework. 
 
Referencing in speaking 
 
Occurrences were then analyzed where MPs would make direct reference to a remark made 
by another member of the parliament. These references give indication on narratives changing 
into discourse, and reveal intention to turn monologues into dialogues or even streams of 
communication. LMP made 15 such references, followed by Jobbik (10) and MSZP (7), while 
government (3) and the Fidesz (2) lagged behind. Figures imply that referencing and reacting 
to allocutions is exercised by the opposition parties, the government and its parties rather 
refrain of referencing. This phenomena can presumably be the reflection of standard 
parliamentary structures, where governments and government parties see their role as 
presenters of bills while opposition parties need to reference and position themselves against 
the government and often against each other. 
 
Relevance of parliamentary speeches 
 
Relevance of parliamentary speeches was designated according to how direct their focus on 
the Paks expansion had been. All allocutions were categorized to see their direct relevance as 
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follows (Table 4). Category 3 includes contributions with a focus on the future of nuclear 
energy in Hungary and the planned expansion of the Paks NPP, category 2 refers to speeches 
with focus on other aspects of nuclear energy, while category 1 is attributed to those speeches 
that have remarks on nuclear energy but their focus in actually on another field.  
 
 1 2 3 TOTAL 
LMP 15 16 16 47 
Government (Fidesz) 8 13 7 28 
Jobbik 8 12 6 26 
Fidesz 7 12 5 24 
MSZP 11 8 4 23 
KDNP 1 5 2 8 
Government (KDNP) 1 1 2 4 
PM - 1 1 2 
TOTAL 51 68 43 162 
                  Table 4: Parliamentary addresses and their relevance to Paks development plans 
 
LMP shows an even distribution of speeches combining a direct and an indirect approach to 
the subject. Analysis of MSZP remarks show that socialist MPs touched nuclear related issues 
with indirect aspects, and showed limited relevance to the actual expansion of the Paks NPP. 
Fidesz, KDNP and Jobbik as well as the government preferred to discuss areas with nuclear 
relevance but that were not directly related to the future development plans of Paks NPP. 
LMP exploited every possible opportunity to tie to the nuclear issues and deal with every 
aspect. Their strategy can be characterized as that of full front approach. MSZP preferred not 
to be involved with direct nuclear development issues, therefore their strategy can be 
described as avoidance. Fidesz, KDNP and Jobbik as well as government opted for restraint 
from positioning development plans as the actual focus of nuclear issues. Their strategy can 
be described as a drive for re-direction. 
 
Immediate questions 
 
Immediate questions to the government are reflections of issues raised by members of the 
parliament and addressed to members of the government. During this period 4 questions were 
raised in relation to nuclear energy, all by politicians of LMP. These questions concerned 
planned action of government following the Fukushima disaster, results of the stress tests of 
the Paks NPP and the repeated enquiry into how much the recovery of the Paks breakdown in 
2003 did cost to Hungarian taxpayers. 
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3.2.3. Risk and benefit narratives in parliamentary addresses 
 
Distribution of risks 
 
In the context of analysis of risks and benefits the dominance of certain issues is notable.  
 
 cost safety lack of public 
control, 
information 
lack of 
sustainability 
past 
record 
leaves no 
space for 
renewables 
time and 
budget 
overruns 
long term 
handling of 
fuel rods 
TOTAL 
LMP 5 4 3 1 2 1 1 - 17 
Fidesz 1 - 1 1 - - - - 3 
Jobbik - 1 - - - - - 1 2 
TOTAL 6 5 4 2 2 1 1 1  
Table 5: Occurrences of mentions of nuclear related specific risks 
 
The issues of cost and the non-transparency of budgetary aspects, followed closely by the 
concerns of operational safety, dominate the discourse on risk (Table 5). The third significant 
area of concerns is related to issues of lack of public control, unclear role of authorities and 
questions related to information and management. Lack of sustainability and its negative 
effect on development of renewable energies are also mentioned. Risk perception and 
discourse is dominated by representatives of LMP, in fact its politicians were the only ones to 
present solely risk aspects. 2-2 speeches each from Fidesz and Jobbik MPs refer to risks as 
well as benefits, while MSZP and KDNP representatives as well as government members do 
not touch on risks at all. 
 
The analysis shows that the risk perception of LMP is especially high on the issue of costs, 
safety and on lack of information and public control. Past records, time and budget overruns 
as well as doubts about sustainability also prevail in their narrative. To a much lesser extent, 
Fidesz is aware of risks related to costs, lack of publicly available information and 
sustainability, while Jobbik mentions possible risks in relation to handling of used fuel rods 
and safety. LMP represents a comprehensive risk awareness model, where financial, 
managerial, environmental and political issues all abound. Fidesz represents selective risk 
perception where certain risk elements random appear. Jobbik has an occasional risk 
perception, related to its claimed expertise in technological aspects. Government members did 
not touch upon any of the risk elements in the given period. 
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Distribution of benefits 
 
 environment, 
clean energy 
cost, cost 
efficiency 
supply security, 
reliability 
safety, professional 
control 
energy 
independence 
TOTAL 
gov. (Fidesz) 4 3 3 3 - 13 
Jobbik 4 3 2 - - 9 
Fidesz 3 1 2 - 1 7 
MSZP 1 2 - 1 1 5 
KDNP - - - 1 - 1 
TOTAL 12 9 7 5 2  
Table 6: Occurrences of mentions of nuclear related specific benefits 
 
In terms of benefits, the dominant framing is provided by the positive effects on the 
environment through decarbonization, followed by cost efficiency and claimed low cost as 
well as security of energy supply (Table 6). Safety of operations and reduction of dependency 
on energy imports are also mentioned. Narratives on benefits are lead by Jobbik (7 mentions), 
followed by the government (5), Fidesz and MSZP (4 each). KDNP contributes with 1 
argument for the benefits, while LMP deputies do not touch on any benefit in their speeches. 
 
The benefit mapping of the parliamentary parties provides a relatively even spread. With the 
exception of LMP, all other parties mention certain or several benefit elements. With the 
highest number of mentions, government representatives emphasize benefits the most. Jobbik 
perceives environmental effects, cost factors and the energy supply security as main benefits. 
Fidesz and MSZP perceive an even distribution of various benefit factors. 
 
Overall assessment of risks and benefits 
 
In overall terms, mapping of risks or benefits provides an insight into the perception of 
nuclear energy of the given political party. Priority to risks reflects concern for the expanded 
use of nuclear energy, while focus on benefits underlines anticipated advantages. The balance 
of risks and benefits provide an indication if the actor is rather of supportive or of opposing 
views regarding the expansion plans of the Paks NPP. 
 
Risk theory elaborates that risk is an element measured by the probability and the impact of 
the occurrence of a given event. The higher the likelihood of the occurrence of an event to 
happen, and the higher the impact of the manifestation of the given event, the higher the 
consequent risk is. Risk relationship is expressed as: Risk = Impact x Probability.  
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Of the two factors, analysis of texts testifies that politicians primarily focus on impact and 
neglect assessment of probabilities. Supposedly, description of impacts serves communication 
and political purposes better than probabilities. Furthermore, emphasis on impact is in line 
with the overall approach that builds on the significance of the social-environmental factors. 
On the other hand, discussion on probabilities rather refers to occurrence of events directly 
related to operations. This observation on risk perception in political discourse supports the 
statement that within the risk formula in general terms, the impact of the danger, consisting of 
size and controllability is considered of bigger importance than the probability of its 
occurrence (Bauer, 1995). 
 
Balance of risks and benefits: the Risk Perception Index 
 
Introduction of an indicative figure can be drawn based on the difference in number of 
mentions of benefits and risks (Table 7).  
 
 government Jobbik MSZP Fidesz KDNP LMP 
risks 0 2 0 3 0 17 
benefits 13 9 5 7 1 0 
BALANCE (risks-benefits) -13 -7 -5 -4 -1 17 
Table 7: Balance of risks and benefits based on nuclear related parliamentary addresses 
 
The difference provides an indication of how actors see the relationship between risks and 
benefits and gives an insight into individual risk perceptions. The Risk Perception Index can 
also be perceived as an overall reflection of the attitude towards nuclear energy development 
plans. Bearing in mind that supporters tend to emphasize benefits over risks, while opponents 
usually put focus on risks ahead of benefits, the balance of benefits and risks gives 
manifestation to levels of support or dissent to the expansion project. Based on the Risk 
Perception Index, the most ardent supporter of the Paks expansion project is the government, 
followed by Jobbik, MSZP and Fidesz, while the only and notable critic of the nuclear project 
is LMP. 
 
It is argued that the continuous assessment of risk and benefit factors in the discourse would 
allow creation of a permanent Risk Perception Index. The index could accommodate 
longitudinal variations, emergence of new risk and benefit elements and consequently reflect 
risk awareness of the political actors. Responsible approach to the nuclear discourse would 
embrace this indicator that provides input to possible future actions. 
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3.2.4. Reference to power relations 
 
Once the differences between parties in relation to their nuclear energy attitudes are noted, it 
is worthwhile to identify language structures of political actors (Table 8). As a standard, 
political argumentation serves 2 purposes: it is an attempt to convince other parties and / or 
the government of an actual position, and, perhaps more importantly, it is a demonstration to 
the public sphere that the actual political party represents the interests of its electorate. 
Language structures may provide in-depth explanations for political standpoints regarding the 
issue of nuclear energy as well as views on actual electorates. 
 
name date quote (in English, with Hungarian original) category, 
reference to power 
relations 
János 
Bencsik, 
Fidesz (gov) 
6/8/11 we are speaking about the replacing of existing capacities, and not 
about expanding additional capacities / a meglévő paksi 
kapacitások kiváltása kapcsán tehát nem kapacitásbővítésről, 
hanem a meglévő kapacitások kiváltásáról beszélünk 
political turnpoint, 
first reframing of 
the issue 
István 
Göndör, 
MSZP 
6/8/11 let us create a positive public atmosphere and acceptance to the 
expansion / a bővítés lehetőségéhez teremtsünk megfelelő 
társadalmi hangulatot és elfogadottságot 
misuse of 
terminology on 
purpose 
Benedek 
Jávor, LMP 
11/14/11 it is democracy that needs debate, including potentially a 
referendum, and not the issue of nuclear energy or renewables / a 
demokratikus vita lehetőségét, ideértve adott esetben a 
népszavazás kiírását is ebben a kérdésben, az Országgyűlés nem a 
megújuló energiaforrások támogatása érdekében, nem az 
atomenergia elutasítása érdekében, hanem a demokrácia 
érdekében támogassa. 
reframing the issue 
at stake 
András 
Schiffer, 
LMP 
6/18/12 we should be grateful that they are not forcing in the nuclear law 
into here / még jó hogy nem az atomenergia törvényt 
szuszakolják ide be  
nuclear issue as a 
symbol 
László 
Szilágyi, 
LMP 
6/28/12 Instead of dealing with this, the government is dreaming about 
new nuclear reactors / Ahelyett, hogy a kormány ilyesmivel 
foglalkozna, új atomenergia-blokkokról álmodozik 
discrediting the 
other party, 
minimize and 
ridicule their 
activity 
Pál Völner, 
Fidesz (gov) 
11/19/12 One of the key guarantees of nuclear energy safety and social 
acceptance is the transparency of related activities / Az 
atomenergia-alkalmazás biztonságának és társadalmi 
elfogadottságának egyik legfontosabb garanciája a kapcsolódó 
tevékenységek átláthatósága. /  
hypocritical, trivial 
statement 
Bernadett 
Szél, LMP 
11/19/12  Fidesz does not understand, perhaps it lacks this in its inner 
culture, that inclusion of stakeholders is not something 
unnecessary, but rather the opposite / Fidesz nem érti, talán azért, 
mert ez a párt belső kultúrájából hiányzik, hogy az érintettek 
bevonása a döntésbe nem valami fölösleges dolog / 
discrediting the 
other party, 
generalization 
János 
Fónagy, 
Fidesz (gov) 
11/26/12 The new reactor(s) are fundamentally necessary for maintaining 
the energy security of the country / Az új atomerőművi blokk, 
illetve a blokkok létesítését az energiaellátás biztonsága 
szempontjából alapvetően szükségesnek tartjuk. 
political turnpoint 
Ferenc Tóth, 
Fidesz 
11/27/12 social control does guarantee safety / a társadalmi ellenőrzés 
garantálja a biztonságot 
hypocritical, trivial 
statement 
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Lajos Kepli, 
Jobbik 
11/27/12 It would be worthwhile to check, before taking to underground 
storage, what radioactivity these wastes have at all, after being 
stored for years on the surface / Érdemes volna egyébként 
visszamérni, mielőtt a végleges tárolóba leszállítják majd ezeket a 
hordókat, hogy mégis milyen radioaktivitással rendelkeznek 
jelenleg, miután már több éve a felszínen vannak tárolva 
minimization of 
problem, attack 
instead of defense 
István Józsa, 
MSZP 
11/27/12 MSZP supports life cycle extension / az MSZP támogatja az 
élettartam hosszabbítást 
political turnpoint, 
change in party 
policy 
János 
Bencsik, 
Fidesz 
2/12/13 nuclear safety needs to enjoy utmost priority against any other 
partial interests / a nukleáris biztonságnak minden egyéb 
részérdekkel szemben elsőbbséget kell élveznie 
political turnpoint, 
change of emphasis 
Lajos Kepli, 
Jobbik 
2/12/13 The iodium contamination did not cause any health hazard, and 
only served for the anti-nuclear circles and lobby to create panic 
for practically nothing / az Izotóp Kft. által kibocsátott 
jódszennyezés újabb alkalom volt az atomenergia- és a 
sugárzóanyag-felhasználást ellenző erőknek, köröknek, lobbinak, 
hogy pánikot keltsenek, úgy gondolom, hogy szinte feleslegesen. 
/ 
minimization of 
problem, attack 
instead of defense 
Bernadett 
Szél, LMP 
2/12/13 nuclear energy keeps generating problems that today’s economy 
and society can simply not handle / a nukleáris energia mint olyan 
a mai napig olyan problémákat termel ki, amellyel a jelenkor 
társadalma, gazdasága nem tud egyszerűen mit kezdeni /  
nuclear issue as a 
symbol 
Bernadett 
Szél, LMP 
2/12/13 Nuclear energy is present in every home / Az atomenergia 
minden otthonban jelen van /  
nuclear issue as a 
symbol 
Pál Völner, 
Fidesz (gov) 
6/3/13 If the distinguished MP had not only focused on keeping contact 
with the Austrian green party reps during the visit at Paks, 
obviously he could have received much more detailed pieces of 
information / Ha a képviselő úr a paksi látogatásán nem csak az 
osztrák zöldekkel tartotta volna a kapcsolatot, nyilván sokkal 
részletesebb információkat is kaphatott volna / 
discrediting the 
other person, 
speaking from up to 
down 
János 
Fónagy, 
Fidesz (gov) 
10/28/13 Dear Ms. MP, please relax (laughter and clapping from 
government benches). You will receive an answer to every 
rational question of yours. / Tisztelt Képviselő Asszony! Kérem, 
nyugodjon meg. (Derültség és taps a kormánypártok soraiban.) 
Minden racionális és megválaszolható kérdésére választ fog 
kapni. /  
discrediting the 
other person, 
speaking from up to 
down, sexism 
Viktor 
Orbán, 
Fidesz (gov) 
12/2/13 I am happy to tell you this, but if you had prepared before your 
speech, you could have read it for yourself / szívesen elmondom 
most önnek, de ha az interpellációja előtt utánanéz, akkor ezek 
mind olvashatók / 
discrediting the 
other person, 
speaking from up to 
down 
Table 8: Quotes with references to power relations 
 
Categories and reference to power relations prove that political language is in deed an 
important tool in creating reality. Framing of the issue of nuclear energy is accomplished 
through the use of specific language. Transcripts do not provide detailed information on 
emotions, but indications show that emotional content adds significant elements to the 
language construction. In the political context, language serves the purpose of winning over 
the other. Choice of words and manufacturing of sentences show self-confidence, awareness 
of self-importance and significance dedicated to the issue. In certain cases missionary 
commitment, careful distancing or even skepticism is felt. Whichever way it is, choice of 
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language is not accidental, it is a representation of the individual and group (party) attitude to 
the issue of nuclear energy. The common practice of referring in speeches to structural and 
personal relations between the speaker and the addressed person reinforces a number of 
concepts described earlier. It indicates that in the political nuclear discourse the concept of 
political alienism is notable, the interpretation of communication come across as an often 
unbalance relationship setting between the various actors, and that the description and up 
keeping of nuclear energy as an exclusive form of energy and science, requiring unique 
competencies and rights, all prevail. 
 
3.2.5. Conclusions of political discourse 
 
Analysis of political discourse on the nuclear agenda indicates diversity of strategies, 
narratives and uses of language. Detailed text analyses allow summarizing certain key 
findings.  
 
1. Individual narratives are influenced by personal background, party affiliation and perceived 
interests of the electorate. 
2. Communications is situational and content and style of narratives vary over time in 
relation to change in strategy, focus, situation and audience. 
3. Most of the addresses are monologues and do not refer to contributions from others. 
However, when reference is made, it is usually confrontational. Contrasting or even 
alienating is not only reflected in differing contents, but in construction of language and 
tone attempting to minimize, ridicule, discredit or speak down on someone. 
4. Nuclear communication strategies of political parties show three distinct approaches: full 
front approach to include nuclear aspects of all possible issues, avoidance that attempts not 
taking sides on this issue and re-direction that, within the nuclear framing, places focus on 
other aspects with the purpose to define the dominant framing and to rule the discourse. 
5. Each actor, including the political parties and the government has its distinct risk and 
benefit awareness footprint. Introduction of the Risk Perception Index facilitates having a 
clear indication of the dimension of these differences. 
6. Political nuclear discourse is based to a considerable extent on building and using power 
relations. Consequently it underlines our earlier hypotheses about the emphasis of the 
exclusivity of nuclear power and about its perception as a reflection of power of a country 
and its people. 
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3.3. Professional discourse on nuclear energy 
 
3.3.1. The Aarhus initiative 
 
The professional field offers an essential layer of interaction on nuclear energy. Exclusion of 
political players and of the media allows for a direct presentation of often conflicting views 
on nuclear energy. An important forum to challenge opinions on nuclear issues is the Aarhus 
roundtable. The actual analysis of the communication processes within the Aarhus roundtable 
was important to study actual direct exchange of information related to nuclear energy.  
 
The Aarhus roundtable started as a pan-European initiative to promote transparency of issues 
with strong environmental relevance. The Aarhus Convention, signed on 25 June, 1998, 
adopted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, establishes a set of rights 
for the public to become part of significant processes with environmental relevance. The three 
cornerstones of the convention include ‘everyone’s right to receive environmental 
information that is held by the authorities, the right to take part in environmental decision 
making and the right to review procedures to challenge public decisions not respecting the 
aforementioned rights’9. Usually these are described as the three access rights: to information, 
to participation and to justice. The national roundtables have the task to monitor, influence 
and report on the national execution of the Aarhus Convention. In short, the Aarhus 
roundtable ensures public participation in decision-making in the environmentally sensitive 
areas, most significantly the nuclear domain. 
 
The Aarhus roundtable in Hungary 
 
In many of the EU member countries, the nuclear energy is the field where access to 
environmental information is the most critical. In Hungary, among others, the activities of the 
national Aarhus roundtable focus on planned and existing nuclear projects (Table 9). Being 
the largest single investment with strong environmental relevance and with pressing need for 
transparency, the planned extension of the Paks NPP was put into the focus of the work of the 
Aarhus roundtable. The national Aarhus roundtable set as objectives the creation of guidelines 
and recommendations to improvement of communication processes, contribution to informed 
decision making as well as initiation, monitoring and interpretation of legislative changes. 
 
                                                
9 European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/, accessed 26 February 2014 
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In terms of work structure, meetings of involved actors serve for identification of issues, 
recognition of barriers, agreement on scope of work and on outcomes, as well as to discuss 
and approve drafted materials. Their usual schedule for convening is once a year. The 
working group acts as a body that provides input, and elaborates and presents proposals to the 
roundtable. Its usual schedule for meetings is 3-4 times a year. The structure encourages 
dialogue between members and between sides. Search of consensus is advocated by the 
decision-making procedures. However, unanimity poses risks by limiting flexibility and 
efficiency of group work. Equal voting rights reflect democratic principles, but hide 
differences between members in terms of informal and formal power, access to information, 
resources and actual weight. In 2009, the setup of the roundtable was created to accommodate 
all stakeholders. Members, upon application and acceptance, are designated to represent one 
of the following four sides: licensees, government and authorities, NGOs, academics and 
others. The four sides form equal right partners where decisions are made through unanimous 
decision making of the sides, while the vote of each side is based on the majority voice of its 
members (for list of members of roundtable and of working group see Annex 1). 
 
date event key decisions 
2009 working group is established to 
prepare setting up of Aarhus 
roundtable in Hungary 
 
7 May 
2010 
1st meeting of Aarhus roundtable •adopts mandate to act as a forum for dialogue 
•gives mandate to ad-hoc working group (WG) to 
elaborate documents for next convention of roundtable 
4 May 
2011 
2nd meeting of Aarhus roundtable •accepts Modus Operandi, defining operating and voting 
procedures 
•accepts Protocol on Access to Environmental 
Information 
•does not agree on Definition of Emissions and refers 
back to WG for further work 
•gives mandate to WG to elaborate Protocol for Public 
Participation in Authority Licensing Procedures  
12 Dec 
2013 
3rd meeting of Aarhus roundtable •accepts Paks 2 as new member 
•accepts Definition of Emissions 
•postpones acceptance of Protocol for Public 
Participation and seeks further input to existing proposal 
•seeks report and presentation from Paks 2 about 
planned expansion of Paks NPP 
20 Feb 
2014 
4th meeting of Aarhus roundtable •listens to presentation of CEO of Paks2 on 
technological aspects of Paks NPP expansion 
•NGOs announce suspension of membership in 
roundtable and in working group due to lack of access to 
actual relevant information 
Table 9: Key milestones of Aarhus roundtable development  
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3.3.2. Methodology 
 
To study deliberation within the roundtable, a specific approach was taken. The method of 
participant observation was adapted to study and interpret group dynamics, and to arrive at 
conclusions that comprise observations on attitudes related to the issue of nuclear energy and 
the public sphere. Participant observation is ‘the systematic description of events, behaviors, 
and artifacts in the social setting chosen for study’ (Marshall and Rossman, 1989:79). 
Observation allows to note nonverbal expressions and to determine directions, intentions and 
style of communication (Schmuck, 1997). As for the exact role of the observer, of four 
theoretical options, a position needs to be chosen (Gold, 1958): 
 
- complete participant, member of the group, actually hiding their role as observer 
- participant as observer, member of the group and everyone is aware of their role as 
researcher 
- observer as participant, not an actual member of the group however the group is aware of 
the observation activities of the researcher 
- complete observer, not a member of the group, in fact the group is not even aware of the 
presence or observation activities of the researcher. 
 
Clearly, there are limitations to the extent participant observation can be used. The observer 
faces the challenge of becoming attached, even emotionally involved with the actual subject 
of observation (Paul, 1953). Even tensions can be noted between observation and 
participation (Tedlock, 1991). A dilemma often encountered is clearly the descriptive nature 
of the findings matched against the need for ‘scientific results’ (Devereux, 1967). Participant 
observant faces possible ethical challenges as well. 
 
In the case of the Aarhus roundtable, for choice of role, limitations and specific conditions 
needed to be considered. Overall, the essence of participant observation was found suitable, as 
it allows the observer to become part of the group and acquire knowledge by being physically 
present in the process. In the current research, the author became involved in the roundtable 
as an invited moderator10 to ensure the smooth running of the operations of the roundtable. 
Upon introduction, the author expressed satisfaction of being involved and contributing to the 
efficient functioning of the process, but also sought agreement to use observations and the 
accessed information for research purpose. Members of the roundtable agreed, with the notion 
                                                
10 The author of the current dissertation was invited to take over the role of moderator following the retirement 
of the previous moderator 
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of underlining sensitive nature of certain elements of the information. However, in line with 
the mission of the roundtable, to provide access to environmental information, the agreement 
was granted. The actual role of the moderator in this process can best be described as the 
participant as observer: being an active member of the group while making clear their role as 
observer. 
 
During the planning of the observation process and for the designed outcome of the research 
certain limitations had to be considered: 
 
- the Aarhus roundtable is not a permanent social or business structure, members spend 
limited time with the group, while considerable time spans separate meetings  
- these limits induce that there is not much opportunity for development of a standard group 
culture or behavior patterns 
- instead of characteristic group patterns, it could be presumed that rather the differences 
dominate, where each member represents its organizational behaviors and attitude patterns 
- observation opportunities are limited in terms of occasion and time, and therefore limit 
validity of conclusion of observations11. Observations cannot be turned into quantitative 
statements with statistical validity but serve as indicative reflections. 
 
Observations were made by taking detailed notes, while conclusions are drawn based on 
personal notes and by official transcripts of meetings and official correspondence among 
roundtable members. During the participant observation process the author paid specific 
attention to maintain balance between three considerations. First, the actual moderation of the 
meetings as well as the interim processes had to be ensured. The moderator was in charge of 
facilitating the actual information flow, and maintaining consistency of operations and 
responsibilities also included securing involvement and engagement of attendees. Second, a 
range of non-rational factors had to be considered, and a set of skills, most importantly 
facilitator competencies, was needed to smoothen the process at certain critical points. The 
author pursued dialogue and actual decision-making as priorities in mind, even to the price of 
not having optimal decisions made. Finally, the author had to make sure that his involvement 
in actual discussions is limited, as this could have harmed both missions: curator of the 
moderation procedure and observer of the communication process. 
                                                
11 In the period April 2013 - December 2013 author took part in 1 roundtable meeting and 2 working group 
meetings. Transcripts of further 2 roundtable meetings and 1 working group meeting from the period May 2010 - 
March 2013 were also analyzed. Later, a further roundtable was attended in the additional period in February 
2014. 
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The key question for study was whether the forum actually meets the criteria ensuring 
transparency, and if participants interpret their role accordingly. The communication flow is 
analyzed by looking at various angles, and analyzing it from the different perspectives. 
 
3.3.3. Findings of research 
 
Findings are based on the qualitative and quantitative assessments of the individual 
interventions and of interactions made at the meetings on behalf of the representatives of the 
members. 
 
Communication roles  
 
Energiaklub and EMLA are the regular initiators of new directions of communication. The 
initiatives of these NGOs are twofold: they build on international best practices with the 
purpose of possible adaptation in Hungary, and they address establishing practices and 
procedures beyond those legally binding.  
Most frequent communication role: initiator 
Quote: ‘The task of the roundtable is to dissolve delays between actual development and flow 
of information’ - EMLA, 13 June 2013 
 
In most cases licensees, specifically MVM Hungarian Electricity Ltd., Paks NPP and Paks 2 
are addressed by these pieces of initiated communication. Reactions from licensees are often 
defensive, declining or diverting. In cases, reference is made to lack of delegated official 
responsibility, authorization and obligation, or to the existence of other, substituting tools. At 
the same time, licensees voice initiatives encouraging extended public use of existing 
channels to obtain information, and be part of standard processes for public involvement. 
Most frequent communication role: reactive and initiator 
Quote: ‘We can support those plans of the roundtable that do not disturb the business 
processes’ - MVM, 7 May, 2010 
 
Involvement of government and authority representatives show a diverse picture. Activity 
level of the Ministry of Rural Development is high, responding and even initiating procedural 
and content related measures is common, while the Ministry of National Development shows 
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indifference to these issues. Authorities show limited level of involvement and focus on 
individual core competencies and responsibilities. 
Most frequent communication role: observer 
Quote: ‘The ministry is in charge of the Aarhus Convention, and it has to prepare a thorough 
report on its status, incorporating results of public consultation.’ - Ministry of Rural 
Development, 13 June 2013 
 
The prime interest of representatives of the 4th side is to ensure smooth and effective 
operations of the roundtable. Communication focus is on process management, interpretation 
and possible accommodation of needs of the members. A significant part of communication 
actions are international context driven. 
Most frequent communication role: facilitator 
Quote: ‘This is the first roundtable initiative that aims at institutionalizing a new kind of 
dialogue’ - AJBH, 4 May 2011 
 
Intensity of involvement and identification with nuclear agenda 
 
Members of the working group turn to be the most active members of the roundtable. Most of 
the relevant - non-technical - interventions in the working group are from the following 
participants: AJBH, EMLA, Energiaklub, Ministry for Rural Development, MVM, Paks NPP, 
Paks 2 and REC. They are followed by interventions by the Hungarian Atomic Energy 
Authority and NAIH, while the Ministry of National Development and PURAM are the least 
active members of the working group. These levels of activities are also reflected in the 
roundtable addresses. The majority of the non-WG members of the roundtable only contribute 
to specific topics where they are specifically involved or addressed. Different members show 
varying levels of interest and involvement in the discussions, and express contrasting attitudes 
to the Paks development plans. Actual positions can be defined based on the number and 
content of interventions in the working group sessions and the roundtable discussions, 
reflected in the official transcripts of the meetings. Observation of contributions in meetings, 
together with the analysis of the texts of the transcripts provides both qualitative and 
quantitative data and consequently allows for a combined recording of individual behavior 
(see Annex 2). 
 
The graph depicting the intensity level and the identification level of Aarhus roundtable 
members reflects diversity. Nevertheless certain patterns can be noted where the highest 
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number of critical interventions regarding the Paks expansion plans are expressed by a group 
of NGOs. This group can be labeled as that of the active opponents. Activity of licensees 
show high number of supportive interventions, these companies form the group of active 
supporters. Finally, a distinct group is formed by certain government authorities and NGOs 
that are supportive to the nuclear development agenda or even have a responsibility in 
pursuing this however they contribute very little to the work of the roundtable: these are 
called the passive supporters.  
 
Communication style 
 
Words during the meetings and actual actions between meetings but outside of the framework 
of the Aarhus roundtable do not match. Two distinct spheres of relation exist, one that is 
Aarhus compatible, the other one that is actually followed during the actual operations 
between the individual organizations. The latter category includes delaying and even 
obstructing nuclear related communication processes, starting legal cases and omitting 
communication about important events and developments. Aarhus convention principles do 
not radiate to areas of everyday operation. The roundtable creates a structure where 
organizations compromise between reaching their actual agenda and the criteria of meeting 
transparency requirements. The communication style within the Aarhus roundtable does not 
become the standard in non-Aarhus related proceedings. This reflects the Aarhus roundtable 
becoming one of the possible tools of discourse that, in the end, does not have much 
contribution to the general nuclear discourse. Members consequently pursue achieving their 
objectives and communication needs beyond the frameworks of the roundtable. 
 
Findings related to content of work 
 
The international context of the Aarhus process is lost. The Hungarian developments are not 
in any way connected to international Aarhus developments. Reports from individual 
members taking part in the international initiatives are received with indifference. National 
and international layers of issues exist apart. Except for the few members involved 
specifically with the international level aspects, only the national level issues are of relevance 
for the participants of the Aarhus roundtable. Interpretation of legal relevance of the Aarhus 
concept is debated throughout. Repeatedly, members do not agree granting additional rights 
to participants than what is anyway obligatory through legal terms. The concept of ‘soft law’ 
that would actually aim at easing the interpretations and adapting existing law does not 
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become standard. Instead, its interpretation creates a division line between members: some 
consider the legal framework as something that can and should be filled up to its limits, while 
other members consider legal framework as strong limitations that mark the no touch zones.  
Behavior of the members of the roundtable represents their organizational behavior patterns 
and their organizational attitude to the institution of the roundtable. Different types of 
organizations can be identified in terms of hierarchical setup, communication style, focus on 
process or on output, working for expectations or working for objectives. Their roles define 
their attitudes. Members are not ready to make steps beyond what their organization is 
mandated for. 
 
Conflicting views on key issues 
 
Key issues seem stalemated due to conflicting views of members and the lack of actual 
dedication to find solutions. A selective list of examples includes: 
 
Interpretation of role of clients in environmental proceedings  
•NGOs: anyone could be a client of nuclear procedures as they have effects on the whole 
population 
•licensees, government: the law limits with reason the definition of clients, and there is no 
reason to go beyond those limits 
 
Existence of channels of public participation 
•licensees, government: NGOs and the public use a fraction of the existing channels for 
obtaining information, consequently there is no need to extend channels 
•NGOs: the existing channels are limited, they often include hard to match deadlines and 
criteria for participation, therefore they are insufficient 
 
Legality of Paks expansion plans 
•licensees, government: legal framework is ensured by Parliamentary resolutions and 
government decisions 
•NGOs, 4th side: existing legal framework is in many respects debatable regarding the 
expansion plans of the Paks NPP 
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Information access and confidentiality 
•licensees, government: all necessary information is available for grounded decisions. Some 
of the information are confidential and sensitive and, consequently, can not be shared with the 
public. 
•NGOs, 4th side: serious flaws prevail in the existence and availability of information. Public 
control presupposes access to sensitive information and information can not be denied 
referring to claimed business confidentiality. 
 
Perception of key considerations regarding the Paks expansion plan 
•licensees: technical, operational, managerial 
•NGOs: social, economic, ecological 
•government: energy political, economic 
•4th side: legal, environmental information technological 
 
3.3.4. Summary of findings 
 
Along all criteria, fundamental differences describe members (Table 10). Together with the 
‘weak’ coercive power of the Aarhus obligations, the potential for success is limited. 
 
Members take part in the process with substantially different agendas and commitments. Each 
member represents its own organizational interests and appreciates importance of Aarhus 
roundtable accordingly. Due to the model setup and the commitment of members, the 
roundtable serves as a forum of matching and conflicting argumentations. While certain 
agreements are reached, the significance of these agreements is debated by some members. 
Fundamental differences continue to exist. The forum allows for identification of differences, 
even if satisfactory solution in many cases is not reached.  
 
Analysis of the discourse shows that uneven access to information on nuclear issues results an 
unbalanced communication situation. Equality of members cannot be granted due to 
inequality in access to information. Monopoly of information contributes to the notion of 
exclusivity of nuclear energy and of information. While the Aarhus roundtable sets a 
framework for developing deliberation on nuclear energy in Hungary, however, due to its 
limitations it rather becomes the representation of limitations to the public space. 
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side own agenda core driver perception of law perception of 
roundtable 
perceived 
responsibility in Paks 
NPP development 
primary stakeholders 
served 
licensees ensure business 
rationality and satisfy 
business objectives 
•nuclear professional 
expertise 
•business rationale 
•ownership of project 
interpreted as the limits 
for transparency 
a necessary element to 
meet obligations 
related to involvement 
of the public 
operational, 
developmental, 
technical 
•owners 
•shareholders 
•government 
NGOs have environmental 
transparency prevail 
•ecological rationale 
•business rationale 
•transparency 
interpreted as 
framework that needs 
to be fully filled 
one of the tools to 
ensure transparency in 
environmental issues  
representation of public 
interest in monitoring, 
control and influence 
on processes 
•public 
•opponents 
•international 
organizations  
government represent national 
interests 
legality and rationality interpreted as its own 
domain of authority 
a task to be fulfilled for 
meeting international 
obligations 
execution of National 
Energy Strategy and 
creation of legal and 
financial framework 
for development 
•(voting) public 
•international 
organizations 
•European Union 
others provide and facilitate 
forum  
•process management 
•watchdog status 
interpreted as a 
structure which may 
need changes 
a possibility to match 
the mission of their 
individual institution 
with the success of the 
roundtable 
representation of 
principles over possible 
practical shortcuts 
•members of the 
roundtable 
•public 
•international 
organizations 
Table 10: Overview of Aarhus roundtable stakeholders
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3.4. Media discourse on nuclear energy 
 
In previous chapters it has been described that complex issues are prone to become subjects of 
parallel realities. Media has a significant role in the creation, maintaining and confirmation of 
constructed views. Due to possible differences in attitudes, expertise, dedication and possible 
political motivations of the various media, construction of differing narratives and parallel 
realities emerge. As a result, audiences face differing information, views and opinions of any 
given subject, without the actual possibility for matching these differing views. Parallel 
realities are compared to self-fulfilling prophecies, and media provides ammunition for 
further confirmation of claimed truth and accomplish reinforcement.  
 
The probability of individual creation of reality grows parallel to physical distance, the lack of 
first-hand experience and the complexity of the issue. In this respect the social environment of 
nuclear energy production strongly encourages development of personal interpretations, as 
usually the physical distance to an existing nuclear power plant is significant, and one does 
not have the chance to easily visit such an installation. The majority of individuals has never 
had and will never have first hand, direct experience with nuclear-based electricity 
production. Finally, the issue of nuclear power production is vastly complex, including a 
range of aspects and characteristics that are difficult to overview and understand. 
Consequently a special phenomenon occurs: double construction of reality. Members of the 
public construct their realities based on constructed realities of the media. By meeting the 
personal filter system of knowledge, beliefs and values of each individual, the constructed 
reality of the media results in the creation of countless realities. Each interpretation is 
different and is a representation of personal attitudes; consequently the number of parallel 
realities is countless. 
 
In relation to the effect of language in the construction of reality, it is important to underline 
that communication actors have an especially critical role. Through creation of the 
framework, and interpretation and construction of the reality they face the challenge of 
exceptional responsibility. Possible structures of relation and behavior are formed based on 
interpretation of actual events. Examples illustrate that the competence, attitude and 
responsibility of individual persons in the field of science and technology communication is 
critical. Not only do they need to have competencies in a technical field and in 
communication but they also need to maintain a balance regarding the quality and quantity of 
information they share with the public. Critical role of communication actors are 
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demonstrated in cases such as the 2010 Aquila earthquake in Italy, the 2011 Fukushima 
nuclear disaster in Japan, and health hazards and consequent actions related to the 2009 H1N1 
global flu epidemic.  
 
3.4.1. Methodology 
 
In order to gain overview of media involvement in the nuclear agenda, media content analysis 
was conducted. The analysis interpreted texts from a qualitative perspective as well as 
explored the proportions and emphases of the texts through a quantitative approach. 
Quantitative approach allows for handling of the material as a mass collection of data (Baker 
et al, 2008). The combined approach has allowed for an analysis that has its in-width and in-
depth scope as well. 
 
The media research evaluated the overall presence of the issue of nuclear energy in the media. 
The key word of analysis was that of ‘nuclear energy’ (atomenergia). Following the selection 
of the media, a coding system was set up, with the basic unit of coding being one article. Each 
article was coded according to a set of criteria: focus, general frame, tone, relevance, risks and 
benefits, keywords and identification of power relations. All articles have been evaluated that 
appeared in the given media and period and contained the indicated term. A well-trained 
coder helped inputting data, with their coding being controlled on a randomly selected basis. 
The coded data was then used to identify the communication patterns and strategies related to 
issue of nuclear energy.  
 
For qualitative media analysis, and in order to assess actual representation and 
communication of independent actors, a different methodology has been chosen. To study the 
personal elements of individual discourse, the method of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
(van Dijk, 1989) has been followed. CDA places research of dominance in the focus, and 
seeks identification of elements of social injustice. CDA shares the belief that every social 
interaction has an inherent power dimension, and analysis of elements exploring power shed 
light on the actual social setting. Most often, representation of power dimensions appears in 
individual interviews or quotes given by individuals. These quotes usually provide an insight 
into the individual’s reflection of the full situation, including the social, political and 
economic setting of the actual issue. Quotes serve as sources for the identification of signs of 
power, they reveal power relations and, consequently, indicate elements of political power or 
social injustice. Very often these quotes and interviews have a dual meaning, one that is 
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understandable at first sight, and another one that implies a hidden reference to other issues or 
other stakeholder groups. Furthermore, practitioners of CDA state that analyses cannot be 
done from a socially insensitive perspective, and that research needs to take sides. In their 
view, it is considered that CDA is a tool in the endeavor for a socially just structure, therefore 
CDA should assist those that suffer of social injustice. The qualitative media analysis of the 
current dissertation builds on the methodology of CDA, but firmly remains on the ground of 
objectivity. The current dissertation builds on the belief that the role of social sciences is to 
create a thorough representation of the world, where information is uncovered to facilitate 
grounded decision making. The current analysis consequently keeps distance of its subject, 
and is not motivated by the obligation to provide or judge value content of the elements of its 
subject.  
 
3.4.2. Focus and findings of the media analysis 
 
Content analysis of the online versions of the 4 leading daily political papers for 2 periods of 
3 months each12 was implemented. Splitting the 6 months into 2 distinct periods allowed for a 
better identification of trends, weighing of comparisons and avoidance of overrepresentation 
of individual events. Choosing online versions of the leading political dailies was driven by 
the hypothesis that due to editorial policies and practices selected mass media provides insight 
into how dominant political and professional narratives are represented in the public sphere. 
The priority of identification of dominant narratives overwrote other possibilities, including a 
wider choice of media or disfavor for classical mass media instead of social media. 
 
Analysis of texts has been primarily done from a socio-linguistic dimension. With focus on 
the actual content analysis of text corpuses, certain other aspects gained less attention. 
Usually, in the case of online media coverage, the graphic format is also of importance as it 
indicates how the newspaper or online page text is organized. With the upgrade of importance 
of visibility and in the era of ‘visual world’, the focus on the actual content and composition 
of texts neglect certain other aspects. Nevertheless, as visuality - in contrast to textuality - is 
often a matter of choice characteristic to the media, and much less to the given topic, therefore 
inclusion of graphical and visual solutions for this analysis has not been considered. 
                                                
12 The research covered all mentions of nuclear energy in the online versions of the 4 leading daily political 
papers in Hungary, in the period October 1 - December 31, 2012 and the period October 1 - December 31, 2013. 
Online versions of the following papers have been included: Magyar Hírlap online (magyarhirlap.hu, “mh.hu”), 
Magyar Nemzet online (mno.hu), Népszava online (nepszava.hu, “nsz.hu”) and Népszabadság online (nol.hu). 
Each of the media has a distinct political orientation, due to its ownership and editorial policy, briefly 
describable as: Magyar Hírlap (mh): right, conservative, Magyar Nemzet (mno): center right, conservative (close 
to government), Népszabadság (nol): center left, close to (main opposition) socialist party, Népszava (nsz): left 
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Characteristics such as typographical choices, drawings, cartoons, maps and further 
illustrations are fundamentally ignored. As for the actual position of the article on the page, 
which could be an indicator of its attributed importance, it is neglected on the basis of the 
media characteristic: online media are flexible in terms of page size and position as well as its 
changing, dynamic nature, and it does not allow for concluding objective and valid 
statements. The only exception where visuals are considered is the field of photos and their 
captions. In our assessment this gives an indication to what focus and importance is attributed 
to the article, and what the editorial attitude to the actual news content is.  
 
Articles were coded according to relevance of articles. The coding of relevance levels 
followed that in the analysis of political discourse. Three categories were set up as follows: 
relevance content categorization 
1 information and news related to developments in international political 
relations 
non-relevant 
2 Hungarian or international information and news on fields in close relation 
with use of nuclear energy for electricity production  
indirectly 
relevant 
3 Hungarian or international information and news directly related to the 
development of the Paks nuclear power plant 
directly relevant 
 
Distribution of articles 
 
Distribution of articles according to media and relevance are shown below (Table 11). 
relevance 2012 2012 total 
 mno mh nsz nol  
1 32 4 17 19 72 
2 15 4 3 8 30 
3 3 3 2 5 13 
TOTAL 50 11 22 32 115 
 2013 2013 total 
 mno mh nsz nol  
1 20 9 6 34 69 
2 16 10 5 6 37 
3 17 3 2 9 31 
TOTAL 53 22 13 49 137 
 2013 vs 2012 
 mno mh nsz nol TOTAL 
1 0.63 2.25 0.35 1.79 0.96 
2 1.07 2.50 1.67 0.75 1.23 
3 5.67 1.00 1.00 1.80 2.38 
TOTAL 1.06 2.00 0.59 1.53 1.19 
          Table 11: Distribution of relevant articles in years 2012 and 2013 by media and level of relevance 
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In the first period, October 1 - December 31, 2012, 115 articles mentioned the term ‘nuclear 
energy’ (atomenergia). Mno.hu dealt with this subject in 50, nol.hu in 32, nepszava.hu, 
(“nsz.hu”) in 22 and magyarhirlap.hu, (“mh.hu”) in 11 articles. In the 3 months period a daily 
average of 1,25 articles mentioned this issue. A year later, in the second period, a total of 137 
articles appeared, an increase of 19%. Of the four media, mno.hu published 53 and nol.hu 
published 49 articles, while nsz.hu produced 13 and mh.hu 22 articles. Daily average saw an 
increase to 1,49 articles/day. Nsz.hu shows disinterest in the issue while limited interest is 
reflected in the number of mh.hu articles. Actual presence of relevance 3 articles, dealing 
directly with the expansion of the Paks NPP, is only notable in nol.hu and mno.hu. Number of 
Paks development related articles almost doubled in nol.hu (from 5 to 9) and grew by more 
than 5 times (!), from 3 to 17 in mno.hu. In the latter case, being a media considered close to 
the actual government, a significant change in editorial policy on a strategic matter presumes 
agreement, or at least approval, from government.  
 
Meta-topics in the media 
 
Articles were analyzed according to the meta-topics covered. Each article was categorized 
into one of the meta-categories. In 2012 there were 9 such topics, while a year later this grew 
to 11. 
 
Political and economic aspects related to nuclear power dominate the narratives, with 71% of 
all articles over the two periods. A point of differentiation is that most articles with political 
content have an international focus, while articles about economic aspects of nuclear energy 
are mainly with Hungarian content. Further meta-topics that have considerable presence are 
safety, energy policy and energy strategy. Interestingly, certain key aspects of a nuclear 
energy discourse are either underrepresented, such as technology (6 articles) or science (3 
articles), or totally missing. Most notably, neither the environmental nor the possible moral 
aspects are discussed in these periods. 
 
In terms of the comparison of the 2 periods certain significant shifts are to be recorded (Table 
12). Most importantly the number of articles dealing with the economic aspects of nuclear 
energy increased over 6 times, from 7 to 44, and significant growth is detected in energy 
strategy, crime (primarily related to plutonium related theft cases in South Africa and Mexico) 
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and technology. A significant decrease in areas of safety, politics, energy policy and energy 
economy are also apparent.  
 
meta-topic 2012 2013 total change 2012 
to 2013 
politics 70 58 128 -12 
economy 7 44 51 +37 
safety 16 - 16 -16 
energy policy 10 2 12 -10 
energy strategy 4 8 12 +4 
crime 1 8 9 +7 
energy economy 5 2 7 -3 
technology - 6 6 +6 
disaster management - 4 4 +4 
science 1 2 3 +1 
economic policy - 2 2 +2 
sport - 1 1 +1 
art 1 - 1 -1 
TOTAL 115 137 252  
            Table 12: Distribution and change of relevant articles in 2012 and 2013 by meta-topic. 
 
Focus of articles 
 
It is worthwhile to check the geographical focus of articles (see Annex 3). In the period of 
2012, of the 115 articles 38 refer to the Hungarian aspects of nuclear energy, further 12 
mentions both international and Hungarian contexts, while 65 articles deal with international 
aspects only, reflecting an ‘international dominance’, with a distribution of 38/12/65 articles. 
International focus implies that there while many events take place internationally related to 
nuclear energy, they are primarily in the field of political developments and therefore do not 
really concern Hungary. Most of the articles with Hungarian focus cover the ‘everyday’, 
operational, business as usual aspect of nuclear energy. Politicians and experts speak about 
successes, results and finished projects, issues do not appear as problems to be solved. 5 
articles mention the planned expansion of the Paks plan, 2 of which analyze in detail that the 
decision whether to build further blocks is of significant importance to the future of Hungary.  
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In the period of 2013, significant changes can be noted. The distribution of the 137 articles, 
according to their contexts, split between Hungarian, mixed and international focus changes 
to 67/15/55, reflecting a sharp shift to issues with Hungarian relevance. The share of Hungary 
focused articles changes from 33% to 49%, and the center of media attention is on the actual 
development plans at the Paks site. The ‘focus Hungary’ change is in parallel to the previous 
description of the change in meta-topic, with the economic context becoming the dominant 
framing for Hungarian nuclear related issues. The number of articles dealing with actual Paks 
expansion plans, leaps from 5 to 20. General discussion on energy policy and safety issues is 
replaced by explicit expressions of will to execute the nuclear development strategy: 16 of the 
67 Hungary related articles mention nuclear strategy and steps related to it. Another 
‘newcomer’ on the list of topics for 2013 are the articles on international nuclear cooperation 
Hungary pursues with various countries. In these articles Hungary appears both as a receiver 
of nuclear technology as well as a country that is ready to share its experience and knowledge 
with others, for example with Vietnam on the operational aspects and with Japan on the safety 
aspects and disaster management.  
 
Absence of confrontational views and narratives 
 
Analysis of narratives indicates that confronting views generally do not appear within one 
article. Especially in the first period, there is no discourse between the various actors. The 
articles do not aim at convincing and do not contain argumentation, but rather they interpret 
the decisions for expansion of the plant as the only possible alternative or describe the 
possible counterarguments to development plans. Analysis of the actual situation takes place 
in one article, while in another one a representative of an organization of renewable energies 
explains that the government support given to nuclear development goes against their 
interests. NGOs or other public actors are not present in the articles with the exception of 2 
articles where a campaign of Greenpeace is mentioned. In 2012, in the articles, especially in 
the media that are close to the current government, the key words in relation to nuclear energy 
in Hungary are safety and security13 as well as independence. The mention of safety usually 
refers to experience learned from the Fukushima disaster and the reassurance that concerns in 
Hungary are unfounded. The term of security usually appears in the context of energy supply 
                                                
13 In Hungarian safety and security are covered with one word: biztonság and the context decides which meaning 
is valid.  
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security, of which the Paks power plant is the most important collateral. In 2013 a few articles 
appear, especially in nol.hu, where confronting views are presented. 
 
Emphasis of benefits in media close to the government match political discourse. The issue of 
nuclear energy is often represented as the guarantee of national independence. The energy 
situation of Hungary as well as the overall economic performance of the country relies on the 
ability to produce nuclear energy and this is closely related to independence. In two articles 
nuclear energy production appears as a significant element in the regional role of Hungary. A 
number of articles appear about various political protocol issues. 
 
Dominant and missing narratives 
 
The absence of certain topics also reflects editorial intentions. Communication research 
considers non-communication as part of communication (Buda, 1988). From the perspective 
of organizational communication and media communication, non-communication is an 
example of non-agenda setting. In 2012, in spite of the focus on international aspects, no 
mentions were made in the articles about the consultative referendum in Lithuania about the 
establishment of a nuclear plant, and the decision in Bulgaria to host a referendum about the 
future of the existing nuclear plant. With the exception of sporadically mentioning Japan and 
Germany, it was not indicated at all that in a number of countries nuclear energy plans were 
under revision or have been put to halt. 
 
Semantics of titles 
 
In a further area of research, the titles of articles have been analyzed and compared. Titles 
bear special significance. Their role is to attract readers’ attention, encourage reading of 
articles and to condense content of the article. Not only does a title orientate the reader, but it 
creates a certain relationship between journalist and reader, media and audience. 
 
Analysis of titles was done on relevance 3 articles, directly dealing with the development 
plans of the Paks NPP (Table 13). The 2012 period titles reflect descriptive purposes. Of the 
13 articles that have appeared in 2012 in category relevance 3, all titles are short factual 
statements, such as “The Russian giant would work with Hungarian subcontractors”14 or 
                                                
14 “Magyar beszállítókkal dolgozna az orosz óriás”, mno.hu, 6 December 2012 
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“Visegrád countries in nuclear swing”15. All of them inform objectively and reflect keeping 
certain distance of recent developments or planned steps. There is only one article that breaks 
this rule and raises a question: “Nuclear for us?”16 
 
 2012 
media support 
development 
criticize 
development 
neutral 
mno 1 0 2 
mh 1 0 2 
nsz 0 0 2 
nol 0 1 4 
TOTAL 2 1 10 
 2013 
 support 
development 
criticize 
development 
neutral 
mno 10 1 6 
mh 1 0 2 
nsz 0 1 1 
nol 0 7 2 
TOTAL 11 9 11 
       Table 13: Meaning of titles of articles 
 
However, the 2013 period titles represent a significant change to the previous practice. The 
number of relevance 3 articles more than doubles (from 13 to 31). The informative role of 
titles diminishes, and headlines serve to provide clear orientation to the reader. The distance 
keeping tradition disappears and titles urge readers to take their side. Instead of reflection of 
content of article, the titles start to mirror editorial opinions and intentions. Instead of 
descriptive statements, the majority of titles imply a normative reference or a value judgment. 
A number of the titles openly build on the perceived risks or benefits of the Paks expansion. 
Study of titles indicates that contrasting opinions crystallize between mno.hu and nol.hu. Mno 
appears as a consistent supporter of the development plan, underlining the benefits of the 
project. Of the 17 title of mno, 10 clearly match moving from information to orientation, from 
a descriptive to a normative model. Titles include “A growing number recognize benefits of 
nuclear energy”17, “Our country would benefit of nuclear energy”18 and “Nuclear energy is 
popular”19 openly take a standpoint on the issue. Further six titles are neutral in their 
statements and there is one article voicing dissonance: “Varró: New Paks is not a gift”20. 
                                                
15 “Nukleáris lendületben a visegrádiak”, nol.hu, 12 October 2012 
16 “Atomot nekünk?”, nol.hu, 4 November, 2012 
17 Egyre többen felismerik az atomenergia előnyeit, mno.hu, 31 October, 2013 
18 Jól járna hazánk a paksi bővítéssel, mno.hu, 12 November, 2013 
19 Népszerű az atomenergia, mno.hu, 11 November, 2013 
20 Varró: Nem ajándék az új Paks, mno.hu, 12 December, 2013 
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Similarly, the editorial content of nol, reflected in choice of titles, give proof of committed 
journalism. Of the 9 articles in the 2013 period, 7 bear a title that reflect the editors’ open 
criticism of the project, and highlight risks rather than benefits. “Paks electricity will be 
expensive”21, “Nuclear power is of the past”22, “Prearranged deal behind Paks expansion”23 
and “Low cost electricity from most expensive source?”24  
 
Titles emphasizing risks and benefits crystallize a new function of media, which is to 
mobilize supporters and help them voice their concerns. This practice reflects the observation 
that manufactured communication often builds on existing fears, perceptions, observations or 
findings of surveys (Habermas, 1962). Consequently, media functions as voice of supporters 
or of opponents of the project. 
 
In summary, there is a distinct difference between the two periods. In 2012, titles reflected a 
mainly neutral standpoint where the self-representation of media is that of conveying 
information. It envisions itself as a technical tool, a medium that serves the public by sharing 
information. In 2013 a drastic change can be observed. Titles reflect an orienting function 
where they clearly implicate the audience what standpoint to take. The titles openly build on 
key claimed values and emphasize benefits or the risks of the expansion plan. Presumably, 
media taking sides is a reflection of growing political and economic pressures. 
 
Descriptive vs. normative approach 
 
A further consideration for analysis is offered by the identification of value content of the full 
articles, not only their titles. An attempt has been made during the analysis of the discourse to 
make a distinction between fact based descriptive and value laden normative articles. 
Descriptive articles can be characterized as factual and having a descriptive content. The 
statements of the articles are based on verifiable factors and analyze the subject of the article 
as something that is true or false. Normative articles include a reference or a clear expression 
about how the ideal situation would or rather should like. Usually they contain a comparison 
between the actual, factual situation and a certain standard. The standard is often expressed by 
someone with authority building on expertise or position. The normative approach matches 
facts with ideals, often contains prescriptive elements, and looks at the subject of the article 
                                                
21 Drága lesz a paksi áram, nol.hu, 31 October, 2013 
22 Az atomenergia a múlt, nol.hu, 4 November, 2013 
23 “Lezsírozott” paksi bővítés, nol.hu, 20 December, 2013 
24 Olcsó áram a legdrágább forrásból? nol.hu, 19 October, 2013 
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from the perspective of justifiability, not verifiability. On a theoretical basis, the normative 
articles bear a value judgment, and therefore carry a comparison towards an imaginary 
criteria, while descriptive articles give coverage of a certain event or process. The two 
approaches mark a distinct difference in that descriptive articles serve as source of 
information while normative articles tend to provide orientation. Articles of both periods were 
studied in order to identify their character of being value laden or fact driven. However, due 
to a significant number or articles showing both descriptive and normative characters, this 
analysis did not lead to conclusive findings. 
 
3.4.3. Assessment of risks and benefits: systemic versus linear thinking 
 
In 2012, of the topical subjects in international media, none of the Hungarian articles cover 
the context of the issue of financing nuclear constructions, the risks of delayed projects and 
the issue of interrelation between politics, nuclear industry and supervisory authorities, all of 
which are frequently discussed internationally. All this contributes to the creation of a reality 
where the decision making process, the construction and the operation of the extended nuclear 
plant follow a simple, linear model and is not challenged by risks noted internationally. 
 
A key element in discourse about nuclear energy is weighing the risks and benefits of use of 
nuclear energy for electricity generation. Summary of the two periods show that of all risks, 
financial considerations, including high costs, impossibility of financing and the risks of fixed 
price system are most apparent. The group of risks regarding democracy, including lack of 
information on the project, concerns about illegitimate decision-making and deadlines 
straining legality, follows this. Risks about compatibility with democracy appear in 
opposition media only. Risk factors related to safety considerations are also significantly 
present, while political risks of growing political dependency and environmental risks are 
mentioned only sporadically. 
 
As for benefits, relevant articles underline the cost efficiency of electricity generation through 
nuclear power, turning it into the single most dominant benefit factor. In the listing of 
benefits, the safety aspects of nuclear energy follow, while the reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions underlines the environmental benefits. In a few further cases, security of energy 
supply and the economic aspects of reduced need for imports together with the creation of 
employment are mentioned. 
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 risks benefits 
finance high cost of investment, 
financing difficulties 
16 low cost of operations 27 
compatibility with 
democracy 
lack of information, illegal 
decisions, deadlines 
10 - - 
safety Fukushima prove that nuclear 
energy is not safe 
8 especially after Fukushima it is 
highly safe 
16 
independence strong political dependency 4 reduction of energy dependence 4 
environment nuclear waste, radiation risks 3 total decarbonization 11 
energy supply - - supply security 5 
effect on the economy - - creation of employment 1 
  41  64 
    Table 14: Mapping of risks and benefits based on the relevant articles 
 
Matching argumentation of risks and benefits implies interesting conclusions. It is clear 
(Table 14) that several aspects of nuclear energy bear risk as well as benefit factors. Both sets 
of arguments claim cost factors are on their side. A more detailed analysis sheds light on 
different interpretations of the costs aspect. Critics of nuclear energy highlight the 
uncertainties related to the costs of investments of a new NPP, the consequent financing 
difficulties and the material repercussions of increased, post-Fukushima safety measures. 
Protagonists of nuclear energy underline low operational costs of existing NPPs as a key 
benefit. The difference reflects different approaches: the critical viewpoint is expressed rather 
of a broader platform with looking at the more complete NPP life cycle, while the supportive 
approach focuses on the actual operational aspects of an existing NPP. 
 
The issue of safety is also addressed both as a risk and a benefit factor. In both 
argumentations, Fukushima plays a critical role: in critics it is a proof of the ongoing risk 
factors linked immanently to nuclear energy, while for supporters post-Fukushima safety 
measures are key arguments in discourse on benefits. The topic of independence is also 
perceived differently: the core of the difference between risk and benefit communication is if 
political independence is also included or the focus in on energy independence. In general its 
is also disputed if energy independence and political independence are interrelated or not. 
 
Argumentation of benefits, such as low cost of operations, decarbonization of the 
environment, secure supply of energy, economic benefits all reflect linear thinking. In this 
approach the focus is on the existing, operational nuclear power plant. It is claimed that the 
benefits of these operations clearly outweigh the potential risks. Linear thinking does not 
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dedicate considerations to actual and virtual costs of creation of an operational nuclear power 
plant, appreciation of social costs are non-existent. Benefits are weighed without actually 
looking at the price-tag: what the country, the society or the environment needs to cover in 
terms of opportunity cost, what it needs to put in or give up in order to have an operational 
nuclear power plant.  
 
Argumentation about risks reflects a more complex approach. Here the argumentation is not 
linear, but reflects interdependency of issues. The aspects of financial costs, risks of lacking 
proper information, concerns about political dependency, handling of nuclear waste, the issue 
of timing, and deadlines as well as concerns of illegitimate decision making all reflect an 
interdisciplinary, systemic thinking. Opponents claim that it is not enough to look at an 
actually operational NPP, but the whole process needs to be considered to weigh all risk 
factors, starting with the planning, building and operation of the plant to the handling of the 
uranium and of nuclear waste. Critics of opponents claim that most of the risk factors are 
raised by people who are not competent in the field of nuclear energy, and their observations 
are to a large extent irrelevant. The strong differences between linear thinking and system 
based thinking result inability to enter into discourse, and this gives explanation to why 
parallel realities exist in this field as well. 
 
Differences in risk - benefit perceptions indicate contrasting structures of thinking. 
Differences can be best described by matching the elements of linear and systemic thinking:  
 
aspects linear thinking systemic thinking 
framing technology environment 
function operation creation 
perception of systems closed open 
key value stability flexibility 
model role regulatory adaptive 
sensitivity to: benefits risks 
   Table 15: Indicative differences between structures of thinking 
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3.4.4. Analysis of interviews 
 
In a further piece of research a semantic comparison was made of two leading opinion 
interviews about the expansion of the Paks nuclear plant25. Mr. Pál Kovács, Energy Secretary 
of the Hungarian government and Mr. András Perger, senior energy advisor of NGO 
Energiaklub were interviewed after each other by the leading Hungarian news site, Origo26. 
 
Criticism might be raised that two individual media interviews do not provide proper ground 
for socio-linguistic comparisons, challenging if interviews interpreted and published by a 
medium can be considered as unbiased representations of the thoughts and words of the 
interviewees at all. Arguably, there is a chance that the intentions of the media itself are also 
represented in the interview, through the questions, the reactions and the style of the journalist 
as well as the actual editing of text. Respecting the distinct difference between sociological 
and media interviews, the validity of the current comparison is granted by the practice of 
interviewees in Hungary to check interview texts before appearing in print. Both persons have 
had a considerable experience in expressing their thoughts and in articulating their 
argumentations. Bearing in mind furthermore that the two interviews have been prepared 
within a short interval and by the same journalist, the interviews can be considered as 
comparable representations of the interviewees’ thoughts and words. Of course, having 
controlled texts at hand and the filter of editorial contribution, certain layers of sociological 
and psychological contexts may have been lost. Bearing in mind that both persons had the 
chance to review the article before going to ‘print’, the articles are suitable to identify certain 
framing structures and patterns of thinking and communication. Though media interviews 
may partially reflect editorial intentions and therefore cannot be considered as full right 
sociological interviews (Solt, 1978, 1998), they are still appropriate for semantic analysis. 
 
Semantic analysis of text corpuses 
 
In the first step, the analysis focused on the identification of key words and categories. Use of 
keywords represents a conscious effort on behalf on an interviewee to emphasize or de-
                                                
25 The semantic analysis is based on the author’s conference presentation: Safety Narrative of Nuclear Energy at 
the Conference of the Culture of Safety and Defence, Gödöllő, 14 June, 2013 and the publication of the text The 
Issue of Safety and Security in the Discourse about Nuclear Energy in Hungary in the consequent conference e-
book, available at: http://psharg.com/Preview/gabor-sarlos.html 
26 Mr Pál Kovács: 20 November, 2011: http://www.origo.hu/idojaras/20111220-nem-engedheti-meg-maganak-
az-atomstopot-magyarorszag-interju-a.html, Hungary can not afford a stop to nuclear energy” and Mr. András 
Perger: 5 December 2011: http://www.origo.hu/idojaras/20111205-olyan-lesz-paks-ii-mint-a-negyes-metro-
interju.html, Paks 2 will be like underground line 4” 
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emphasize certain aspects, while categories provide an indication of the framing effort of the 
given person. Consequently, identification of patterns of thoughts and indications to areas of 
focus can be pinpointed. Content analysis based on search and analysis of key words and 
assigning categories to groups of key words allow for identification of patterns and structures 
of texts and thoughts. However, this method does not allow for context analysis, and has 
limited validity for identification of emotional content of interviews. Nevertheless content 
analysis is suitable for identification of focus areas, exploration of internal balance structures 
and identification of patterns of argumentation.  
 
Through the content analysis, 16 categories (Table 16, 17) and 55 key words have been 
recognized. Of the 7 most important categories, the first 2 categories - data and energy - are 
identical in the 2 interviews. Differences appear in the next categories where in the case of 
Mr. Kovács the expressions related to future (including frequent use of words like future, 
development and will be) as well as values (with words such as stability, security, 
responsibility and clean energy) are also among the most frequently used terms. In the case of 
Mr. Perger, the terms within the framework of finances (including frequent reference to costs, 
billion, forint, dollar and risk) and Paks are also among the most frequently used terms.  
 
Mr. Pál Kovács  Mr. András Perger 
data 51 data 76 
energy 37 energy 52 
economy  25 economy 41 
nuclear energy 16 nuclear energy 38 
electricity production 14 finances 32 
future 13 electricity production 25 
values 13 Paks 13 
  Table 16: Top categories in the two interviews 
 
In order to determine how significant the actual difference is in use of key words a 
comparison of number of mentions was made. To this end, coverage of each category was 
compared in numeric terms, and a ratio of occurrence of key words related to the various 
categories in the 2 interviews was calculated.  
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 Perger / Kovács Kovács / Perger ratio 
finances 32 / 4  8 
nuclear energy 41 / 16  2.56 
accident 10 / 4  2.5 
electricity production 25 / 14  1.79 
official procedure 7 / 0  x 
.......    
environment  0 / 6 x 
values  3 / 13 4.33 
traditional energy sources  3 / 6 2 
future  10 / 13 1.3 
        Table 17: Comparison of occurrence of categories of key words (top 9 of 16 categories) 
 
Higher values indicate differences with higher significance. Categories that are more in the 
focus form a better basis of comparison than those where a relatively low number of mentions 
are made. The most significant differences are noted in 9 categories out of 16. In the interview 
of Mr. Perger primarily the issue of finances gain strong dominance against the other 
interview, while nuclear energy, accident, electricity production and official procedure also 
show a significantly higher presence than in the other interview. As for the narrative of Mr. 
Kovács, key words in the categories of environment and values outnumber significantly 
similar usage from Mr. Perger, while reference to traditional energy sources and to future 
also outnumber comparative use of similar expressions. 
 
An in-depth analysis compared use of key words. The objective has been to identify what the 
key words for the two interviews were and what difference existed in the frequency of use of 
these words. Comparison has shown that the 6 most frequently used words are identical in the 
2 interviews: 0, power plant, nuclear, electricity, reactor, 1, Paks, will be and market. For Mr. 
Kovács, capacity and consumer have been the next most frequently used words, while for Mr. 
Perger these are need and cost. Consequently, the most frequently used 11-11 words do not 
indicate significant differences, and show that the overall language reconstruction of reality in 
the 2 interviews is similar. A notable difference can be remarked by looking at key words, 
that have been used significantly more often by one or the other person, and the analysis of 
the category where these words belong. Comparison of categories of words showed that 
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among the words Mr. Perger used most often compared to Mr. Kovács, 3 belong to economy, 
2 to nuclear energy and 1 each to accident and finances. Mr Kovács used relatively more 
frequently the framing of values (2 words) and 1 word each from the categories of traditional 
sources of energy, international aspects, environment and the future.  
 
In consequence it may be noted that the general construction of reality is similar for the 2 
interviews. Differences can be noted in terms of argumentation, where Mr. Kovács builds on 
a general framing with principles, plans and values in the focus. With each of these aspects 
the benefits are emphasized. This argumentation can be characterized as macro-framing 
where the emphasis is on the overall direction, and for sharing and looking for understanding 
and support in terms of values, beliefs, attitudes. The general approach of Mr. Perger 
indicates a concrete, factual and often number-oriented framing. The argumentation goes for 
the clarification of details, where the balance regarding the development plans speaks clearly 
against development, and where risks are more visible than the benefits. His argumentation 
can be described as a micro-framing where the focus is on the controversies of the actual 
development plan.  
 
Analysis of emotional content 
 
A further attempt focused on widening the analysis by including the study of occurrence of 
morphemes (Table 18). The dissertation focuses on identification of morphemes that would 
add meaning beyond that actual text, and give indication about the relationship between the 
person and the topic. The analysis focused on 4 distinct elements: punctuations, prepositions 
of time, negatives and the possessive case.  
 
category morphemes occurrence 
András Perger 
occurrence  
Pál Kovács 
ratio  
punctuation ? 8 4 2 
 “ “ 3 0 x 
preposition of time already 25 6 4.16 
 yet 13 4 3.25 
negatives no, not 41 9 4.55 
 nor, neither 12 3 4 
possessive case our’ 21 32 1.52 
       Table 18: Selected morphemes identified in the interviews 
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Differences in use of morphemes may lead to important conclusions. With the exception of 
the possessive case, usage of all other morphemes is significantly more frequent with Mr. 
Perger. Punctuations, prepositions of time and negatives used by Mr. Perger may indicate 
uncertainty, reference to doubts or reflections of emotional influence, all in relation to the 
topic of nuclear development plans. All this adds further dimensions to the interview, and 
encourages the reader to continue contemplating on the issue. The complexity of 
identification with the issue is closely related to the complex nature of the actual issue. Mr. 
Kovács has a significantly higher ratio of use of possessive case in the interview. This may be 
an indication of strong identification with the subject of the interview: the actual development 
plans. However, full assessment of differences in attitudes requires consideration of the 
different positions of the two persons. Expectations towards a government representative 
leave a limited space to voice personal opinion, while the expert of a NGO may have a wider 
choice of tools at hand. Nevertheless differences are apparent and need to be considered when 
the effectiveness of the interviews is considered. 
 
 
Conclusions on differences 
 
In conclusion it may be noted that in the narrative of András Perger on the use of nuclear 
energy and expansion of Paks NPP is an issue for rational discourse, where facts form the 
basis for forming opinions and making decisions. These aspects are primarily dominant in the 
fields related to economics, the financial aspects as well as the safety and security angles of 
the planned project. In his narrative, use of nuclear energy is not a symbol of sublime ideals, 
but a matter of weighing choices among alternatives for future energy use. All this is 
differentiated further through the analysis of morphemes that disclose the thoughts of a person 
raising doubts about the project and the participation of the state within that. 
 
The narrative of Pál Kovács ephasizes that the project in fact means one of the most important 
tasks of the present and the future. Based on values and the future prospects, the use of 
nuclear power and the expansion of the Paks NPP is a task meriting the highest level of 
responsibility. Such tasks can only be executed if acceptance of the highest principles is 
respected. In this complex situation, use of nuclear energy is not simply the most important 
element of electricity production, but is a symbol of a modern, stable and safe country. 
Nuclear power in itself is a symbol of the creative energies and productive capacities of the 
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country. Analysis of morphemes reinforce that the issue is in the hands of person who is 
personally convinced and committed to this cause. 
 
3.4.5. Nuclear discourse in the social media  
 
Analysis of the media discourse cannot be complete without the inclusion of social media. 
Technological changes, as described in the literature review, sparked restructuration of 
previous communication processes, dominated by mass media and interpersonal 
communication. The emergence of “mass self-communication” grants equal chance for 
access to communication channels to all actors. Differences in power, influence, availability 
of resources, domination and background become counterbalanced through the possibility to 
become active communicators. The previous barriers of the agenda-setting practice of the 
editors or the lack of access to mass media become surmountable through direct reach to the 
individuals. 
 
Brief overview of the digital communication scene and the social media27 signal that 
individual websites, blogs and social media do cover various aspects of the nuclear issue, 
however, due to lack of interactivity, limited scope for actual involvement is offered.  
 
Overview of Google rankings 
 
Google ranking records the status of how various websites appear in the Google search 
engine. This approach has been widely accepted as an indication of the relative importance of 
digital references. Actual results are the result of a range of factors, including frequency of 
how the relevant websites have been previously accessed, as well as the result of search 
engine optimization activities of the actual organization. Regardless of the factors, Google 
ranking shows the actual order how websites appear in relation to a specific subject. As user 
statistics prove that internet surfers tend to find information on the first few pages, therefore 
the order of the rankings is critical for accessibility to the users. The search focused on 
rankings in relation to the term “nuclear energy” (atomenergia) and involved recording of the 
findings in two distinct moments: 23 October, 2013 and 29 January, 2014. The rankings show 
what the most important points for sources of information on nuclear energy were in those 2 
moments. To identify actual mass self-communication actors, the news sites and the resources 
of the traditional mass media companies were excluded from the rankings. 
                                                
27 Detailed analysis of the social media landscape on nuclear energy extends the frames of the current 
dissertation.  
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 category∗ address comment rank 
23 Oct 
2013 
rank 
 29 Jan 
2014 
wikipedia other http://hu.wikipedia.org/wik
i/Atomenergia 
 1 1 
Országos 
Atomenergia 
Hivatal 
government http://www.haea.gov.hu/w
eb/v3/OAHPortal.nsf/web?
OpenAgent 
government agency, 
sub page of 
government site 
2 3 
Atomenergiainfo licensee, 
international 
atomenergiainfo.hu official site of Rosatom 
in Hungary  
3 2 
KFKI other http://www.aeki.kfki.hu/ Atomic Energy 
Research Institute of 
the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences 
4 9 
Euratom licensee, 
international 
http://europa.eu/legislation
_summaries/energy/nuclea
r_energy/index_hu.htm 
EU agency 5 6 
BME Nukleáris 
Technikai Intézet 
other http://www.reak.bme.hu/ Nuclear Technology 
Institute of the 
Budapest Technical 
University 
6 7 
Klímabarát 
Települések 
Szövetsége 
NGO http://klimabarat.hu/node/2
48 
Association of Friends 
of Climate 
7 4 
Energiakaland licensee, 
international 
http://www.energiakaland.
hu/energiavaros/energiafor
rasok/atomenergia 
EOn educational site 
for students and 
teachers 
8 - (34) 
International 
Atomic Energy 
Agency 
licensee, 
international 
http://www.iaea.org/ only in English 9 8 
atomenergia.lap.h
u 
other  site collection for all 
information related to 
nuclear energy 
10 - 
NEFMI government http://www.kormany.hu/hu
/nemzeti-fejlesztesi-
miniszterium/klima-es-
energiaugyi-
allamtitkarsag/felelossegi-
teruletek/atomenergia 
site of Ministry of 
National Resources, in 
charge of development 
of nuclear energy in 
Hungary 
- 5 
Fenntartható 
Atomenergia 
Technológia 
Platform 
other http://faetp.kfki.hu/ new association, 
Platform for 
Sustainable Nuclear 
Energy, close to the 
technical university 
- 10 
  ....    
Virtuális 
Ökomúzeum 
other http://www.zoldmuzeum.h
u/atomenergia-pro-es-
kontra 
listing argumentation 
for and against the use 
of nuclear energy 
27 40 
Alternatív Energia other http://www.alternativenerg
ia.hu/ 
overview of all 
alternative energy 
sources with 
mentioning of nuclear 
energy 
33 - 
Greenpeace NGO http://archiv.greenpeace.hu
/kampany/energia_es_klim
a/atomenergia 
global NGO, highly 
critical 
36 49 
Paksi atomerőmű licensee http://www.atomeromu.hu/
atomenergia-jelen-es-jovo 
Paks NPP 42 - 
Table 19: Google ranking of sites dealing with nuclear energy 
∗ Categories match grouping of Aarhus members: government, licensee, NGO and other. 
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In the top 10 ranking in October (Table 19), 1 site represented the government, 4 belonged to 
the category of licensees (but none of them were the actual Hungarian licensees), 1 NGO was 
ranked and 4 were representing other institutions. Beside the site collection, the further 3 
“others” were all sites related to the sphere of nuclear research and education. The absence of 
the actual stakeholders is apparent on the list. The government, directly in charge of nuclear 
development is not present, none of the NGOs present and active in the Aarhus roundtable are 
visible and the actual Hungarian licensees are not represented either. Without a more 
structured analysis it can still be stated that the active presence on the internet, in the form of 
an informational website, is not among the listed tools of communication for the actors of the 
nuclear issue. 
 
The January “snapshot” slightly modifies the picture, with the Ministry in charge of nuclear 
development becoming an active player and with the appearance of another pro-nuclear 
association, linked to the Technical University, appearing on the list of top 10 sites. As a point 
of interest, the site of Greenpeace, the prime green NGO opposing nuclear development, 
ranks 36 and the actual licensee of the Hungarian nuclear development, the Paks nuclear 
power plant ranks 42 on the October 2013 listings. A number of hypotheses would need to be 
tested to understand the reason of the rankings. Neglect from both the owners and the visitors 
of websites, which could be primarily in charge of disseminating information on the nuclear 
development agenda, is obvious. Owners of sites could raise ranking through search engine 
optimization, while visitors could give a lift to sites through frequent visits and use as prime 
source of information on nuclear matters. Presumably, actors use other channels of 
communication to obtain information and to reach their publics.  
 
Overview of You Tube activities 
 
You Tube activity provide on indication on the intensity of visual mass self-communication. 
Films generated by individual users and shared over You Tube provide information with the 
public. Number of viewers, likes and shares provide an indication on the “popularity” of an 
actual upload. Originally starting as an entertainment channel, its role is continuously 
growing in the field of education, organizational communication, sharing of scientific and 
technological information. The channel becomes a model for the merger of sharing 
information and entertainment, infotainment.  
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title description author date statistics on views 
A nukleáris energia nem 
megoldás - m1 
/ Nuclear energy is no solution 
Roundtable on 
MTV1, leading 
Hungarian public 
broadcast channel 
Greenpeace 28 Mar 
2010 
1088 views 
Jump in viewership: 
following March 2011 
(Fukushima disaster), 
July 2012 and January 
2014 (Paks deal) 
Áramlat 
/ Stream 
Public competition 
organized for 
promotion of 
nuclear energy 
Atomenergia
info 
31 Oct 
2013 
1005 
statistics not available 
Láncreakció - Varró László - Az 
atomenergia és a megújuló 
energiaforrások... 
/ Chain reaction - Nuclear 
energy and the renewables, 
László Varró 
Conference 
organized on risks 
and use of nuclear 
energy 
Ökopolisz 
Foundation 
23 Dec 
2011 
807 
Jumps:  
January, March, October 
2012 
June 2013 
Messiás...az én 40%-om - 
Atomenergiainfo 
 / Messiah - my 40% 
Public competition 
organized for 
promotion of 
nuclear energy 
Atomenergia
info 
31 Oct 
2013 
461 
statistics not available 
Atomenergia az én 40%-om! -- 
Atomenergiainfo 
 / Nuclear energy is my 40% 
Public competition 
organized for 
promotion of 
nuclear energy 
Atomenergia
info 
31 Oct 
2013 
412 
Jump at beginning but no 
visitor since December 
2013 
Szél Bernadett a paksi erőmű 
bővítéséről, az atomenergia 
problematikájáról 
 / MP Bernadett Szél about the 
extension of Paks NPP 
interview about 
risks of nuclear 
energy 
Ökopolisz 
Foundation 
29 Aug 
2011 
370 
jump:  
February, June 2012 
October 2013 
Láncreakció - Jávor Benedek - 
Az atomenergia és a megújuló 
energiaforrások... 
 / Chain reaction- Nuclear 
energy and the renewables, MP 
Benedek Jávor  
Summary of lecture 
at Conference 
organized on risks 
and use of nuclear 
energy 
Ökopolisz 
Foundation 
23 Dec 
2011 
358 
Jumps:  
April, October 2012 
June 2013 
Vége az olcsó atomenergia 
korszakának! 
  / End of low cost nuclear era 
Summary of the 
whole conference 
on the energy 
systems of the 
future 
Ökopolisz 
Foundation 
28 Oct 
2012 
358 
no significant jump 
Aszódi Attila: Atomenergia - 
objektív kockázat, szubjektív 
félelem 
 Nuclear energy - objective 
risks, subjective fears 
Interview with head 
of nuclear research 
lab of the Technical 
University 
TudásPressz 
/ Science 
Cafe 
15 Feb 
2013 
346 
Jumps: 
December 2013 
January 2014 
Az atomenergia és a civil 
szervezetek 
 / Nuclear energy and the civil 
society  
Summary of a 
roundtable at the 
Syposium of the 
Hungarian Nuclear 
Society 
Laszlo Palos 1 Dec 
2011 
286 
no significant jump 
Table 20: Top 10 You Tube films on key word “atomenergia” (nuclear energy) 
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The search focused on You Tube rankings in relation to the term “nuclear energy” 
(atomenergia) and involved recording of the findings the 29 January, 2014. The rankings 
show what the most frequently visited films were nuclear energy were at that moment. To 
identify actual mass self-communication actors, the news sites and the resources of the 
traditional mass media companies were excluded from the ranking. The 29 January 2014 the 
top 10 films on You Tube, researched through the key word “nuclear energy”, included four 
films of Ökopolisz, the green foundation close to the LMP, dominate the list, followed by 
three films of Atomenergiainfo, the Hungarian language site of Rosatom (Table 20). The 4 
films are recorded speeches at various conferences and events, while the latter 3 are 
promotional films for a nuclear awareness competition. The promotion of nuclear energy is 
further supported with one film each by the Hungarian Nuclear Society and the Technology 
University, while the critical views are expressed by the film of Greenpeace, attracting 
actually the highest number of viewers. The listing shows that the government and the 
Hungarian licensees did not produce any film to land on the list of top hits. The uneven 
presence on You Tube shows that certain actors consider this channel as a significant entry 
point to the public sphere, while for others it remains an unexplored area. 
 
In overall terms, it can be noted that based on the analysis of two selected digital channels, 
mass self-communication, the use of digital information sharing technologies from the sides 
of the government and the companies in charge of Paks expansion, is neglected. NGOs do not 
seem to be using these tools systematically. The most significant presence can be noted from 
educational and scientific organizations as well as international licensees. A detailed content 
analysis could provide indication about to what extent are those information influenced by 
perceived interest of the actors to gain a role in the future development of nuclear energy in 
Hungary. Digital communication is underutilized in the nuclear discourse which may indicate 
a lack of genuine discourse on this issue. 
 
3.4.6. Summary of findings 
 
In summary it can be noted that due to the complex nature of the issue, the public relies on the 
media to create an understanding about the nuclear issue. Media subsequently plays a critical 
role in the construction of reality of nuclear energy and the Paks expansion. Media analysis 
indicates that in longitudinal comparison, media is becoming increasingly alert about nuclear 
issues. While earlier the media was dominated by internationally related and politically 
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dominated news, by the end of 2013 focus turns towards Hungarian relevance and economic 
aspects of nuclear development. Risk and benefit perception often refers to the same 
characteristics of nuclear energy, differences can be rather attributed to variation in 
approaches. Most of the media continues to address the nuclear agenda from a linear 
approach, however a growing number of articles reflect an aspiration for systemic thinking. 
An increasing number of articles accommodate contradictory views, and titles of articles tend 
to reflect strong orienting and normative purposes. Differences in approaches of the various 
actors can be noted in individual interviews as well as in the attitude and familiarity of use of 
social media. Narratives appearing in the media show strong elements of similarity with 
trends in political and professional narratives. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE ROLE OF OPINION POLLS IN INFLUENCING 
THE NUCLEAR DISCOURSE 
 
Analysis of the political, professional and media discourse lead to the conclusion that these 
layers have limited ability to represent the nuclear discourse, therefore are able to convey only 
fragmented elements of the reality. Access to political discourse is difficult due to the 
reconstruction of its language and its secluded nature, the layer of professional discourse is 
limited to the frameworks of a dedicated series of meetings and discussions, while the media 
discourse seems to reflect a manufactured construction of the reality. This leads the search to 
identify further layers of discourse where the narratives related to the nuclear discourse can be 
revealed. In order to identify what further areas can be of interest, notable are the fields that 
serve as reference areas for the discussions in the previous three layers. In order to gain 
credibility, political and professional actors as well as media articles often refer to two further 
areas: opinion polls and international nuclear discourses. This strategy falls in line with a 
common communication practice of accrediting value and credibility through ‘credibility 
transfer’, where the credibility of external parties are used to reinforce value of own 
statements.  
 
Findings of opinion polls on nuclear energy may provide clear identification of narratives. 
Devising manufactured publicity is based on an in-depth knowledge of the public that one 
wants to reach. Ownership of factual information is simply scratching the surface. Instead, 
surveys focus on exploration of fears, beliefs, values, associations and attitudes related to a 
given topic. The more the issue focuses on the individual, the more it focuses on exploring the 
deeply hidden aspects. The use of the results of surveys is characterized by how the findings 
of facts are used in the course of actual deliberation, and become elements of discourse 
themselves. It can be argued that research tools may become items of manipulation on their 
own right. For the direct assessment of the views of the public the opinion polls need to be 
analyzed in detail. 
 
4.1. Challenges of public opinion polls 
 
Public opinion polls have a critical role in gaining insight into public thinking. Polls provide 
surveys of the public opinion through soliciting answers from a particular sample. The 
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primary role of surveys is to provide feedback and assist decision making of the owner. 
However, findings of polls can serve as potential tools for actual communication purposes. In 
these cases, research findings serve as points of information that provide argumentation to a 
specific subject. The model for argumentation is through referring to the findings of the polls, 
claiming that the public support or opposition to a planned action has been expressed through 
the poll. Attributing authority to and claiming the backing of the public endorses the 
argumentation of the owner of the poll. 
 
Opinion polls are prone to become tools in manufacturing the public. In a large number of 
cases, vested interest is connected to arrival of polls at specific findings. Once results of the 
poll match the envisaged outcome, it can serve as justification and support a specific decision. 
In relation to a strategic issue with contradictory narratives, temptation or even pressure may 
arise to serve a specific purpose, and to support an actual message by arriving at preconceived 
results. Subsequently polls can provide argumentative support or opposition to the planned 
expansion of the Paks plant.  
 
Seeking specific results is not done through manipulation of findings. Manufacturing results 
is rather attributed to various methodological issues (Babbie, 2007), such as containing 
statements that may be interpreted in more than one way and include more than one complete 
thought (Edwards, 1994), specific way of constructing questions and selecting specific 
answers for publication (Mariotte, 2012), the actual context and the wording of questions 
(Antal, 2013), impact of repeated surveys and the use of questions that directly appeal to 
emotions like insecurity (Lever, 2013). 
 
Validity and objectivity of a poll comprises two different sets of criteria. In terms of validity, 
it is enough to meet the professional standards of the industry, for objectivity the purpose of 
the research and the owner of the research should not in any way influence the design of the 
poll neither the interpretation and publication of its outcome. If these criteria fail, not only 
opinion polls but their interpretations also become part of the game of constructing reality. 
Comparison of outcome of different pieces of research requires attentive consideration. 
Comparability is especially difficult in the case of polls on complex issues, where 
interpretation of the issue reflects perceptional differences, deriving of variations of 
knowledge, awareness and attitude. Findings of polls on highly complex issues, on which 
very few people have first hand experience, often reflect significant differences or even 
divisions. Issues related to technologies affecting human lives, such as genetic modification 
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(Poortinga, Pidgeon, 2003) and climate change (Semanza et al, 2008) are especially prone to 
divide. Attitudinal restraints, including distinct split on specific issues, is influenced by 
skepticism, distrust, fatalism and lack of knowledge (Lorenzoni et al, 2007). Complexity of 
the issue of nuclear energy may be reflected in the diverging approaches opinion polls 
represent. Even with focus on the same issue, the use of nuclear energy, research polls still 
may differ considerably. 
 
4.2. Public opinion polls on nuclear energy in Hungary  
 
In the period 2009-2013, a number of public opinion polls have been conducted comprising 
this subject. In order to gain a general overview of the public perception of nuclear energy in 
Hungary and of the planned expansion of the Paks nuclear power plant, 6 public opinion polls 
have been examined and compared (Table 21). Various opinion polls arrive at contrasting 
results. An analysis and comparison of methodologies is conducted to understand the 
differences in results. Comparison of a pool of polls may help come to a conclusion that 
reflects aggregate results. 
 
Analysis of these polls helps better understanding of the subject as well as studying the role of 
public opinion polls in exploring and shaping attitudes, beliefs and knowledge. To balance 
inconsistencies and allow better comparability, 6 polls were selected: 3 polls from TNS (TNS 
Global and TNS Hoffmann, its Hungarian company), 2 from Medián Opinion Poll Research 
(Hungary) and 1 from Ipsos. On a European level, a number of research take place for 
example in the framework of the Eurobarometer context. However, most of these refer to the 
issue of energy in a larger context28 and are not directly related to the topic of nuclear energy. 
Of the Eurobarometer studies, only the one chosen for the pool had a direct relevance to the 
issue of support and/or opposition to nuclear energy in Hungary. Of research with 
international context, only the Hungarian aspects are studied in this chapter. It is important to 
note that no publicly known piece of opinion research from the period 2009 - 2013 has been 
excluded from the following comparison. 
 
                                                
28 EB 75.1. European Parliament Eurobarometer. Europeans and Energy, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/eurobarometre/2011/2011_04_21/SA_EN_Final.pdf, EB 74.3 European 
Parliament Eurobarometer, Standard EB 74.3 on Energy, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_pe_74-3_synth_en.pdf  
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   title data 
collection 
publication 
date 
poll 
company  
ordered by focus special features methodology 
1 Europeans and 
Nuclear Safety (Full 
public version), 
Special Barometer 
324  
September 
- October 
2009 
March 
2010 
TNS 
Opinion 
and Social 
European 
Commission 
attitudes to 
nuclear 
energy in EU 
countries 
the only Eurobarometer 
issue that dealt with the 
topic of nuclear energy 
in the period 2009-13 
EU countries, face to face, 1000 interviews 
(in Hungary) with people 15 years and 
above, weighed according to gender, age, 
region and size of locality, confidence limits 
+/- 3.1% 
2 Global Citizen 
Reaction to the 
Fukushima Nuclear 
Plant Disaster(Outline 
for public) 
March 
2011 
April 2011 Ipsos 
Global 
Reuters News social effects 
of 
Fukushima 
disaster  
specifically focused to 
test reactions to 
Fukushima disaster 
24 countries, online panel interviews, apr. 
1000+ interviews (in some countries 500+), 
age 16-64, weighed according to 
demographics, est. error margin +/-3.1% (+/-
4.5% for countries with smaller samples) 
3 Should referendum 
decide? (Outline for 
public) 
July 2011 August 
2011 
Medián Origo Should 
referendum 
decide about 
Paks 
extension? 
part of an omnibus 
research 
face to face interviews, 1200 adults, 100 
vicinities, weighed according to size of 
locality, age, gender and qualification, 
confidence limits +/- 2-5% 
4 Public awareness 
about energy sources 
and Paks NPP 
(Outline for public)  
July 2011 August 
2011 
TNS 
Hoffmann 
MVM/Paks 
Nuclear Plant 
attitudes to 
nuclear 
energy and 
to the Paks 
plant 
standard quarterly 
research of which 
1/year is made public 
unknown, but presumably same as TNS 
Hoffmann research in August 2013 (survey 
6) 
5 Nuclear attitudes in 
Hungary (Outline for 
public) 
July 2012 October 
2013 (!) 
Medián environmental 
organizations, 
headed by 
Greenpeace  
attitudes to 
nuclear and 
to the Paks 
expansion 
plans 
published over a year 
later than the actual 
data collection 
unknown, but presumably same as Medián 
research in July 2011 (survey 3) 
6 Public awareness 
about energy sources 
and Paks NPP (Full 
version) 
August 
2013 
October 
2013 
TNS 
Hoffmann 
Paks Nuclear 
Plant 
attitudes to 
nuclear 
energy and 
to Paks plant 
standard yearly 
research 
face to face interviews, 1007 15+ adults, 100 
vicinities, weighed according to size of 
locality, geographical region age, gender and 
qualification, confidence limits unknown 
Table 21: Key data of opinion polls on nuclear energy 2009-2013 
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4.2.1. Comparison of key findings of the polls 
 
In the following descriptions and comparisons, polls are ranked according to their 
chronological order.  
 
1. TNS OS, March 2010 
 
Description: as a survey of the European Commission, this is the only issue of Eurobarometer 
that dealt with the topic of of nuclear energy in the period 2009-2013. 
 
Key findings: 45% of Hungarians think that risks of nuclear power outweigh its benefits, 
while 43% think benefits outweigh its risks. The proportion of nuclear energy of all energy 
sources should be reduced according to 20% of Hungarians, increased according to 27% and 
maintained according to 49%. 50% of respondents say that nuclear risks are exaggerated, 34% 
believe they are underestimated and 2% say that nuclear risks are perceived correctly. 72% of 
Hungarians trust companies operating nuclear power plants and 26% disagree with this 
statement. 26% of pollees say that media provides enough information to draw conclusions 
about risks and benefits, while 71% says it does not. 20% of Hungarians confirmed they 
would like to be directly consulted and to participate in the decision-making about energy 
strategies, including nuclear energy. 
 
2. Ipsos, April 2011 
 
Description: the poll was taken in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster and 
focused especially on the study of how global attitudes to nuclear energy had changed as a 
consequence. 
 
Key findings: use of nuclear energy for electricity production is strongly supported by 12%, 
somewhat supported by 29%, somewhat opposed by 30% and strongly opposed by 29% of the 
Hungarian population. Construction of further nuclear power plants is supported by 38% and 
opposed by 62%. 20% of Hungarians consider nuclear power to be a long term viable source 
of energy production, while 80% consider it as limited and to be outdated in the foreseeable 
future.  
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3. Medián, August 2011 
 
Description: part of an Omnibus survey commissioned by one of the leading news sites, 
Origo. 
 
Key findings: Extension of the life cycle of the current plant is supported by 32% and 
opposed by 63% of the Hungarians. Construction of a new reactor is supported by 36% and 
opposed by 58%, while 43% oppose to both suggestions. 43% agree that nuclear energy 
authorities in Hungary are independent and provide sufficient information, while 48% 
disagree with this statement. 48% would support and 47% would oppose a national 
referendum regarding the destiny of Hungarian nuclear power plants. In case of a referendum, 
60% would definitely or probably attend, and 36% would definitely or probably not join. 80% 
would prefer the state supporting the use of renewable energies, 8% would support that of gas 
and 7% that of nuclear. 
 
4. TNS Hoffmann, August 2011 
 
Description: the poll is prepared on a yearly basis on the commission of the MVM Hungarian 
Electricity Ltd., the state-owned mother company of the Paks NPP. Only limited and 
controlled content is shared with the public, in spite of repeated legal efforts from NGOs to 
have the full research made public. 
 
Key findings: 73% of population agree that a nuclear plant is operating in Hungary, 58% 
support the planned extension of its life cycle. Construction of a new reactor is supported by 
51% and opposed by 44% of Hungarians. 
 
5. Medián, July 2012 
 
Description: Commissioned by green NGOs, over a year separates data collection from 
publication of poll results. Focus is on possible Russian involvement in the planned expansion 
of the Paks NPP. 
 
Key findings: On a scale of 5, the risks from the Paks plant are 3.58, the risk in general of 
nuclear power plants is 3.81 and the risks of nuclear wastes are 4.06. Of the various sources 
of energy, the state should encourage, according to 78% of the pollees, the use of renewable 
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energies, 13% suggested it should be nuclear and 10% suggested it to be gas. The extension 
of the life cycle of the existing NPP is supported by 35%, the construction of a new NPP is 
supported by 42%, while the latter is opposed by 51%. 50% of the population would support 
decision-making by a referendum and 56% declared they would definitely or probably attend 
it. In case the new NPP was built on Russian credit by a Russian state owned company, 25% 
would support the project and 66% would oppose to the project. 
 
6. TNS Hoffmann, August 2013 
 
Description: part of the yearly regular surveys commissioned by MVM.  
 
Key findings (public part): 76% of Hungarians agree that a nuclear plant operates in Hungary, 
43% believe that nuclear energy is the cheapest source of electric power. The nuclear power 
plant has especially high level of support in the 30 km vicinity of the plant29. 4 out of 5 
Hungarians agree that a higher proportion of electricity should be produced locally. 41% of 
pollees would accept a maximum 10% level of imported energy, while a further 33% would 
accept a maximum 25% level import energy rate30.  
 
Key findings (non-disclosed part): 51% of Hungarians believe renewables will be the most 
reliable source of energy for the next 10 years, while 17% each think it will be gas or nuclear. 
Safe supply of energy will be provided by renewables, according to 49%, while 23% say it 
will be nuclear and 17% believe it will be gas. 78% of Hungarians share that renewables have 
the smallest effect on the environment, while 10% say it is nuclear and 7% claim it is gas. 
51% of pollees agree with building new nuclear reactors and 45% oppose to this. If it were 
built next to the existing plant, support would increase to 56%, against 40% opposition. 
Regarding the preconditions required to the expansion of the existing Paks plant, 57% would 
support to have a referendum, 13% would agree to a referendum in the 10 kilometers vicinity, 
12% would tie it to a parliamentary decision, 9% to a government decision and 8% to a local 
referendum. In case of a referendum, 50% would support construction of a new reactor, 38% 
would oppose to it. 87% would oppose to putting the Paks NPP, currently state owned, into 
private hands while 11% would support this move. Extension of life cycle is supported by 
64% of the population and opposed by 30%. 
 
                                                
29 A separate piece of research has been conducted in parallel to test opinion of the citizens living closest to the 
NPP. 
30 Currently this rate is at 30% 
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Only a limited part of the latter research findings are made public. Non-disclosed parts 
comprise topics that might not support narratives about perceived benefits of nuclear energy. 
These include that a relative majority sees renewables as the safest supply of energy, an 
overwhelming majority considers renewables as the most environment friendly source of 
energy, most pollees would support a referendum over the planned expansion of Paks NPP 
and an overwhelming majority would oppose to the privatization of the NPP. In summary, the 
comparison of the results of the findings looks as follows. 
 
 title and conducted by data 
collection / 
publication 
date 
support 
nuclear 
energy 
oppose 
nuclear 
energy 
support 
Paks 
expand 
oppose 
Paks 
expand 
key additional findings 
 
1 Europeans and 
Nuclear Safety (Full 
public version), 
Special Barometer 
324 / TNS Opinion 
and Social 
Sept. -
Oct.2009 
/March 
2010 
     
2 Global Citizen 
Reaction to the 
Fukushima Nuclear 
Plant Disaster(Outline 
for public) / Ipsos 
Global 
March 
2011 / 
April 2011 
41% 59% 38% 62%  
3 Should referendum 
decide? (Outline for 
public) / Medián 
July 2011 / 
August 
2011 
- - 36% 58%  
4 Public awareness 
about energy sources 
and Paks NPP 
(Outline for public) / 
TNS Hoffmann 
July 2011 / 
August 
2011 
73% 25% 51% 44%  
5 Nuclear attitudes in 
Hungary (Outline for 
public) / Medián 
July 2012 / 
October 
2013 (!) 
  42% 51% 50% support 
referendum on Paks 
NPP and 56% would 
attend, 66% would 
oppose Russian 
involvement, 78% 
would like state support 
renewables and 13% 
would favor nuclear 
6 Public awareness 
about energy sources 
and Paks NPP (Full 
version) / TNS 
Hoffmann 
August 
2013 
/October 
2013 
76% 21% 50% 38% 56% would attend 
referendum on future of 
Paks NPP and 50% 
would support 
extension 
Table 22: Key findings of opinion polls on nuclear energy 2009-2013 
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Outcome of these pieces of research show significant variations (Table 22). To identify 
possible causes of differing results certain presumptions are made. It is supposed that each 
company followed the written as well as unspoken ethical rules and professional set of 
criteria. Furthermore it is assumed that the companies published the actual figures of their 
research. Research companies would not risk their reputation by agreeing to unethical or 
illegal practices. The cause of variations needs to be identified in the wider contexts of these 
pieces of research. Study should be made to see if differences in objectives and orientation of 
research could be the reason for differences. Specific answers to specific questions are 
defined by a number of details. Circumstances of actual polling are not known, including 
information regarding specific conditions of the interviews, list of exact questions and the full 
context of the research. Full comparison of pieces of research would only be possible if all 
factors of polls were identical. Nevertheless it is possible to accomplish comparisons, bearing 
in mind the similarities in the focus, sampling, methodology and professional standard of the 
organizations. Differences in findings of similar surveys can be attributed to a variety of 
reasons. 
 
4.2.2. Possible interpretations of differences in findings 
 
Background and purpose of research 
 
The TNS Opinion and Social research (1)31 forms part of a regular series of pieces of 
research, commissioned by the European Commission to test the attitude of European citizens 
on various issues. The Eurobarometer series is both a tool for the Commission, and a service 
to the public. Nuclear issues sporadically arrive on the agenda and are usually related to 
general energy issues, climate change or handling of nuclear waste. In case of the Ipsos 
research (2) 24 countries were involved, in each of them a similar set of questions was asked 
(except for Japan). Apart of Reuters News there was no specific firm behind the survey, it 
was backed financially by Ipsos. The study focused on the effects of the Fukushima accident. 
The Medián research (3) was part of their omnibus survey, and the specific questions were 
based on the assignment from (a leading Hungarian news site) Origo. The research focused on 
the need and the viability of a possible referendum on the Paks development plans. Except for 
a poll 10 years earlier, Medián did not conduct any research in the area of nuclear issues 
before. TNS Hoffmann (the Hungarian arm of TNS Global) research (4) is strongly 
                                                
31 Numbers in brackets refer to the chronological ranking of polls, as described at beginning of the chapter 
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determined by the fact that the state owned company committing to the research is actually 
the owner of the company operating the Paks NPP. The research, repeated on a yearly basis 
since 1990 (!), provides ammunition to both public communication about nuclear energy, and 
to setting of internal strategies regarding development plans. Bearing in mind the long term 
and close relationship between the owner of the research, the nuclear plant and the research 
company, a relatively low level of research independence is supposed. Medián research (5) is 
primarily a reiteration of the earlier research, with environmental organizations 
commissioning the poll this time and with a slight change of focus: instead of the issue of 
referendum it focuses on the attitude to development plans, especially with the inclusion of 
Russian state owned nuclear firms. The TNS Hoffmann research (6) is part of the regular 
yearly series of research to study attitudes to nuclear energy and the Paks NPP. A copy of the 
full version of the latest research findings was made available for the dissertation, allowing 
study of both public and non-disclosed parts. 
 
A further point of differentiation can be the purpose of the poll. If the purpose is to provide 
reassurance, safety, comfort, it will then build towards questions that focus on the benefits of 
nuclear energy. However, if the purpose is to raise doubts, highlight controversies or initiate 
uneasiness, it may decide to focus on questions that raise risk awareness. The yearly TNS 
research (4,6) are good example for the benefits oriented polls, while the Medián polls (3,5) 
are examples for the risks oriented polls.  
 
Timing of the poll 
 
The TNS OS research (1) is one of the EC polls on certain aspects of nuclear energy, focusing 
this time on the issue of safety. Comparison to other pieces of earlier research is not covered 
in its documentation. Ipsos Global (2), Medián (3) and TNS Hoffmann (4) are all in 
chronological proximity to the Fukushima accident. The accident set back confidence towards 
Japan and in nuclear technologies around the world (IAEA, 2013 and Edelman, 2012), though 
these setbacks are usually considered temporary only (Besley and Oh, 2013). Actually, testing 
the aftermath was the explicit purpose of the Ipsos Global research, while results of the 
Medián (3) and the TNS Hoffmann (4) polls may have been strongly influenced by the 
accident. The TNS Hoffmann (4,6) and the Medián (3,5) pieces of research can be considered 
part of a series that allows for comparisons, leading to in-depth knowledge of the subject and 
study of the critical points. 
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Wording of questions 
 
The actual wording adds to the identification or to the alienation with the topic. The TNS OS 
research (1) approaches the issue with rather abstract terms. Only 2 questions of the 20 have a 
personal reference: one enquires whether the person visited a NPP before, while the last one 
asks the pollee to weigh risks and benefits of nuclear power generation, with bearing in mind 
the interests of their family. The Ipsos Global research (2) builds on questions that directly 
relate to personal choices in terms of consumption of food or energy. The questions in the 
Medián research (3,5) and TNS Hoffmann research (4) tend to refer to more distant subjects 
to which emotional attachments are difficult to build. However, TNS Hoffmann research (6) 
does combine abstract terms with personal choices, for example in the case of personal 
decisions on how much more would people be ready to pay for electricity. Though the exact 
wording of all questions is not known, appearance of the questions in the charts or text of 
public communication give an indication to the actual wording. Certain typical cases can be 
noted that imply a breach to the standards. In a number of questions hidden statements and 
implied answers appear. 
 
- Medián research (5): ‘Should there be built a new NPP in Paks next to the existing one?’32 
This implies an unnecessary doubling of capacities both in geographical sense and in terms 
of capacity.  
- Medián research (5): ‘Would you support the construction of a new NPP if it was built of 
Russian credit by a Russian state owned company?’’33This implies and duplicates a hidden 
danger as well as asks for an answer to a complex question. The question actually consists 
of 3 parts - financing of project, ownership type of company and nationality of company - 
which may distort genuine answers.  
- TNS Hoffmann (6): ‘Would you be ready to pay a markup for the electricity, if it was 
generated of renewables and not nuclear power?’’34The question implies a statement that 
electricity generated of renewables is more expensive than that of nuclear energy. Wording 
of this question also may prepare the ground to a later question that enquires about the kind 
of energy that is considered the cheapest to generate today. 
                                                
32 In Hungarian: “Pakson épüljön új atomerőmű a már meglévő mellett?” 
33 In Hungarian: “Ön támogatná egy új atomerőmű megépítését, ha azt egy orosz állami vállalat orosz hitelből 
építené meg?” 
34 In Hungarian: “Ön hajlandó lenen a jelenleginél többet fizetni a villamos energiáért, ha azt megújuló 
energiaforrásokkal állítanák elő szemben az atomenergiával?” 
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- TNS Hoffmann (6): ‘Do you agree that a nuclear plant operates in Hungary?’35 This 
question has been widely and publicly criticized for its wording36, as it, in this form, asks 
opinion on an actual fact and therefore mixes information seeking with opinion seeking. 
True agreement with the existence and the operations to the NPP should be enquired by 
asking: ‘Do you agree that a nuclear plant should operate in Hungary?’ Instead of an 
expression of a statement referring to the present, it should rather, in subjunctive form, allow 
for the inclusion of personal opinions oriented to the future use of nuclear energy. 
 
The overall problem with biased wording of questions is that it upsets the balance structure of 
opinion polls: acquiring information in order to learn about public perception, and then build 
on this during strategy development and message formulation. Instead, upsetting the balance 
puts importance of acquiring argumentative support ahead of learning the actual views of the 
public. This approach limits the ability to obtain in-depth insight into the public attitude. 
Furthermore, manufactured wording contributes to strengthening the concept of ‘us’ and 
‘them’, and leads to emotional identification or to alienation. Subsequently, it may add to the 
construction of creating ‘political aliens’. 
 
Order and structure of questions 
 
The actual order of questions has a strong influence on the answers, however, except for TNS 
OS (1) and Ipsos Global (2) polls, there is a lack of information on the original order of 
questions. Consequently only the order of appearance in public communication can be noted. 
The current dissertation intends to identify what topics may have preceded the actual 
questions and, subsequently what the context of the most critical issue, the attitude to the Paks 
expansion plans may have been. 
 
The TNS OS research (1) covers 5 topics. Right after the demographical questions, the issue 
of nuclear safety was touched first; there was no other topic before it. The nuclear issue was 
followed then by the topic of corruption. The Ipsos Global (2) research focused first on the 
readiness to consume food items previously imported from Japan, such as rice, noodles, fish, 
algae, following the Fukushima accident. The majority of pollees gave negative answers to 
these questions. These were followed by questions on support to nuclear energy and to further 
expansion plans of nuclear electricity production capacities. Based on the communication 
                                                
35 In Hungarian: “Egyetért Ön azzal, hogy Magyarországon működik atomerőmű?” (ahelyett a formula helyett, 
hogy: “Egyetért Ön azzal, hogy Magyarországon atomerőmű működjön?”) 
36 Public criticism has been voiced for many years as the question is repeated in its actual form annually. 
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output, the first questions of the Medián research (3) focused on the independence of nuclear 
energy authorities and the credibility of their information. Answers showed an even split on 
these issues. These were followed by questions related to the extension of the Paks NPP life 
cycle and the expansion of the plant. The order of questions of the TNS Hoffmann research 
(4) can be presumed of the document acquired and made public by NGO Energiaklub37. The 
exact context of the questions is unknown, the series of questions supposedly starts with the 
regular question of the survey for 20 years: ‘Do you agree that a NPP operates in Hungary?’ 
Responses have reflected wide support to Paks NPP for 2 decades. These are followed by 
questions on development plans, to be pursued further by issues on Paks meeting European 
standards, and perception about the types of power plants that supply energy at the lowest 
cost.  
 
The publicly communicated results of the Medián research (5) indicate that the list of 
questions started with identification of most important risks related to nuclear power 
production, followed by a question on the source of energy that should be most supported by 
the state. This is followed by the critical question on whether a further new nuclear power 
plant is needed next to the existing one, ending with the enquiry whether pollees would 
support a new NPP, if it were built on Russian loan and by a Russian state-owned company.  
 
Obtaining the full presentation of the TNS Hoffmann research (6) indicates that the 
assumption on the order of questions of the TNS Hoffmann research (4) was presumably 
wrong. The full presentation indicates that the complete list includes 28 questions38 
(compared to the 5 that had been made public 2 years before). The first 5 questions refer to 
security of energy supply from various energy sources, environmental considerations of 
various sources of energies, and additional markup people would be ready to pay for 
renewable energies. The next set of questions concerns the Paks NPP and starts with soliciting 
general agreement to having nuclear power production in Hungary. These are followed by 5 
questions on safety, followed by 3 questions on pricing and 1 on the acceptable share of 
imported energy. This is pursued by the 4 focus questions on attitude to expansion plans, 
followed by a question each on possible privatization and attitudes to the planned expansion 
of life cycle of the current plant. The last questions cover awareness and opinion on the 
Fukushima accident (5 questions) and 1 question asking feedback on the promotional truck 
moving around in Hungary and promoting the Paks NPP.  
                                                
37 Information about the research was included in the documentation that was made public following a court case 
settling public access to documentation on Paks development plans. 
38 Approximate number, based on the number of slides covering an independent question 
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In summary, the actual context and order of questions is critical. Especially in the case of 
Omnibus surveys it is difficult to tell, what actually proceeds the questions related to nuclear 
energy, and what effects they may have on the interpretation of later questions. When 
questions refer first to risks or accidents, than with good probability, pollees will show higher 
risk awareness during the whole interview. In case of questions referring to well known facts 
or questions where there seems to be a wide agreement on the positive aspects of nuclear 
energy, people will tend to show a higher level of benefit awareness during the poll. In the 
case of objective driven polls, the simple rule seems to be: ‘Start with those questions that 
support your objective, and to which you expect to gain the biggest support. That will ease the 
whole process and help findings the conclusions one was looking for.’ 
 
4.2.3. Transparency of surveys and communication of results 
 
A final point of consideration regarding the validity and credibility of the polls concerns how 
the findings are communicated. The TNS OS research (1) is part of the Eurobarometer 
structure where transparency in communication is a political prerequisite. The main objective 
of the Ipsos Global research (2), commissioned actually by a news service company, Reuters 
Thomson, is to communicate its results and build the Ipsos brand further. Communication 
therefore meets the criteria of full transparency, by allowing full public access to 
methodology and to the survey tables. Furthermore, it facilitates public communication of the 
findings through the development of publicly available and easy-to-use presentations and 
survey releases. Both Medián polls (3,5) allow limited access to methodology, to the order 
and wording of questions and to background information. Public outputs are communicated 
through the media, in the case of research (3) by Origo and in the case of research (5) by 
Greenpeace, the NGO heading a group of environmental organizations. The full research or 
the possibility of detailed backgrounders do not appear and nor are the surveys present on the 
website of Medián. 
 
During communication of both the Medián and the TNS Hoffmann polls, factually debatable 
statements tend to be written in the titles of the press releases. The title of the press release 
issued by Greenpeace about the Medián research (5) claims that ‘Two-thirds oppose to the 
Paks expansion’ 39 The body text actually explains that 51% oppose to the plan, while 42% 
support it. However, when the question also includes Russian involvement and Russian state 
                                                
39 In Hungarian: “Kétharmad ellenzi a paksi bővítést” 
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ownership of the construction company, then the share of opposition rises to 66%. Titles or 
communication of the TNS Hoffmann polls (4,6) do not reflect that the owner of the polls, 
MVM Hungarian Electricity Ltd., brings to the public a limited segment of the findings, with 
the majority of the findings being kept for company use. TNS Hoffmann does not take part in 
the communication of results. The title of the only and official press release on the poll (6), ‘A 
growing number of people recognize the benefits of nuclear energy’ 40 is not in any way 
related to the findings of the research, it does not derive directly or indirectly of its findings.  
 
Actual communication of poll findings is strategically important for the companies 
commissioning the surveys. Presumably, these surveys are in fact designed for publication, to 
raise credibility of certain agendas and support the case of survey owners. Communication of 
findings does not mean full disclosure of survey results. Full access to outcome of the results 
in only granted in the case of the two international surveys, TNS OS (research 1) and Ipsos 
Global (research 2)). In all other cases, ownership control of polls mean at the same time 
limitations to public control, and this makes them vulnerable to manipulation. 
 
Consequences of differences in survey results 
 
Differences in the result of the various opinion polls may have a boomerang effect. Lack of 
analysis of understanding differences may lead the public to loose confidence in the findings, 
or even the issue in general. On the other hand, proper analysis could result in a clear 
understanding of underlying reasons of differences, and lead to better understanding and even 
identification with the issue. Understanding the reasons for significant differences is therefore 
critical. Differing survey results exercise significant impact on public receptivity and 
awareness of the subject. Differing results may exercise negative effects on all elements of the 
survey process: the issue under research, the polling company, the company commissioning 
the poll and the persons involved themselves.  
 
Possible effects of differing results include: 
 
Loss in confidence regarding the validity of survey results 
To overcome cognitive dissonance non-professional people may react by increasing 
indifference. Instead of efforts to interpret the results, they rather loose interest in 
internalization of the findings of the poll.  
                                                
40 In Hungarian: “Egyre többen ismerik fel az atomenergia előnyeit”  
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Drop in confidence regarding the subject of the research 
Another reaction might include a drop in confidence in the issue of nuclear energy. This 
interpretation of the results grows further the perception that this topic is complicated, should 
be left to experts to prepare and handle, and to politicians to decide about. This strengthens 
further intentions to withdraw the nuclear discourse of the public sphere. 
 
Contribution to the construction of parallel realities  
Differing results contribute to the construction of parallel realities where each of the realities 
is supported by its own set of results. Instead of clarifying public understanding and better 
understanding, the existing division, regarding the perception of need and use of nuclear 
energy, is reinforced. 
 
Public opinion survey changes its role 
The purpose of public survey changes: instead of interpretation tools for understanding the 
reality, they become active tools to influence reality and its perception. Each stakeholder 
commissioning a survey considers it as a tool to support its own argumentation. 
 
4.2.4. A tool to overcome differing results: aggregate reporting 
 
In 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD published a 
report summarizing findings of previous opinion polls, primarily Eurobarometer reports41 
(OECD, 2010). The purpose of the report has been to facilitate decision making of member 
states on nuclear related issues by being better informed. As stated in its foreword, ‘the report 
brings together a number of particularly insightful public opinion polls and surveys about 
nuclear energy with the objective of making the assembled outcome available to a wider 
audience of decision makers and opinion leaders’ (OECD, 2010:3). The foreword also states 
that ‘OECD/NEA countries will only be able to make use of nuclear energy if a well-informed 
public considers that its benefits outweigh its risks, an opinion which is not yet widely shared 
in the countries polled’. Here again, it has a clear bias in order to promote the use of nuclear 
energy, while it does admit that in most countries there is no explicit support for nuclear 
energy. The text furthermore claims: ‘Although the Eurobarometer poll did not directly 
address views on the cost of nuclear energy, it seems likely that people would be less opposed 
if it were clear that nuclear would reduce the price they paid for electricity’(OECD, 
                                                
41 special Eurobarometer reports 227 and 297 on radioactive waste, nuclear safety (271), energy technologies 
(262) and climate change (300) as well as on EU energy policy (206a) 
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2010:29). This implies that generation of electricity from nuclear power is with lower cost 
than with other sources, which, in the case of newly started NPP projects, is highly debated. 
Even the OECD report refers to certain considerations when assessing the validity of an 
individual poll. It underlines that the possible vested interest of the organization that 
commissioned the poll can influence validity, and so can the wording, the ordering and the 
adequacy of the sample. It summarizes by saying that ‘differences in wording and 
methodologies can produce misleading comparisons between the outcomes of different polls.’ 
(OECD, 2010:11). Statements of the OECD report reinforce our earlier statement about the 
importance of the commissioning organization of the poll, the reasons and the difficulties in 
interpreting differing results, and the dangers of constructed research findings. 
 
4.2.5. A tool to overcome differing results: conducting an independent research 
 
Bearing in mind the controversies and the blurred overall picture of the existing polls, the 
author of the current dissertation decided to execute an independent poll to validate existing 
statements. Preconditions did not allow for the development of a full scale opinion poll 
covering every important aspect of nuclear energy. Consequently, the poll is limited to three 
closed questions with up to 8 answer possibilities each. Comparison with the other pieces of 
research, and consequently validation of any or all of the other pieces of research is limited. 
However, findings of the author’s independent research may provide an indication to the 
validity of the findings of the other polls.42 The key data of the independent research are: 
title data 
collection 
conducted 
by 
comment methodology 
Nuclear attitudes 
in Hungary 
June 2013 Ipsos part of an 
omnibus survey 
face to face, 1000 adults, weighed 
according to size of locality, age, 
gender and qualification 
Table 23: Key data of independent poll 
 
The poll included 3 questions (see Annex 4): 
1. In your view, is there a need to build two further reactors in the Paks NPP? 
2. Do you believe you have enough information about the expansion of the Paks NPP? 
3. Do you think that similarly to other countries, expansion about the Paks NPP should be 
decided on a referendum?43 
                                                
42 The author of the dissertation expresses its gratitude to Ipsos Hungary for their kind partnership and 
contribution in allotting the research questions into their regular omnibus survey. 
43 1. Ön szerint szükség van-e arra, hogy két újabb blokk épüljön a paksi atomerőműben? 2. Megítélése szerint 
Ön elegendő információval rendelkezik-e a paki atomerőmű bővítéséről? 3. Ön szerint más országokhoz 
hasonlóan nálunk is népszavazáson kellene-e dönteni arról, bővítsék-e a paksi atomerőművet? 
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In the case of Q2 and Q3 the possible answers were crafted to give insight into the reasoning 
as well. 
 
A high number of pollees, 46.5% preferred not to answer to Q1, choosing the ‘don’t know’ 
option. In a detailed research the opportunity would have occurred to offer information in 
advance, and then come to the actual question. This could have increased response rate, 
however it would have influenced actual knowledge about the issue. Of those who answered, 
52.5% opposed the plan and 47.5% supported the plan. The outcome confirms a modest 
majority of opponents, but the split confirms that the population is divided on this issue.  
 
Regarding Q2, referring to the need of further information about the expansion, only 4% of 
pollees expressed satisfaction with the amount of information they had. 38% responded they 
did not have enough information and were not interested in obtaining more information 
anyway. 38% of pollees would be interested in having more information, primarily about the 
environmental aspects, followed by the economic-financial and the technical aspects. The 
political aspects for the respondents seemed uninteresting, and close to 20% admitted they did 
not know if they had enough information.  
 
Regarding Q3 on the need for referendum, 33.4% would like to have a referendum, referring 
primarily to the reason that they consider this to be an important issue that affects everyone. 
47.4% of the pollees felt a referendum is not necessary, referring to the fact that experts can 
decide better on this, and also expressing that anyway it will be decided by the politicians. 
Again, close to 20% of pollees did not give an answer to the question. The answers reflect 
that almost half of people do not want more information, they trust experts and politicians. 
One-third would like to have a referendum primarily because they believe it is an issue that 
affects everyone. 
 
 title and 
conducted by 
data collection / 
publication 
date 
Hungarians 
supporting 
Paks expansion 
Hungarians 
opposing Paks 
expansion 
key additional 
findings 
 
7 Nuclear attitudes 
in Hungary (Full 
version) / Ipsos 
June 2013 / 
current thesis 
47.5% 52.5% need for 
referendum:  
yes: 33.4%, no: 
47.4% 
Table 24: Key findings of independent poll 
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Demographic distribution provides certain further points of information. In general, it can be 
affirmed that men would rather prefer expansion, while the relative majority of women would 
rather oppose to this idea. However, 52% of women do not know if there is a need for the 
planned expansion, in contrast to 38% of men with a similar answer. Men are more interested 
in the issue and feel they are better informed, than how women feel about the same issues. 
There is only one area where women significantly outnumber men in their interest for further 
information: in the field of environmental aspects. Interest in the issue of a referendum shows 
no correlation with gender. 
 
Interest in and support to the Paks expansion plans correlates significantly to qualifications: 
the higher the education level, the more support is expressed to the planned expansion. 
Worthwhile to note that support of the highly educated is not unconditional: most respondents 
would ‘rather prefer’ expansion instead of ‘absolutely prefer’ it. Also, the referendum is 
supported relatively most by those with higher levels of education.  
 
In terms of income, people with higher income feel they are more informed or, if not, would 
like to have more information than their fellows with lower income. Support to the expansion 
plans and regarding the referendum are not related to income levels. Significant correlation 
exists between support to referendum and level of feeling informed. The better informed the 
people feel, the higher support they express for a referendum.  
 
People living in bigger cities feel better informed, while support to expansion plans does not 
show any correlation with type or size of locality. 26% of people living in cities would 
definitely be interested in more information about the environmental aspects, compared to 
14% of those living in villages. Relative support to the referendum is the highest in Budapest, 
but even here a split prevails between supporters and opponents to the referendum. The 
relative majority in all other types of municipality opposes the idea of a referendum, stating 
primarily that it is the job of the experts to decide, followed by the statement that usually 
politicians decide on this and that it is a too complex issue for themselves anyway. 
 
Finally, the age of pollees is not a significant factor in these questions. 
 
In conclusion it can be said that supporters of the expansion plan are rather among the men 
and the better educated, while opponents are from women and with lower levels of education. 
Income level and age are not factors to be considered.  
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4.2.6. Conclusions on surveys 
 
Regarding the findings, it is apparent that the society is rather undecided, (feels) under-
informed, is to a considerable extent uninterested and split regarding the Paks expansion 
plans. On a personal level, considerations about the issue of the expansion do not appear 
important. The outcome represents a low level of risk and benefit perception, where answers 
do not reflect the issue having a significant weight. Respondents do not see what is at stake 
and how any decision on that issue would influence their lives. It stands as a project that has 
not much relation to everyday worries, and is one of those matters for which dedicated people 
should be responsible. Perception of the nuclear development issue reflects that, as this is a 
complex matter, it needs to be in the hands of those who have the expertise to handle it. The 
complexity of the issue alienates the people of actually being truly interested in the outcome 
of the expansion plan or express strong support to a referendum.  
 
In summary of all pieces of research, the conclusion is that a significant part of the population 
lacks information and interest in the nuclear issue. In the public perception, the connection 
between nuclear and the everyday issues are not connected. Lack of interest and involvement 
conflicts however with the views of a relatively significant part of the population, that would 
like to have their say in the decision and would prefer a referendum. The significant gaps and 
differences in knowledge, awareness and interest leave space for further intensive 
communication, be it for informative or manipulative purposes.  
 
Regarding the polls, in conclusion, in the case of these polls, their mission to explore attitudes 
is limited. Most of them primarily serve to provide argumentation to predesigned narratives. 
As details of creation and structuring of the polls are unknown, the published outcome does 
with high probability not provide exact reflection of the actual outcome, and leaves room for 
individual interpretations. Finalization of outcome and communication of results is subjugated 
to the utilitarian aspects of poll making. Owners of the polls not only provide the resources, 
but also express an expectation regarding its outcome. Instead of widening the public sphere, 
opinion polls become tools in strengthening a manufactured public sphere. In terms of further 
relevance to earlier statements, the creation and communication of the polls underline the 
agenda setting activities, reinforce the notion of political alienism built on ‘us’ and ‘them’, as 
well as expand the divide between risk-oriented and benefit-oriented pieces of research.  
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CHAPTER V: THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
 
A further field of reference for political, professional and media discourses is the area of 
international nuclear discourses. Actors of the Hungarian nuclear discourse use international 
references, especially those of other European countries, to reinforce own messages. The 
discourse in Europe provides a valid referencing and consequently increases the power of 
argumentation.  
 
5.1. Overview of situation 
 
Social discourse on the future of nuclear energy in Hungary cannot be complete without its 
international context. Most directly, it is linked to the country being a member of the 
European Union. Analyzing the nuclear agenda of countries of a similar situation may lead to 
better interpretation of trends, layers of discourses and opinion poll findings. 
  
Half of the 28 member countries of the European Union have existing nuclear power plants in 
operation44. Share of nuclear energy in the national energy mix ranges from minimal 
(Netherlands, 4%) to dominant (France, 75%). History and current status of nuclear energy 
differs considerably in the various countries. An overview of status shows (Table 25) status of 
nuclear energy in the EU member countries45 in relation to what plans exist for the future 
about nuclear energy, and in what form the relevant decision has been made. 
 
The table has been created to help identify patterns in European countries along two criteria: 
content of decision regarding the use of nuclear energy and the form of how the actual 
relevant decisions have been made. Identification of patterns helps understand motives and 
methods of decision-making. 
 
 
                                                
44 Slovenia and Croatia owns jointly a NPP in Slovenia. With Croatia also included, 15 member countries can be 
considered as generating nuclear energy 
45 Beyond the 14 EU countries with NPPs in operation the table includes Austria, Italy, Lithuania and Poland 
were currently no NPPs are operational, as well as non-EU member Switzerland 
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Decision nuclear energy (date of decision in brackets, modification of decision in bold) 
form of 
decision 
abandon nuclear energy keep nuclear energy develop nuclear energy  
referendum Austria (5 November 1978) 
(Zwentendorf NPP project was 
abandoned before completion) 
 
Sweden (23 March, 1980) (in 
June 2010, revision by parliament 
abandoned phase-out legislation) 
 
Italy (8 November 1987)  
(one NPP project was abandoned 
before completion and two 
operational NPPs were shutdown)  
(13 June 2011) (renewed 
government plans to relaunch 
NPP development were put to halt 
in another referendum) 
 
Lithuania (14 October 2012) (in 
October 2013 revision of decision 
is suggested by government) 
  
 
parliament 
resolution 
Belgium (2002, followed by a 
government policy statement 
attempt on 13 October 2009 to 
revise decision) (phase-out is 
planned by 2025, however NPP 
operators lobby hard to have the 
deadline extended by 10 years) 
 
Germany (31 July 2011, 
following a government decision 
on 14 March, 2011) (shut down 8 
of 17 reactors with immediate 
effect with all other reactors to 
follow by 2022) 
 
Switzerland (8 June 2011) 
(phase-out with expiry of planned 
lifetime of NPPs by 2034, green 
NGOs lobby for earlier phase-out 
by 2029) 
 Hungary (March 2009) 
(preliminary approval to 
investigate building further 
reactors to Paks NPP, 
followed by resolution in 
February 2014 approving 
actual expansion plans) 
 
Poland (May 2011) 
(following a government 
decision in 2005, the 
regulatory framework was 
set by parliament to build 
at least two NPPs by 2030. 
Local referendum in 
February 2012 in Mielno, 
one of the potential sites, 
refused hosting planned 
NPP) 
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form of 
decision 
abandon nuclear energy keep nuclear energy develop nuclear energy  
government 
decision 
Spain (1983) (phase-out is 
planned as NPPs reach their 
projected lifecycle, however 
strong lobbying is exercised to 
delay phase-out) 
Netherlands (2010) 
(government overwrites 
1994 parliamentary 
resolution of phasing out 
nuclear energy, and is 
open to new construction 
as existing NPP reaches 
end of lifecycle) 
 
France (2012) 
(announcement to reduce 
share of nuclear related 
electric power from 75% to 
50% through closing oldest 
NPPs by 2025, at the same 
time construction of new 
NPP at Flamanville-3 
continues) 
 
Slovenia (April 2013) 
(government decides to put 
plans to construct new 
reactor on hold, while the 
existing reactor remains 
operational until 2021) 
Bulgaria (11 December 
2013) (government plans 
announced to continue 
development of new NPP. 
Earlier, 27 January 2013, 
referendum on future of 
other NPP was invalid due 
to low turnout) 
 
United Kingdom (April 
2013) (government issued 
permit to plan two new 
reactors at Hinkley Point) 
 
Finland (December 2003) 
(government decided to 
build new NPP. In spite of 
considerable delays and 
unprecedented over-costs 
of construction of the 
Olkiluoto-3 NPP, the build 
of further NPPs was 
decided in April 2010) 
 
Czech (2010) (government 
decided to add further 
nuclear capacity to the 
currently operating 2 
NPPs. However, actual 
decisions on planning and 
building are being delayed 
and program may be put to 
halt in total)  
 
Romania (since 2000) 
(beyond having completed 
a construction previously 
abandoned, the 
government plans to add 
further nuclear capacity to 
the currently operating 2 
NPPs but plans are 
hindered due to financial 
constraints) 
 
Slovakia (January 2006) 
(government decided to 
renew plans to extend 
existing nuclear capacity 
with finishing construction 
of two new reactors and 
capacity increases) 
Table 25: Milestone decisions on use of nuclear energy in EU countries and Switzerland 
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5.2. Conclusions on decision making 
 
Regarding changing directions of nuclear issues certain important patterns can be identified.  
 
5.2.1. Countries with decision to abandon nuclear energy 
 
a. Trigger of decisions 
 
Increased risk perception following nuclear accidents, and actual effects of recent nuclear 
disasters play a direct role in decisions to abandon nuclear energy. The Three Mile Island 
accident in 1979 directly influenced Swedish decision, the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 brought 
Italian referendum to stop use of nuclear energy, while the Fukushima disaster in 2011 
triggered German and Swiss parliamentary decisions to stop use of nuclear energy, as well as 
resulted in repeated Italian refusal of nuclear plans. In other cases differing motivations can 
be the drivers of non-nuclear resolutions: maintenance of perceived independence and 
expected costs of new nuclear plant (Lithuania), green party participation in the government 
(Belgium) and strong preference to renewable energies against nuclear energy (Spain). In all 
cases perceived risks exceeded potential benefits of projects, and resulted in decisions to stop 
use of nuclear energy. 
 
b. Validity of decisions 
 
Decisions of a national referendum in Sweden were overruled 30 years later by the 
Parliament, with a majority of 2 votes. A year after the national referendum Lithuanian 
government plans to revise referendum decision, while the Italian government intended to 
overwrite referendum and was only stopped by a second referendum from re-launching 
nuclear development plans. Phase-out commitments of Belgian parliament and of Spanish 
government are lobbied against for revision, to have at least the deadline for phase-out 
extended and allow life cycle extension projects. There has been no change in stance in the 
case of Austria that first passed a law in 1978 prohibiting the use of nuclear energy for 
electricity production, and then installed the non-nuclear nature of the country in its 
Constitution in 1999. Germany and Switzerland have also stood firm to their 2011 
legislations. Regardless of the actual form of decision-making, validity of actual outcome is 
not questioned. However, a number of cases prove that decisions are usually not considered 
infinite. Government intentions to change previous legislation were successful in the case of 
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Sweden, unsuccessful in Italy and are still pending in Lithuania. Business actors are pursuing 
efforts to have Belgian and Spanish phase-out legislation reconsidered. Actors initiating 
change in previous resolution argue with changes in external conditions, inappropriate access 
or content of previous information (Lithuania) and business rationality (Belgium, Spain). 
Effects of nuclear-related events and internal political and economic motives are primarily 
prone to influence existing status quo.  
 
5.2.2. Countries with decision to keep nuclear energy 
 
a. Trigger of decisions 
 
Changes of external conditions and of internal capabilities are the triggers to decisions behind 
keeping nuclear development plans open. Though vastly different in many respects, the group 
of Netherlands, France and Slovenia share openness to continued use of nuclear energy. The 
Netherlands and Slovenia are considering construction of new reactor(s) as existing ones face 
phase-out, while France, the global leader in nuclear energy production is committed to keep 
share of nuclear in the electricity production, even if at a somewhat lower level than 
previously. Argumentation for maintaining nuclear energy production evolves around 
business rationale and meeting of CO2 emission goals. However, in the case of the 
Netherlands and Slovenia, keeping nuclear energy can also be viewed as a result of 
indecisiveness whether nuclear energy should be developed or phased out. With the exception 
of France, risks and benefits in these countries are still weighed and result in the current 
situation. France still considers benefits of nuclear energy to override risks, but admits 
presence of risks through lowering dependence on nuclear related electric power. 
 
b. Validity of decisions 
 
As the current directions derive of decisions made in 2010-2013, at this stage, in terms of 
time, it is not yet possible to discuss validity of these decisions. 
 
5.2.3. Countries with decision to develop nuclear energy  
 
a. Trigger of decisions 
 
Commitment to expand nuclear capacity prevails in a significant group of the countries. 
According to the public narratives, the main motives for development are reduction of share 
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of imported energy (Hungary, Czech, Slovakia), meeting of CO2 emission targets (United 
Kingdom, Poland), economic rationality of nuclear energy production (Bulgaria, Romania) 
and perceived technological qualities (Finland). However, especially in the post-Fukushima 
period, with the tightening criteria of safety measures, the growing investment and 
operational costs as well as expanded planning requirements, the time demand for 
establishment of new NPPs is extended considerably. Significant delays and cost overruns at 
current French and Finnish nuclear projects reinforce perception of complexity of project 
planning and execution. Development plans are driven by the perception of benefits 
overriding potential risks. 
 
b. Validity of decisions 
 
Plans to develop nuclear energy capabilities are currently valid in these countries. However, 
the biggest threat to the validity of these plans are the difficulties of planning as described 
above. Increased focus on planning and construction, and extended time and budget needs do 
not eliminate emergence of external factors. On the contrary they solicit the emergence of 
new challenges, be them political (Russia, planned supplier of a number of nuclear plans in 
Europe being involved in the Crimean crisis, spring 2014), technological (fast development of 
alternative renewable energy technologies, and possible advance of shale gas exploration), 
legal (EU Competition Commission may decide to stop perceived national state involvement 
in nuclear development projects) and financial (financing of nuclear projects having a close 
relation with the general credit standing of the specific countries). From the perspective of 
nuclear development plans, each of these creates significant risks. As a consequence of 
extended risk assessment processes and delayed projects, debates about the specific projects 
continue even after parliamentary or government decisions are made and consequently 
influence planning of the project. The classical linear structure of project planning is blurred 
and turns into a permanent process of planning, assessment of the situation, analysis of the 
internal and external factors and performing an ongoing risks and benefits analysis. 
 
5.3. Prevailing narratives in Europe 
 
The issue of nuclear energy does not rank high among the critical ones for people living in the 
European Union (Eurobarometer, 2012), even if considered in combination with environment 
and climate issues. On a list of 13 possible problems, the complex issue of environment, 
energy and climate ranked only 11th, with 5% of the EU citizens granting it any importance. 
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The detailed analysis of the subject of energy indicates that only issues directly relevant to the 
citizens are of consideration. Stability of energy prices, the increase in the share of renewable 
energies, guarantees of energy supply and ways to increase energy efficiency are of 
importance, while the subject of nuclear energy does not emerge (Eurobarometer, 2011). 
 
In spite of not being among the dominant issues for the citizens, the subject of nuclear energy 
is a matter of political, media and professional discourses. These discourses often reflect 
presence of certain imbedded values. An outline of the discourse of certain selected EU 
member countries is given below46. It may be argued that the selection of the countries is 
somewhat arbitrary, however the intention has been to include a cross section of countries that 
represent EU member states, by differences, among others, in attitude to and perceived 
importance of nuclear energy, country size and economic power. 
 
5.3.1. Morality and altruism - the Netherlands 
 
Benefits and risks are weighed against each other based on morality, where both advocates 
and critics of the use of nuclear energy refer to arguments deriving of personal norm systems 
(de Groot, Steg, 2010). The norms of the individual create a link between weighing the 
benefits and risks on the one hand, and willingness to act on the other hand. The existence of 
strong personal value system norms is linked to the willingness to act. The level of 
willingness to act differs between supporters and opponents of nuclear energy, with 
opponents expressing a higher level of readiness to act. The most often expressed criticism 
against the use of nuclear energy is the immoral nature of the unsolved issue of radioactive 
waste and of used fuel. Both the legacy for the next generations or its export to other 
countries reflect irresponsible and immoral attitude. 
 
In everyday life personal norms are not necessarily noticeable, however they become triggers 
of action when it is realized that non-moral action may lead to detrimental consequences 
(Schwartz, 1977). Expected positive effects are also motivators of actions based on personal 
norms (Schwartz, Howard, 1981). The issue of morality is raised with claimed intrusion into 
the order of nature with potentially significant moral implications (Sjoberg, 2000, 2004). 
 
                                                
46 In this part the author built on a previous presentation and research: Safety Narrative of Nuclear Energy at the 
Conference of the Culture of Safety and Defence, Gödöllő, 14 June, 2013 and the publication of the text The 
Issue of Safety and Security in the Discourse about Nuclear Energy in Hungary in the consequent conference e-
book, available at: http://psharg.com/Preview/gabor-sarlos.html 
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From the perspective of efforts related to global warming, it has been noted that altruism is 
the basic value prerequisite of an environmentally aware behavior. For the individual, 
environmental awareness implies reduced consumption, in hope that the society will use the 
benefits of more favorable environmental conditions. Having the community goals realized 
requires giving up on individual goals. The price of giving up is a burden for the individual, 
while the whole community can reap its benefits. However, benefits are only significant, if a 
considerable number of individuals give up on consumption. In case of issues where costs and 
benefits are not closely related, changing mentality remains a challenge however.  
 
5.3.2. Level of trust - United Kingdom 
 
Risk perception of a specific issue reflects the level of trust towards the operators of the given 
system (Renn and Levine, 1991; Johnson, 1999; Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003b). The complex 
role of the UK government in nuclear regulation and its relation to the nuclear industry 
contributes to complex results regarding level of trust. (Poortinga, Pidgeon, Lorenzoni, 2006). 
32% of British agree that existing rules are sufficient to control the nuclear industry while 
26% oppose to this statement. 33% each agree and disagree with the claim that the British 
government regulates nuclear issues in a satisfactory manner. At the same time 41% of 
respondents think that the government is too much influenced by the nuclear industry. 39% of 
pollees express doubts about the nuclear industry, if it would operate nuclear plants in a safe 
and secure way, while, in another question, 41% agree that the British nuclear industry has 
good reason to be pride about its safety records. The issue of trust can be extended to a cross 
section of actors related to the nuclear issues (Bickerstaff et al, 2008). The highest level of 
trust is towards environmental organizations and scientists at universities and environmental 
groups. Government and the nuclear industry scientists lag behind, while the highest level of 
distrust is shown against nuclear corporations. Competence, care and consensual values form 
trust-building factors (Johnson, 1999). The first refers to the competence and professional 
expertise of the members of the nuclear industry; the second one includes an open attitude and 
the readiness to communicate, while the third one covers the basis for having a common 
ground between the individuals and the effected company. 
 
Following a shift in perception, British population accepts, but not without condition, the 
need of nuclear energy as a response to the global warming challenges. A minority of the UK 
population expresses unconditional support to the use of nuclear energy. ‘Reluctant 
acceptance’ (Bickerstaff et al., 2008) is expressed by those who, weighing the risks of the use 
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of nuclear energy, accept the need of its use, as ‘there is nothing better instead’. These 
respondents are fighting with resignation, discomfort and frustration. The least support is 
shown by those who are critical towards the issues of climate change, the security of energy 
supply and who put high priority to environmental values. The researchers summarize this by 
saying that the issues of climate change and secure energy supply can only have a limited 
impact on the support of nuclear energy. Significant growth in the proportion of supporters 
would only appear once the other, better-preferred options had all run out. Confusion about 
trust is built further by contradicting results of different pieces of research. Of 17 different 
pieces of research overviewed by a British Parliament committee, 3 showed a clear but not 
unconditional support to nuclear energy, 8 reflected divided public opinion, while the 
majority in further 6 studies refused the extended use of nuclear energy. The argumentation in 
the latter studies focused on distrust against the method of nuclear waste disposal, the distrust 
in the security systems of the nuclear plant, fears about the deconstruction of the nuclear 
plants as well as preference for other energy sources. Confusing opinion poll results 
reconfirm our earlier notion about possible inconsistencies of the nuclear-related pieces of 
research.  
 
5.3.3. Energy security - Lithuania 
 
In Lithuania, three levels of discourse on energy security are identified (Genys, 2013). 
Political discourse creates the framing that the purpose of the energy policy is to provide 
energy security. As underlined frequently in public, this is an issue of national importance. 
Significance is reflected by the use of national symbolism in the discourse when talking about 
energy security; therefore politicians frequently build on terms such as ‘liberating society 
from the energy trap’, ‘national goal’ and ‘energy independence’. Argumentation for energy 
security often resonates geographical threats, especially from Russia.  
 
Scientific discourse operates with rational argumentation, and interprets events and possible 
scenarios in a broader and more complex approach. Processes are analyzed and specific 
projects, including the nuclear energy development plans, are identified through their 
strengths, weaknesses and uncertainties. Scientific discourses do not expand the borders of 
scientific events, and usually take the form of dissemination of research results.  
 
Media discourse on energy security has nuclear energy development plans in the focus, and is 
dominated by politicians and the political discourse. Media discourse does not cover a deeper 
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assessment of energy security situation and appearance of diverse opinions does not exist. 
The environmental, cultural and security aspects of energy development projects are not 
represented. Independent investigative journalism or reflections to the scientific discourse are 
not present in the media. 
 
5.3.4. Technological competence - Finland 
 
Perceived technological competence of the country and of nuclear power generation are the 
key drivers in Finnish narratives on nuclear energy (Fjaestad, Hakkarainen, 2013). A general 
consensus prevails among politicians and businesspeople, that the key element of maintaining 
competitiveness of Finnish industry is availability of low cost, reliable and domestically 
produced energy. This confidence is further reinforced with the advanced development plans 
of a final disposal facility for nuclear waste. The relevant Finnish authorities in charge of 
nuclear safety enjoy high-level public trust as reliable and independent regulators. Any 
discourse about safety of use and the future of nuclear energy emerge is commonly waived by 
the notion that nuclear accidents happen among totally different political or geographical 
circumstances. There is a self-proclaimed limitation on nuclear development by the 
government, which has decided not to grant further decisions-in-principle during its term, but 
agreed to the processing of a number of decision-in-principles already approved. On nuclear 
issues most political parties give freedom to their members of parliaments to cast their votes 
and do not bind them in an obligatory manner. Technological competence is perceived both as 
a facilitator of execution of nuclear development plans and the main reason to continue these 
projects. However, the population seems to be divided on the nuclear issue with the majority 
expressing in 2009 and 2010 that following the finishing of the current NPP construction, 
Finland should not build any further reactors47. 
 
5.3.5. Managing risks - France 
 
With the highest share of atomic power in generation of electricity, the second highest 
capacity and number of reactors, and being one of the leading countries in terms of nuclear 
technology, France is a global leader in nuclear power generation. As the country has an 
influential position in nuclear energy related issues, analysis of nuclear discourse may have a 
special significance on a global scale as well. Importance of nuclear energy and technological 
                                                
47Finns Remain Opposed to Additional Nuclear Power Reactors, Yle, 29 March, 2010,  
http://yle.fi/uutiset/finns_remain_opposed_to_additional_nuclear_power_reactors/5536424, accessed December 
2013 
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competency leave their mark on the perception of nuclear energy. Support to nuclear power is 
strengthened further by high level of trust towards the nuclear establishment, which has both 
the political power and the technical competency to offer a safe source of energy production 
(Weinberg, 1991). Nevertheless support to nuclear energy should not be considered ‘blind’. 
The majority of the French population are aware that nuclear power production has 
considerable risks, with 63% of French adults confirming risks of nuclear plants (Bastide et 
al, 1989). In public attitudes to nuclear energy, considerable skepticism can be observed, even 
growing to the extent of mass protests (Brouard, Guinaudeau, 2013). Both the support to 
nuclear energy and the level of risk awareness is high.  
 
‘Grounded risk taking’ can be referred to a number of factors:  
 
1. Trust in political system and in competency of authorities reinforce feeling of shared risk 
taking.  
2. ‘Grounded risk awareness’ implies manageable risk taking. The density of nuclear reactors 
in France entail that most of the population would have direct experience of living in the 
vicinity of a NPP. Experience of day-to-day ‘co-habitation’, possible economic and 
employment benefits as well as psychological identification with the nuclear agenda all 
result in perception of manageability of risks (Maderthaner et al, 1978). 
3. Altruistic feelings and agreement to accommodate the interests of the society may also 
generate a more positive than average attitude towards nuclear energy, and contribute to 
perceived low level of risks. 
 
In a detailed research of all the possible factors reinforcing grounded risk taking, only the 
correlation with perceived economic benefits was validated (Rogers, 1984). Notably, citizens 
of technologically advanced countries seem to have a higher level of risk taking. In the USA, 
in the case of nuclear energy, 31% of respondents belong to the group of acknowledged risk 
takers, who are aware of the risks of potential nuclear accidents, but still support the increased 
reliance on nuclear power (Greenberg, Truelove, 2011). A detailed analysis shows that 
‘acknowledged risk takers’ are highly represented in four groups: among the elderly, those 
who have a high level of confidence in the energy production companies and the authorities 
exercising control over them, those with a strong conviction that energy production provides 
an important contribution to the development of the local economy and those who have a 
strong set of individual values. 
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5.3.6. Responsibility – Switzerland 
 
Multiple layers of responsibility characterize the case of Switzerland. Responsible attitude to 
nuclear energy and its environment is reflected by an attitude of participatory decision-
making as well as deliberative and discursive exchange of information on critical aspects of 
nuclear energy (Visschers et al, 2011, von Roten, 2013). Of all possible aspects and potential 
risk hazards of nuclear energy, with 95% of the respondents agreeing, handling of radioactive 
waste is considered the most critical (TNS, 2013). This is a reflection of responsibility 
towards the following generations. A further reflection of responsibility is the acceptance of 
expertise and technological knowledge, together with openness and respect of information 
from NGOs and scientists (TNS, 2013). In 2008, 7% of the Swiss population expressed total 
support to nuclear energy and a further 33% was fairly in favor. The 40% proportion of total 
supporters remained stable (41%) five years later, in 2013. However, the proportion of 
opponents increased significantly, primarily due to the sharp rise in number of those totally 
opposed to nuclear energy. The share of those fairly opposing decreased from 38% to 37%, 
however the proportion of those totally opposing increased from 14% to 20% of the 
population, resulting in a total opposition of 57% of respondents.48 The nuclear discourse in 
Switzerland is characterized by an open exchange of information and of opinions, reflected in 
viewpoints that at certain stage may appear contradictory. The rationality of the discourse is 
indicated by the ability of the pollees to analyze various factors separately. In contrast to the 
current opposition, a majority would turn supportive to nuclear energy in case the situation of 
nuclear waste was solved. As to the findings, 16% of all respondents would be ready to turn 
from opposition to support if a long term and secure solution was found for handling of 
radioactive waste. (TNS, 2013). 
 
Research proves remarkable differences in terms of attitudes to nuclear energy. Geographical 
location and the linguistic divide (Diekmann et al., 2009, von Roten, 2012) are important 
points of differentiation, and so are the gender issues and the ideological differences. German 
speaking Swiss are more supportive to nuclear energy than the French speaking population, 
men are more in favor than women, while as those who identify themselves on the right are 
significantly more in favor of nuclear energy than those who are on the left (TNS, 2013). This 
may explain why differences in views on nuclear energy are described as reflection of choices 
between values related to ecological or economy focused development models (von Roten, 
2013). Finally, quite exceptionally in Europe, the state plays a very limited role in being 
                                                48#Share of „don’t know” dropped from 8% to 2% of respondents.#
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involved in the discourse. It rather pictures itself as the watchdog or facilitator of the process. 
In contrast to the stateification process describe earlier, it takes a neutral position and this 
seems to be appreciated by the citizens through respect of information that would come from 
the state. 
 
5.4. Risks and benefits in the European nuclear discourse  
 
Indisputably, decisions of European countries on nuclear energy, as well as the various 
discourses reflect existence of various narratives. The construction of reality differs in each 
case, the assessment of the balance of nuclear related risks and benefits change not only from 
country to country, but over the years may lead to opposing views and decisions than what 
had been thought and decided years before. Discourses emerge as these narratives confront 
with each other. The core difference between the various narratives can be summed up 
whether the perceived benefits or the perceived risks are of bigger importance. The balance of 
risks and benefits not only gives a direction to the national discourses, but also serves as 
argumentation and basis of decision-making. Acknowledgment of the increased timeframe 
needed for the realization of a nuclear power plant, due to more and more complex planning, 
safety, financing and licensing processes, is unavoidable. The assessment of current and 
future situations as well as extrapolation of trends is more important than ever. 
 
Risks and benefits may provide the overriding framing to nuclear discourse. A number of 
pieces of research serve to understand their nature and their relationship. It is argued, that 
there is no direct relationship between risks and benefits (Thomas et al, 1979). Along a factor 
analysis of 5 various sources of energy, 3 risk dimensions, psychological and physical 
hazards, environmental hazards and indirect hazards, for example of political nature, were 
identified along with 2 benefit dimensions, economic and technological. It has been found 
that no link exists between the risk dimensions and the benefit dimensions. Presumably, even 
in a repeated research with a further benefit, the environmental aspects being listed, the 
research could bring similar findings. This actually confirms an earlier statement related to the 
Hungarian political discourse, where cost factors and environmental considerations were 
listed both as risk and benefit factors. This approach is furthermore supported by a study that 
underlines that the same factors can reflect both risks and benefits (Otway and Fishbein, 
1977). The study claims that psychological aspects, the socio-political context, environmental 
effects as well as technical and economic consequences can all be considered as any of the 2 
factors.  
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Admission of both risks and benefits is reflected in a growing number of trade-off narratives. 
In this framing, the risks are admitted, however they are positioned as costs in order to enjoy 
the benefits. Following the reframing of nuclear discourse in UK, among others, support of 
nuclear energy is growing when evaluated in the context of climate change. In these cases 
nuclear energy is presented as the solution to fight global warming. Findings of opinion polls 
confirm that support to nuclear energy grows significantly once positioned as a contributor to 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Rosa and Dunlap, 1994). A later survey by Los 
Angeles Times/Bloomberg survey reported that 61 % of pollees endorsed nuclear energy as a 
tool to fight climate change, which is about 10 % higher than in another survey, which did not 
connect the topic of nuclear energy with that of climate change (Simon, 2007). 
With the issue of personal safety and security gaining growing importance, an earlier 
statement may be reinforced, that the public dominantly frames issues in the context of safety, 
while benefits are always secondary only (Midden, 1986). This distinction between perceived 
risks and benefits is advocated further (Slovic, 1987), claiming that the perceived dread, the 
fear or risks is the most important factor. The study showed a high level or correlation 
between attitude and risks, but the relation between attitudes and benefits showed low level of 
correlation. Perceived risks and not the perceived benefits seem to be the main drivers behind 
the attitude towards nuclear power. 
 
It is stated that in spite of a possible imbalance between importance of risks and benefits, 
current and future discourses on nuclear energy are to be strongly guided by the perceived 
risks and benefits. Understanding changes in the social environment and elaborating credible 
narratives will prove irrelevant unless risks and benefits are accounted for. This assessment 
needs to be done separately for each case and maintained up-to-date. Assessment of a 
complex set of future risks and benefits, the preparation of a Perpetual Risks and Benefits 
Repository becomes therefore the key element on which not only nuclear power related 
narratives, but the relevant decisions need to be based as well. The preparation of the 
Perpetual Risks and Benefits Repository would allow each country to monitor all the relevant 
trends, including socio-environmental changes, to perform continuous tracking and planning 
of its nuclear programs. Ultimately, optimal decision-making and process control systems can 
be established in the nuclear field. 
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CHAPTER VI: THE NEED AND THE PRECONDITIONS OF A 
RESTRUCTURED NUCLEAR DISCOURSE  
 
6.1. Triggering the discourse: signing of the nuclear agreement with Russia 
 
The 13 January 2014 brought an unexpected turn in the discourse about nuclear energy in 
Hungary. That day, in the presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán, the general director of Russian nuclear energy giant Rosatom and the 
Hungarian Minister for National Development signed an intergovernmental agreement for the 
construction of two new units at the Paks NPP. To secure financing of the construction, 
Russia agreed to offer a loan of up to 10 billion euro. 
 
The signing of the contract caught the public, and, apparently, the majority of the political and 
professional stakeholders by surprise. The previous narrative and the overwhelming 
impression was that even if, due to the existing Russian technology reactors in Paks, Russian 
suppliers would have an advantage when bidding for the delivery of the new reactors, 
however it would be proceeded by an international bid to create competition. Nobody 
expected ‘announcement of the winner before the actual shot of the starting gun’49. Previous 
political narratives underlined the importance of careful consideration, involvement of the 
public, or at least of the professional circles, as well as providing of a transparent procedure. 
Until about November 2013, the importance of an international tender was repeatedly 
emphasized in government interviews.  
 
It cannot be claimed that no signals at all have preceded the signing of the agreement. About 
three months earlier, mentioning of the significance of the international bid faded out of 
media, interviews started to appear underlining importance of continuity and compatibility of 
technology with the existing nuclear technology in Paks. Minister of State, János Lázár, at a 
meeting of the parliamentary committee of economic affairs in mid-December, highlighted 
significance of cooperation with Russia in a range of fields, including nuclear technology. As 
noted before, the political narrative of the nuclear development previously took a notable 
change, and the summer 2013 the expression has moved from ‘expansion of Paks with two 
new reactors’ to ‘maintenance of nuclear capacity’, claiming that the current 4 reactors in 
Paks will cease to operate in the 2030s, and therefore ample preparation need to be pursued to 
                                                
49 Gábor Sarlós: Atomcsend - Túléli-e Orbán az oroszok behívását? / Nuclear silence - Will Orbán survive 
inviting the Russians in, Magyar Narancs, 23 Jan 2014, available at: 
http://magyarnarancs.hu/publicisztika/atomcsend-88392 
 112 
‘maintain capacity’. In the media narrative, an increasing number of normative statements and 
appearance of confronting views indicated approaching to decision points. However, all 
technological explanations and economic argumentations aside, the news of signing of the 
contract took the majority of the Hungarian public, both experts and lay public, by surprise. 
 
The signing of the extension of the Hungarian - Russian cooperation treaty on nuclear energy 
resulted in a sudden intensification, and in many respects, change in public discourse. The 
actual development of events, and the intention to provide framing to what the agreement 
actually contains, what is behind and what it all means resulted in the sudden proliferation of 
narratives. Analysis of the narratives and of the development of the discourse may provide an 
important insight into understanding the differences in narratives and the extended discourse. 
The analysis of the discourse on nuclear energy and on the Paks expansion project is based on 
the comparative analysis of the periods October - December 2013 and January - March 2014, 
in practical terms before and following the signing. Choice of periods was driven by the need 
to identify and compare trends, and exclude over-dominant effects of single events. The 
analysis of narratives is based on a ‘snap-shot methodology’ that focuses on the integrated 
analysis of a variety of sources. This research builds on the following sources: 
 
- Hungarian language ‘traditional’ media 
- websites of individual actors 
- professional developments 
- public events 
- opinion polls 
 
6.2. Changes of meta-framings of the nuclear agenda 
 
The analysis indicates the interpretation of the post-decision situation has required adaptation 
of previous narratives. All stakeholders needed to redefine their attitude to the situation and 
develop their narratives accordingly (see Table 26). 
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actor 
(in order of 
activity in the 
post-decision 
discourse) 
pre-decision  
primary meta-framing 
of Paks expansion Oct - 
Dec 2013 
post-decision 
primary meta-framing of 
Paks expansion 
Jan - March 2014 
change 
in focus 
of 
framing 
change 
in 
commu-
nication 
intensity  
sign of 
any 
political 
framing 
government 
and 
government 
parties 
a key element of the 
approved energy strategy 
and a necessity for 
energy security and for 
economic development 
a must for the economic 
development of the country 
and a guarantee for 
political independence 
partial growth yes 
opposition 
parties 
debated the need from 
energy, climate and 
economic perspective  
a proof of misuse of 
political power 
yes growth yes 
environmental 
NGOs 
contradicts European 
trends and supersedes 
renewables 
not only contradicts 
European trends and 
supersedes renewables 
decision making, but 
exclusion of public reflects 
abuse of political power 
partial growth yes 
energy 
economics 
analysts 
diverse, but primarily 
energy and climate 
diverse, expanding also 
into economic and political 
aspects  
partial growth yes 
political 
analysts (new 
actors) 
- foreign policy aspects, loss 
or regain of independence 
new growth yes 
non-nuclear 
energy 
profession 
an important element of 
the energy mix together 
with other sources of 
energy 
an understandable 
decision, but made 
unnecessarily early and in 
an unexplained rush 
yes steady no 
nuclear energy 
profession  
safe, clean and cost 
efficient solution for 
energy needs 
safe, clean and cost 
efficient solution for 
energy needs 
no steady no 
scientific 
sphere 
diverse diverse  no growth no 
Table 26: Changes in narratives following signing of nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia  
 
 
6.3. Analysis of immediate changes  
 
Signing of the nuclear cooperation agreement brought considerable changes in the prevailing 
meta-framing of narratives. Of the 8 stakeholder groups, it brought a partial or total change of 
focus in the case of 5 of them, did not initiate such change in the case of 2 groups, and 
furthermore resulted in the creation of a new stakeholder group. It also contributed 
considerably to the change of intensity of communication: 6 groups intensified their public 
presence while 2 remained at their previous level of intensity. 
 114 
 
In terms of direction of change it can be stated that the dominant energy-economics narrative 
has become fragmented and a more diverse approach prevails instead. In the post-decision 
framing, together with the energy and economics narratives, political narrative becomes an 
equally important interpretational structure. In fact, in the case of certain stakeholder groups, 
especially in connection with the timing and the form of decision-making, the political aspect 
becomes the dominant approach. In the case of 3 of the 8 stakeholder groups: the nuclear and 
the non-nuclear energy profession as well as the science actors, emergence of the political 
aspects cannot be observed. As noted before, the change in narratives did not all happen at 
once. The growing divergence in the perception of actual risks and benefit became noticeable 
as early as October 2013. In the period leading to the decision, the energy economics aspects 
also became apparent, to be joined with an increasing level of political connotations as well. 
The trend responds to the overall assessment that evaluation of the nuclear agenda requires a 
broad approach. Broadening of the approach carries three further consequences: 
 
1. The concept of nuclear energy cannot be considered as a matter of energy policy only, but 
as an issue that is in close connection to the overall social - political structure of a given 
country.  
2. The group of actors and stakeholders of the nuclear agenda cannot be limited to energy 
technicians and politicians, but needs to be extended to represent a broad range of 
stakeholders across the public to ensure representation of all possible stakeholders.  
3. Finally, the issue cannot be described in the context of a linear model, but is a complex 
issue with multidimensional aspects, the needs of which systemic thinking serves better. 
 
Shift in attitude of media  
 
Compared to the pre-decision period, the intensification of media involvement can be noticed. 
Previously, the limited scope of narratives and the representation of the nuclear agenda as an 
issue for energy professionals created an invisible glass ceiling for the issue. Consequently, 
the topic did not extend beyond the specialized media and the particular sections, columns 
and programs. From the public perception the differences of approaches and narratives were 
not notable. Comparison of media coverage of the 2 periods indicate the following changes: 
- significant increase of level of media intensity50 
                                                
50 In fact, in the period mid January - mid February it becomes the leading political and economic topic in the 
Hungarian media 
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- involvement of a wide range of media, including presence in mainstream and tabloid as well 
- diversification of media approaches, in terms of choice of dominant narratives 
- emergence and visualization of contradicting argumentations within one media, in the form 
of series of articles, parallel interviews, representation of pro and contra arguments, as well 
as proliferation of publicist and opinion letter publications 
 
Change in role of media reflects realization of two issues. First, the intensification of 
stakeholder group activities exercises direct or hidden pressure on the media to provide 
coverage for specific narratives. Second, the public expresses a growing interest in the issue 
of Paks expansion. The possible reason is that with the differentiation of narratives and the 
intensification of communication, members of the public become aware that the extended and 
expanded use of nuclear energy, as well as the conditions of the new project exercises an 
effect on their individual lives. Diversification of narratives also means they can more easily 
find a narrative to associate with, therefore identification or alienation towards the issue 
becomes more apparent. Through depicting the decision as a step that, for the next 50-70 
years, will exercise a strong influence on the lives of people in Hungary, the media becomes a 
partner for a more complex thinking.  
 
Emergence of new considerations 
 
Beyond the changes in meta-framing as discussed above, new aspects have also emerged. The 
fact of having the extension of the nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia, and signing of 
the contract for the delivery of two new reactors with Rosatom, resulted in placing the 
Hungarian nuclear agenda into a pan-European context. First, the exclusion of any public 
bidding and the consequent elimination of possible involvement of French, US, Japanese, 
Chinese and Korean firms, granted a pan-European, international context to it.  
 
Beyond the apparent disappointment, the way of decision-making and the content of the 
agreement has been put up to investigation of the European Union. While a pre-decision 
notice had been made to the EU, and the involvement of Euratom51 in the preparatory phase 
was secured, still the active interference of the Competition Commissioner of the European 
Commission is expected. They would investigate the compliance of the agreement and the 
decision making with the relevant EU regulations. The growing presence of the European 
                                                
51 The Euratom Treaty is an organization of the European Union to pool knowledge, infrastructure, and funding 
of nuclear energy. It ensures the security of atomic energy supply within the framework of a centralized 
monitoring system. 
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narrative can furthermore be assumed by the fact that the political argumentation for the need 
of capacity increase repeatedly refers to the export potential of electric energy into Western 
Europe. Raising this issue resulted in repeated discussions on the future of the energy balance 
of the European Union, and possibly keeps this aspect on the agenda.  
 
A further significant aspect that offers ground to various interpretations is that of the 
conditions of an up to 10 billion euro loan that Russia extends to Hungary, detailed conditions 
of which are undisclosed to the public52. Finally, the European context is clearly explained by 
the complex relationship between members of the European Union and Russia. Especially in 
light of the Ukraine and Crimean crisis within a few weeks after the signing of the Paks 
expansion deal, repeated discussions prevail on the feasibility and the political rationality of 
such a long-term agreement. The risks and benefits analysis of the Paks expansion plans now 
need to be considerably broadened to include factors deriving of the involvement of Russia. 
 
Emergence of new actors 
   name stakeholder 
group 
contribution to narrative 
Gábor G. Fodor political 
analyst 
deal contributes to increased, long term independence 
Zoltán Sz. Bíró political 
analyst 
involvement of Russia increases number and complexity 
of risk factors 
János Ősz energetics 
professor 
lack of transparent bidding and choice of outdated reactor 
model reduces potential efficiency of NPP 
owners of Manitu Solar, PV 
systems company 
non-nuclear 
energy 
professionals 
the deal results in unfair spraying of costs and risks across 
the whole population, instead of individual energy 
development projects 
Zoltán Hózer, president, 
Magyar Nukleáris Társaság 
(Hungarian Nuclear Society) 
nuclear energy 
professionals 
welcomes the deal, urges steps in nuclear education and 
training, and identifies political influence as risks, that 
could endanger professionally grounded decision making 
Pál Zarándi, Magyar Mérnöki 
Kamara (Hungarian Chamber 
of Engineers) 
engineers support to deal and identification of opportunities for 
Hungarian engineers to join in the project 
HYPE - Hungarian Young 
Professionals in Energy 
energy 
professionals 
decision shows that alternatives have not been considered 
carefully, while conditions of decision making contribute 
to the confusion within the lay as well as the professional 
public about the validity and the soundness of the 
decision 
  Table 27: Selected new contributors and contributions to the nuclear discourse 
                                                
52 Reference of details of loan conditions were made on the website of the Russian Parliament, as quoted by 
Hungarian news site Index, 13 March, 2014, available at: 
http://index.hu/gazdasag/energia/2014/03/13/az_oroszok_jovahagytak_a_paksi_hitelt/, accessed 4 April, 2014 
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Following the decision, a number of actors emerged who had practically not been present in 
the pre-decision period (Table 27). Some of them appear in stakeholder groups were not 
active at all, while others represent groups that were already on the scene, but interpretational 
differences emerged within the group and resulted in diversification of the discourse.  
 
 
Intensification of coalition building 
 
Support to narratives and increase of credibility is hammered through by coalition building 
and by third-party endorsement. It can be observed that protagonists of key narratives 
reinforce efficiency of communication narratives and of the desired framing by building 
coalitions. Coalitions have the advantage to support the given narrative of the issue by: 
 
- adding credibility 
- enrichment of the narrative 
- representing and involving the interest of various groups of the public 
- decreasing power of direct criticism 
 
Initiative for building scientific discourse 
 
The Hungarian Academy of Sciences initiated and hosted an event53 where scientists and 
professionals presented their views on various aspects of nuclear energy. The event was 
organized in 2 main sections: technical, economic and international contexts in one section 
and alternatives, energy sources and security issues in the other one. The event was the first of 
its kind to provide the floor in equal numbers to protagonists and opponents of the Paks deal 
and the nuclear agenda. The event proved to be the first, and by the time of 31 March, the 
only forum where confronting views were presented in a systematic manner. The forum itself 
did not offer chance for questions and comments from the audience but, through the 
presentations and the interaction between the presenters, showed a significant initiative for 
stimulating public discourse. The significance of a scientific approach is apparent, however 
its exact role needs to be pursued further. 
 
 
                                                
53 ‘Electric energy supply in Hungary in the 21 century’, 18 February 2014, presentations of the conference can 
be downloaded from: http://mta.hu/mta_hirei/tudomanyosan-megalapozott-ervekkel-az-atomenergiarol-133574/ 
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Missing narratives 
 
In the intensified and, in some cases, emotionally heated discourse, the lack of involvement of 
Paks 2, the project firm of the actual nuclear development program, and MVM Hungarian 
Electricity Ltd., the state-owned mother company of Paks 2, is apparent. First hand 
information from the top executives of these companies is non-existent, all signs indicate a 
subordinate role in the actual execution of the project, to the Russian general contractor on the 
one had and to the Hungarian government, on the other hand. Furthermore, as by 31 March 
2014, Paks 2 is still not present in the virtual world and does not have a public website at all. 
The only information available about the project firm is a one page information on the MVM 
website, containing the basic facts of the company, similarly to all the daughter companies of 
MVM, as well as a Facebook page that comprises lists of which municipalities the 
informational truck is visiting next. Information about the company, the project and any 
background material on the decision is unavailable. Non-communication being a form of 
communication, the situation raises challenges in terms of transparency of and trust towards 
the nuclear development program. 
 
Publication of new opinion polls 
 
Two pieces of public research were published within 3 weeks after the decision on Paks 
expansion54 (Table 28). The motives for creating the polls and their timing show considerable 
similarity, however the findings of the 2 polls differ significantly. 
 
Through the potential support to a variety of narratives, opinion polls can easily become tools 
for communication, or, possibly, for manipulation. As discussed before, a range of factors can 
add to or deduct of the credibility of opinion polls. Analysis of the findings reflect the double 
function of opinion polls: they serve as a prime tool to understand and interpret the social 
environment as well as being challenged by becoming tools to support different narratives.  
 
Notably however, the core findings of the two pieces of research do not necessarily contrast 
each other. A general, though not very strong support to Paks expansion easily turns into 
rejection, once the nature of Russian involvement is brought to the picture.55 In spite of 
                                                
54 http://nezopontintezet.hu/aktualis/paks-nem-jo-tema-az-ellenzeknek/, accessed 17 February, 2014 and 
http://www.median.hu/object.57f2f4fe-d1cd-4a70-9496-3b4de41e3126.ivy, accessed 17 February, 2014 
55 One of the newspaper headlines sums this up by claiming: ‘People nod to Paks expansion but can not stand 
thought of Russian loan’, (“Az emberek a paksi bővítést igenlik, az orosz hitelt rühellik”), Népszava, 3 February, 
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key aspects Nézőpont Institute Medián 
date of publication 1 February, 2014 3 February, 2014 
focus of research - Paks expansion 
- Russian - Hungarian economic cooperation 
- Paks expansion 
- attitude to form of decision making 
key findings Paks expansion  
support: 52%, oppose: 25%, NR: 23% 
 
Paks deal brings rather advantageous or 
disadvantageous: 
adv: 42%, disadv: 23%, NR: 35% 
 
tighten Russian-Hungarian cooperation 
support: 55%, oppose 9%, keep: 22%, NR: 
14% 
Paks expansion by Russian company 
and with Russian loan 
support: 34%, oppose: 56%, NR: 
10% 
 
surprised by news of signing Paks 
deal 
agree: 78%, disagree: 20%, NR: 2% 
 
holding referendum on the issue: 
support: 59%, oppose: 36%, NR: 5% 
headline of press 
release 
Paks: not good topic for opposition (Paks nem 
jó téma az ellenzéknek) 
Paks expansion: serious concerns 
(Paks bővítés: súlyos fenntartások) 
methodology 20-25 January, 1000 pollees, telephone 
interviews 
24-28 January, 1200 pollees, 
personal interviews 
commissioner of poll not clarified not clarified 
general framing Paks expansion and strengthening ties with 
Russia bear the support of the majority of the 
population, therefore a possible political meta-
framing is futile.  
The content of the decision is 
controversial, the form of decision 
making is unacceptable: a 
referendum is needed to decide on 
this issue 
Table 28: Comparison of 2 public polls of February 2014 
 
compatibility of findings, the results serve as support materials for the emphasis of broader 
narratives. This is constructed by placing the issue into a broader, and preferred context or 
framing, and obtaining support to the narrative from the findings of the actual poll. 
Consequently the findings become tools for the reinforcement of credibility of different 
narratives. 
                                                                                                                                                   
2014, accessed 17 February, 2014, http://nepszava.hu/cikk/1009782-az-emberek-a-paksi-bovitest-igenlik-az-
orosz-hitelt-ruhellik 
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Membership suspensions in the Aarhus roundtable 
 
The 4th meeting of the Aarhus roundtable took place the 20th February, in the aftermath of 
the signing of the nuclear agreement. The focus topic of the meeting was to acquire 
information about the nuclear cooperation agreement and about the Paks development plans, 
from representatives of the government and the licensee sides. A presentation was delivered 
by the general manager of MVM Paks2 on the project plans related to the 2 new reactors, 
followed by an intense question and answer session. Members of the government and 
authorities side did not add further information, referring to the fact that MVM Paks2 is the 
entity in charge of the development plan. At the end of the session, most NGO members of 
the roundtable56 announced suspension of membership and participation in the working group 
and the roundtable, due to the unsatisfactory information regarding the Paks deal and lack of 
general progress at the roundtable. At the same time, an informal reference was made, that 
due to the impossibility of the Aarhus process, NGO members will continue seeking new 
channels, to obtain information and to exercise public pressure on nuclear-related decision 
making and execution of development plans. 
 
6.4. Strategic consequences to the nuclear discourse 
 
Diversification within stakeholder groups 
 
Signing of the agreement resulted in the emergence of new actors on the scene. This resulted 
in the diversification and of opinions within the stakeholder groups. Diversification of 
opinions has been generated by the influx of a range of new factors comprising the actual 
issue. In a number of areas, differences in opinions and complexity of open questions reflect 
the lack of detailed information. Information holes and differences in interpretations lead to 
differentiation of narratives. Stakeholder groups that have previously been characterized by 
shared or even standardized opinions now show signs of fragmentation. Complexity of issue 
raises a list of aspects up for potential discussions: 
 
- the content of the decision 
- the actual content of the agreement 
                                                
56 Greenpeace, MTVSZ, Energiaklub and EMLA 
 121 
- timing of the decision 
- validity of the agreement 
- preparedness of the agreement 
- purpose of the agreement 
- political consequences of the agreement 
- economic and financial consequences of the agreement 
- consequences of the agreement on taxpayer commitments 
- relation between contract and energy prices 
- risks and benefits of the agreement 
 
Apparently the only aspect where agreement exists is that an agreement has been signed 
between Hungary and Russia, and a contract signed between Rosatom and the Hungarian 
Minister for National Development. 
 
Potential erosion of political credibility 
 
Longitudinal analysis of the narratives of political parties reflects significant changes in their 
Paks narratives. Most of these cases build on the usual phenomena, where parties in 
opposition tend to say and act differently then once being in power. In a system where major 
political parties regularly swap positions in elections, this induces swapping narratives and 
views on nuclear energy as well. In the current case significant changes in narratives can be 
identified in relation to the following aspects: 
 
Paks expansion needs referendum   vs. Paks expansion needs parliamentary decision 
dealing with Russia is dangerous   vs. dealing with Russia is an economic necessity 
nuclear energy increases dependence  vs. nuclear energy increases independence 
the issue is expanding Paks NPP  vs. the issue is maintaining Paks NPP capacity 
absolute need for international bidding vs. no need for international bidding 
 
Changes in narratives and continued public support to the parties performing these changes 
represent two factors. First, the public apparently accepts the fact that political parties tend to 
modify their views. As long as these are in line with the general value system and beliefs of 
the given individual, their support is ensured. Second, identification with the overall meta-
framing is critical. As long as the narratives fit into the overall political meta-framing, be it 
independence, stability, or European values, actual steps will not cause loss of credibility 
 122 
from their own electorate. Consequently, even radical changes in views on nuclear energy, in 
spite of risking political credibility, will not reduce overall loyalty as long as the meta-
framing is accepted. This implies success of utilitarian politics and of efficient 
communications. 
 
Growing acceptance of constructed realities 
 
Changes in narratives could potentially generate a cognitive dissonance in the public. Certain 
fundamental elements of the nuclear agenda have changed, causing conflicts in the 
conditioning of the audience. As the issue of nuclear energy still remains complex, and proves 
difficult to understand, conflicting narratives result in an obligation to choose. Choice is then 
made based on the assumption of trust and credibility. As the issue becomes more and more 
of a political issue, members of the public are ready to give up or change their assumption or 
feelings about nuclear energy, but much less ready to make compromise on their political 
choices, as these are reflections of basic values and beliefs. Constructed realities not only 
continue to prevail, but are even strengthened further. 
 
Paks becomes an emotional issue 
 
Becoming a symbolic issue implies that members of the public build strong emotional ties, 
supportive or critical, to the nuclear agenda. The elements of emotional attachment or 
alienation induce that Paks and the issue of nuclear energy is not any more a distant concept, 
but it becomes the clear and understandable symbol of a given action. Not only does it arrive 
in the political sphere, but it becomes a meta-symbol, therefore it can be turned into the 
representation of an actual period or way of thinking. As described earlier, referring to the 
case of the Netherlands, emotional attachment is in strong correlation with the value systems 
of the given individual, and the combination of the two can lead to strong expressions of 
opinions. Consequently, this can lead then to a more powerful representation of individual 
opinions and become an issue for the public sphere. 
 
Conflict between energy independence and political independence 
 
A further discussion is foreseen for the future around the issue of independence. One of the 
key narratives for the deal has been the issue of energy self-reliance and increase of energy 
independence. Expansion of nuclear energy capacity is explained by loosening the ties from 
 123 
imported gas, the source of which is primarily Russia. Electricity of nuclear power is 
generated within the country borders, and is not considered a form of imported energy, even if 
the technology and the fuel can only be supplied from abroad. The price of energy 
independence seems to be political dependence on the supplier of the technology and the fuel. 
The concepts of energy independence and political independence seem mutually exclusive 
and therefore represent contradictory philosophies. 
 
Emergence of a new meta-framing: Europe 
 
The signing of the Hungarian - Russian nuclear agreement induced the development of a new 
meta-framing: the issue of the European context. The complex world of energy is not a 
national issue anyway, however the agreement signed directly with Russia underlined its 
international dimension and consequences. The discussion on the nuclear deal includes a 
strong relevance with a discussion about Europe, in terms of its role, power, future, energy 
needs and supplies. Discussions continue on two levels. On the broader level they concern the 
general value system and role of Europe and the European Union within that. On a more 
detailed level, among others, they concern the actual discussions with the EC Competition 
Commissioner’s Office, the potential implications of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine 
and the projected export potential of surplus electricity to the European Union. The way and 
timing of the signing of the Paks nuclear deal induced it to become a European issue. 
 
6.5. The need for a new conceptual framework 
 
The analysis of the discourse proves that discourse is most commonly driven by actual 
stakeholder interests, and that scope of the current framework and structure of discourse is 
limited. The following analysis pursues the structure of layers covered in the previous 
chapters: parliamentary-political, professional and media discourses as well as reflects on the 
role of opinion polls, and assesses the situation from the perspective of the development of 
the public sphere. 
 
Actors of parliamentary debates are driven by the interest to articulate a clear position to win, 
keep and grow their electorate. Ownership of issues and the ability to govern the prevailing 
narrative is a representation of drive for power. In the period following the signing of the 
nuclear cooperation agreement, political actors shifted or even changed their narratives, 
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previous positions became blurred and intensification of communication is noted. Perceived 
interests clash with inherent value systems and cause volatility to political discourses. 
 
Professional discussions reflect the interests of the actors with the primary purpose to 
overcome the considerable imbalances in access to information. Following the signing of the 
nuclear agreement with Russia, lack of access to relevant information resulted in the 
radicalization of opponents to the agreement. Discourses not only highlighted the emergence 
of conflicts due to differences in access to information but, in the case of a number of 
members opposing the agreement, resulted in the voluntary suspension of participation in the 
work of the Aarhus roundtable. The future of professional discourse is unclear. 
 
Media discourses often echo the views of politicians and, consequently, align with 
parliamentary discussions. In the period January - March 2014 changes in media narratives 
reflect diversification, appearance of differing and conflicting views and an in-depth analysis 
of the nuclear issue. Intensification of media narratives provides a reflection of the complexity 
of the possible approaches. The major difference between media narratives seems to be 
whether primarily political or economic motives originated the move of the Hungarian 
government. It is foreseeable however that the primary media interest in the issue wanes and 
pursuing developments in the field will rest on political intentions. 
 
Opinion polls are trapped in a contradictory situation: their dual role requires delivery of 
support to actual communication activities, while they furthermore become channels of 
communication. Dual nature of polls is best shown by the fact that selected pieces of 
information from actual pieces of research are shared, while other aspects are withheld, 
increasing therefore the risk of potential manipulation or misuse of information. Following 
the nuclear deal, parallel opinion polls with differing findings confirm previous 
manifestations of becoming opinionated and reinforce utilitarian use of research findings. 
 
Subsequently, significant changes took place in the public discourse on nuclear energy in 
Hungary following signing of the nuclear agreement. In all layers of discourse, patterns and 
intensity of communication changed. On the one hand, stakeholder communication intensified 
and became differentiated. In terms of tone, narratives turned direct and critical aspects 
became visible. On the other hand, intensification and diversification of the discourse does 
not seem to have any impact on the actual developments. Changes in narratives resonate with 
the European observations. In most of the European countries over a period of years, shifts of 
 125 
positions, changes in narratives and changes in intensity level of communication are notable. 
Often these changes are triggered by external developments, such as nuclear accidents, 
breakdowns or decisions of other countries or are results of internal shifts in power. 
 
Reason of shift of narratives derives of the complex nature of the subject. In the case of a 
multi-faceted issue like nuclear energy, individual narratives are always dominated by 
emphasizing selected characteristics, features, benefits or risks. Preference of certain aspects 
leads to omission of others. However, as political, professional or media interests change, 
added with changes in the fields of science and technology, natural and social environment, 
philosophy and ethics, new dimensions of the nuclear issue gain growing interest. This may 
lead to a constant change in positions. The January 2014 developments contributed to the 
intensification and diversification of the discourse. Development of the discourse would 
comply with the concept, where the public sphere is a forum of public communication of 
individual citizens (McKenna, 1995). This development, in other terms, could be described as 
the emergence of a higher quality discourse. However, the public discourse on the need and 
use of nuclear energy takes place after a decisive political action has been made and not 
before. In this respect the public discourse does not exercise a direct effect on the outcome of 
events, even if in an ideal situation, that would be its actual purpose. If ensured, 
intensification of the public deliberation could contribute to the development of a stronger 
democracy (Barber, 1984, Dahlberg 2004). 
 
Introduction of a new narrative framework could exercise a change in the ongoing flow of 
changing narratives and contribute to the restructuring of the discourse. A new setting could 
lead to the reinterpretation of actors, narratives and issues. In more general terms, this could 
lead to the development of a new model of public participation in the discourse, decision 
preparation and decision-making on nuclear energy.  
 
6.6. The democratization of nuclear energy 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, nuclear energy is often a symbol of power. Use of nuclear 
power represents a strong country that is able to master and rule the ‘wild energies’ of nature. 
Exploration of nuclear capacities and operating NPPs require concentrated resources of 
intellectual power, building capacities, adaptation of scientific, technical and technological 
innovations, securing of financial constructions and of security systems. All this is entailed to 
the extent where they cannot be delivered without the active involvement of the state. In the 
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case of smaller economies, the development of nuclear capacity is clearly a state 
responsibility. Even in the case of large market economies, NPPs cannot be planned, installed, 
operated and controlled without the actual involvement of the state. Furthermore, 
transmission of electricity from nuclear power plants to the consumers require large 
centralized systems, where power lines transfer centrally produced energy to the peripheries, 
all of which implies the involvement of the state again. Nuclear related safety requirements 
are essential and demand utmost drill and discipline: rules governing everyday work in and 
related to the NPPs must be followed closely. 
 
Ownership of nuclear related knowledge and excess to information is considered a privilege. 
Perception of nuclear energy is that it has the ability to solve all, seemingly contradictory 
issues at the same time. For the public, access to information is limited, based on the notion, 
that the responsibility of dealing with nuclear energy is trusted on the experts.  
 
However, a different narrative could be constructed. In this approach, of all forms of energy 
nuclear power is the one that has the biggest impact on the individual members of the public, 
as well as on the whole community. All the resources that are centralized for the exploration 
of nuclear energy are in the end owned by - or at least drawn from - the community. From the 
perspective of the community, opting for nuclear energy is a compromise, if not a sacrifice 
from the community. Financial needs of the establishment of an NPP mean preference over 
the fulfillment of other needs of the society. A society-based approach to nuclear energy is 
strengthened further by the recognition that consideration of nuclear energy cannot be limited 
to the issues of energy supply and technology aspects only. Due to the multitude and 
complexity of aspects it is better represented as a system of socio-economic nature. Members 
of the society are not simply consumers of energy, but are members of the society with their 
vision, aspiration, needs for security and safety, as well as material and intellectual needs. 
From this perspective, nuclear energy is a choice in which opinion of the members of the 
public is not necessarily reflected. 
 
Finally, the nuclear issue is an issue for all, due to the related risk factors. Previous nuclear 
breakdowns and accidents as well as the unsolved issue of handling nuclear waste, 
geographically extend the risk scope on the one hand and push responsibility to the following 
generations on the other hand. The nuclear option is not just an option but is the option that 
bears numerous consequences for all members of society. Consequently, benefits and risks 
need to be weighed from the perspective of the full public. It is claimed that public acceptance 
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or refusal of nuclear power is not a matter of persuasion (Otway et al, 1978), consequently, 
one way communication channels may prove futile. Attitude formation is not a rational 
process and it requires methods different than information and argumentation. 
 
All these lead to the conclusion that strong arguments could be raised for the need of 
democratization of nuclear energy. This approach would challenge the current narrative of 
nuclear energy as a symbol of dominance of power, centralization, rules and state 
involvement. To reestablish a balance between those with access to information and those that 
have none, the new model would include significant shifts: information sharing instead of 
monopolization of information, and inclusion of all stakeholders instead of an exclusionary 
approach (Sarlós, 2014). In order to gain trust in large-scale public projects, the criteria of 
openness of decision-making processes, maintenance of fair partner relations and involvement 
in decision making are listed (Vári, 2009). 
 
Democratization of nuclear energy needs to start with democratization of the nuclear 
discourse. Public participation in processes might contribute to the levels of social trust, most 
important of which is trust in the government (Mulder, 2012). The concept of democratization 
of nuclear energy is described in the following segments: 
 
- political philosophical context 
- elements of decision making in a public participation model 
- elements of communication in a public participation model 
 
Within the analysis of the social dimensions of nuclear energy, first the possible contextual 
interpretation of nuclear energy development needs to be addressed from a political 
philosophical dimension, and to this end the possible adaptation of a communitarian approach 
is pursued. Seemingly, the use and development of nuclear energy and the principles of 
communitarian principles are not reconcilable. An attempt is made to give an insight into how 
the various criteria of communitarian principles could prevail in the planning of nuclear 
power development and during the use of this source of energy.57 
 
                                                
57 The elaboration of the communitarian approach to nuclear energy is based on a research paper: Gábor Sarlós: 
Ecology and Nuclear Energy, presented 28 May 2013. The paper was developed to study possible adaptability of 
communitarian principles with adoption of nuclear power. The study builds on the premises of communitarian 
principles, as elaborated in detail by András Lányi and discussed among others, in: Lányi, A. (2012) ‘Az 
ökológia, mint politikai filozófia’, Politikatudományi Szemle, vol. 21. no. 1. pp. 105–132.  
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Within the field of political theory, ecology is interpreted as a complex system of 
communitarian endeavors. The characteristics of communitarianism are usually hidden behind 
the dominant triangular classification of conservative, liberal and social philosophies.  
 
Ecology is strongly determined by the principles of communitarianism. It seems that of the 
group of mainstream political philosophies, this is the only one that systematically embraces 
the criteria of ecology. Four key criteria define communitarian principles (Lányi, 2012): self-
determination of communities, localization, equal participation and recognition of the right 
scales. The following analysis examines to what extent these considerations are taken into 
account during the nuclear related decision-making process. Findings could provide 
indication to what extent the aspects of communitarian philosophy are taken into account 
during the decisions, and if the nuclear issue could be assessed on a communitarian basis. 
 
6.7. Nuclear energy from a communitarian perspective 
 
Self-determination 
  
In order to speak about self-determination, the size and extent of the public needs to be 
determined first. Both legal and practical definitions define 3 circles of affected communities. 
First, in practical terms, the community most directly affected consists of the people that live 
in the immediate neighborhood, and bear the most direct consequences of the operations of an 
NPP. Local communities are affected both by the risks and the benefits of such a nuclear 
project. Research shows that local communities are aware of both the high risks and benefits 
of NPPs in the vicinity (Venables et al, 2012). Risks comprise direct and closest exposure to 
possible contamination, radiation, increased traffic and industrial activities. Benefits usually 
comprise increased job opportunities, involvement of local businesses in supplementary 
activities, partnership with local institutions, support to cultural, educational, sport initiatives, 
access to and positive affects of developed technology. Typically, communities that actually 
give location to existing NPPs are the biggest supporters of nuclear installments, while those 
communities that are located just outside of the closest vicinity consider that they have been 
recipients of increased risks only, and do not receive their fair share of increased benefits. 
Consequently the latter are among the strongest opponents of such projects. In a number of 
cases, municipal veto or local referendums reject establishment of a new NPP or a nuclear 
waste disposal facility in a new location (Finland, Sweden, Poland). Diverse practices exist 
regarding requirements for seeking agreement of municipalities. In certain countries (for 
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example Belgium) the municipality has no power of veto, in others (for instance France) it 
may veto or a local referendum may oppose to the project but their decision is not mandatory. 
In a third group of countries, like Finland for example, the municipality has the right to refuse 
hosting the project and veto the decision.  
 
In case of Paks, neither in relation to the original establishment in the 1960-1970, nor in 
connection with later expansions and life cycle extensions has the issue of referendum, be it 
local or national, emerged. During the last years however, political discourse related to the 
current expansion of the Paks NPP did raise the issue. Nevertheless these initiatives always 
represented the demand or promise of opposition parties, and were never shared by those 
actually in government. Important to note that in the 1980s in relation to the foreseen filling 
up of the Püspökszilágy nuclear waste depot, a number of options for locations of new sites 
were investigated. In a local referendum in 1990, the population of one of the communities, 
Ófalu, declared that it was not willing to host the planned nuclear waste depot. The refusal 
resulted in a further expansion of the existing Püspökszilágy site, and the identification of a 
new disposal site for temporary storage of Low and Intermediate Level Waste (LILW) at 
Bátaapáti. The local referendum in this village expressed strong support to the establishment 
of the storage facility. 
 
The population of a given country forms the second circle of the affected community. 
Countries have the right to decide on the establishment of nuclear power plants and 
installations. As described in detail in the European context, expansion decisions are usually 
made through government decisions and backed by parliamentary resolutions, while in certain 
cases national referendums also play a significant role. National level decision-making 
reflects a concept of sharing the risks and benefits across the full country and with the entire 
population, where every member of the national community faces both the benefits and the 
risks of nuclear programs.  
 
In legal terms, the international community forms an even wider circle. Effects of use of 
nuclear energy are trans-boundary, as the potential risks of the operations affect communities 
living beyond the borders of the given country. This is the reason why principles and 
proceedings of international involvement are described in the UN’s EGB agreement (‘Espoo 
agreement’) and the relevant European Parliament and European Council directives58. 
                                                
58 Az egyes köz- és magánprojektek környezetre gyakorolt hatásainak vizsgálatáról szóló 2011/92/EU európai 
parlamenti és a tanács irányelv (KHV irányelv) 
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In summary, the issue of community self-determination in relation to the use of nuclear 
energy could be interpreted on a local level, a national level or a trans-boundary level. 
Community self-determination would mean that the community as a political entity is granted 
the possibility to decide on this issue, unrestricted of external pressures. This aspect is closely 
related to the issue of participation and of sharing and distribution of responsibilities. In 
representative democracies, participation of the community in actual decision-making is 
limited. In fact it is argued that actual participation is not possible, as members of community 
neither have the possibility, nor the interest to obtain all the relevant information for informed 
decision-making. Actual participation is consigned to the elections, where members of the 
community have the possibility to make decisions on who their actual representatives in 
decision-making should be. It may be argued therefore that, be it on local or national level, 
referendums are not elements of communitarian self-determination, but are forms of 
participative decision-making.  
 
Nevertheless for the ease of analysis, referendums on planned extension of nuclear power 
capacities can be signals of community self-determination. In the case of the planned 
extension of the Paks NPP no referendum is foreseen. Self-determination in the context of the 
extension of the Paks NPP does not prevail. Indirectly, through expressions of will through 
representatives, members of the community in Hungary approved the preparatory steps for the 
elaboration of an extension in 2009, which was later interpreted by the actual government as 
an approval for the extension project as such. What can be recorded is that the expansion 
plans enjoy the support of the majority of the members of parliament59. 
 
Localization 
 
The prerequisite of localization means the reestablishment of the human scale. This aspect 
includes correspondence to the policies of responsibility, providence and ecological alertness, 
and form important criteria for the communitarian assessment of nuclear energy. Decisions 
are to be made on the level where their consequences prevail. The contextual frame can be 
interpreted both on a local and a national level, and would include examination of how the 
structure of actual decision-making is done and includes the criteria of localization. In a 
symbolic sense, of all forms of energy production, the distance between nuclear energy 
                                                
59 This remains the case following the parliamentary elections the 6 April, 2014 where the ruling parties won the 
elections and were confirmed in their position. 
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production and the members of the public is the largest. Electricity production and 
transmission from a NPP require highly centralized systems, and consequently become 
symbols of central energy production and radial distribution of energy. This model is in 
significant contrast to grid-based solutions, where energy production, mainly built on 
renewable energies, is localized, and energy supply is provided and balanced through a grid 
network. This network allows overcoming differences in production and usage inequalities. 
Decentralized energy production and grid based sharing of energy are symbols of localization, 
while nuclear energy related decision-making and electricity production represent a 
centralized model.  
 
In terms of environmental effects represented by the policies of responsibility and sparing, 
nuclear energy leaves a mixed footprint. On the one hand, the full process of nuclear energy 
involves elements of significant environmental risk. Uranium mining, transport of radioactive 
fuel, actual energy production, transport, storage and reprocessing of contaminated nuclear 
material and fuel rods include a number of critical elements. While these risks prevail on an 
ongoing basis, major nuclear accidents and catastrophes (Three Mile Island 1979, Chernobyl 
1986, Fukushima 2011) together with smaller accidents and breakdowns (Paks 2003) 
represent significant individual points of danger. On the other hand, nuclear energy 
production has a practically zero level CO2 emission and subsequently offers an important 
alternative to fossil based energy sources. In the stage when use of coal, oil and gas is a major 
contributor of increased CO2 levels, and the limitation and reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions is essential, nuclear energy offers an environment friendly alternative. 
 
Equal participation 
 
The issue of equal participation is in close connection with that of self-determination. 
Stakeholders tend to take an active participatory role, if they see chances for having an 
influence on issues direct affecting them. Community participation makes sense, if it is not 
meant for the posteriori legitimation of an existing measure, but is an a priori act that can 
exercise significant influence on the outcome of decisions. In the case of the expansion of the 
Paks NPP those stakeholders have the right to take part in the procedures that are specifically 
spelled out in the law. Recent developments in the nuclear field, including the signing of the 
nuclear cooperation agreement and start of preparation of the expansion project, prove that the 
scope for action is very limited for gaining access to information and involvement in decision 
making. In legal terms, in case of investments with significant environmental impact, affected 
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actors need to register. Once the relevant authorities approve the right of standing of the given 
actors, the possibility for equal participation is created, however in practical terms strong 
limitations are set in terms of number of actors and content of participation.  
 
Involvement of actors is possible through market and societal elements. Examples of Hungary 
related to establishment of nuclear waste sites prove that involvement of local communities is 
based on market methods: communication and compensation (Vári, 2009). In most cases, 
emphasis of benefits and providing of compensation secured the agreement of the local 
population. The buy-in through buyout method implicates that transparent and active 
involvement in multiple points of decision-making is not present.60 
 
Recognition of the right scale 
 
Ecological considerations put recognition of the right scale in the focus, in contrast to the 
perception of abundance of resources. Communitarian views identify that idealizing 
quantitative performance leads to excessive use of resources, while supremacy of the efficacy 
concept leads to focusing and centralizing resources. Argumentation for nuclear power 
production and the planned extension of the Paks NPP derives necessity of extension from the 
need of increased energy supplies. A report compiled for the Hungarian government by MVM 
Hungarian Electricity Ltd. explains that ‘primarily for the obsolescence of the Hungarian 
power generating capacity and second, for the increase in customer demand - even within the 
temporary setback of economic crisis - 5000 MW of new production capacity needs to be 
installed by 2020 and further 4000 MW of new capacities are needed by 2013’61. 
Argumentation for the investment is explicitly based on figures related to performance. The 
document lacks any reference to argumentation that would refer to factors beyond the 
performance focused economic-energy framing. Actual content and validity of document 
cannot be argued, but it gives indication to the absence of a more general, prudent and 
sophisticated approach. The approach reflects the lack of ecological considerations and of a 
more general, social based approach of the issue. Opponents to the current expansion raise 
issues with emphasis on the recognition of the right scale, referring to surplus energy 
available through energy saving, incentives to exploration, production and use of energy of 
renewables sources, support to community based energy production, energy optimization 
                                                
60 Signs indicate that this practice is followed in the case of the current Paks expansion as well. Almost 2 years 
after its official establishment, in July 2012, MVM Paks 2 Zrt., the project company designed for the 
development and the construction of the new blocks does still not have a web site, but the company decided to 
spend 550 million HUF (appr. euro 1,8 million) on buying media space in the first 6 months of the year alone.  
61 61 http://www.kormany.hu/download/4/83/c0000/ekd_20121026.pdf, introduction, paragraph 2 
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through the development of grid based sharing of energy, and existing oversupply of energy 
in Hungary and in Europe in general. All these meet the criteria of enforcing the right scale 
and the respect to diversity.  
 
In conclusion, the use and the development of nuclear energy capacity has been analyzed 
through 4 critical aspects of communitarianism. The analysis indicates that nuclear energy 
does not meet the criteria of equal participation and recognition of the right scale, while 2 
further criteria are met only partially. Certain elements of self-determination and of 
localization, including ecological alertness, seem compatible with nuclear energy. However, 
in overall terms nuclear energy currently does not match criteria of ecological policies. 
Adaptation of a communitarian approach could facilitate understanding and possibly 
acceptance and identification with the issue of nuclear energy.  
 
6.8. Adaptation of principles of participatory democracy 
 
Challenging the notion that nuclear energy is the exclusive form of power generation could be 
achieved through breaking the barriers of exclusivity. This could be done through widening 
the range of stakeholders that have access to information, and allowing that, beyond access to 
information, involvement in decision-making is also granted. Democratization of nuclear 
energy and inclusion of elements of participatory democracy would fall in line with the 
communitarian approach described before. Development of new elements includes innovative 
methods of information sharing, empowerment of publics in decision preparation and 
remodeling of decision making. Adaptation of principles and practice of participatory 
democracy could facilitate development of a new approach to nuclear energy. Being a source 
of energy that spreads risk and benefits across the full population, rights to and responsibility 
of decision-making needs to be shared by everyone. It is argued that decisions by experts and 
elected representatives, together with expressions of opinions through referendums, provide 
ample opportunities for the involvement of the public. This claim should be challenged 
however. In spite of their name, referendums have limited scope and validity. Outcome of 
referendums are often reflections of imbalances in power and in access to information. Only 
in exceptional cases, such as in the aftermath of a nuclear accident, do decisions override 
these imbalances. Alternative ways of achieving informed and involved decision-making 
needs to be sought to overcome differences in access to resources.  
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Need for democratization of nuclear energy is in line with our claim: the nuclear issue cannot 
be approached and limited to the technological, economic and energy aspects. NPPs are 
integrated into complex social systems; therefore the issue needs to be treated from a complex 
socio-economic perspective, where the interests of all current and future stakeholders are 
considered. Adaptation of a 360-degree approach is proposed where all consequences of the 
nuclear option are weighed. 
 
6.9. Adoption of elements of deliberative democracy 
 
Logic and reason, together with the consideration of a multitude of aspects, could be secured 
through a deliberative process. Before decisions are made, careful weighing of all options, 
and expressions of opinions and interests should take place. Potentially not only better-
informed decisions are made, but the empowerment contributes to buy-in from members of 
the public. It is claimed that adaptation of elements of deliberative democracy would 
contribute to the understanding, improved opinion forming and decision making on nuclear 
issues. Adaptation and use of elements require dedication, as experience reveals a range of 
related problems. 
 
Deliberative opinion polls 
 
Deliberative opinion polls are important tools to overcome key problems with traditional 
polling: forming opinion while lacking information and with limited ability to record detailed 
opinions. Deliberative opinion polls that would include dissemination of information, 
discussions, and then grounded forming of opinion could add quality to all dimensions of 
opinion polls. However, it is claimed that key methodological issues are still not solved, 
therefore use of this technique is still considered problematic (Price and Neijens, 1998). 
 
Consensus conferences 
 
Consensus conferences are institutions created to involve public judgment in decision-
making, in relation to issues with strong social and environmental aspects. Involvement 
through understanding complex issues with the inclusion of often contradicting pieces of 
information support informed decision-making. As a backside, they ‘in most cases have fallen 
short or even produced results that are counterproductive to the notion of a productive public 
debate’ (Scheufele, 2011:2). 
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Citizens’ councils 
 
Creation of a series of citizens’ councils can contribute to the formation of a network of 
informed and involved members of the public. Participants in each council represent the 
composition of the given locality. The process itself is similar to that of consensus 
conferences, and the challenges in terms of their efficacy and outcome also carries signs of 
similarity. 
 
 
Intermediary bodies 
 
Fundamental differences in opinions and in access to information can be diminished through 
the involvement of intermediary bodies. Mediation serves the facilitation of the process and 
representation of all interests.  
 
All these elements need to have the concept of balance in focus. ‘Meetings should be part of 
the larger discourse to lead to an enhanced quality of the decisions. In that framework, they 
should focus on receiving input from the public and not be used as a propaganda tool for the 
project.’ (Haverkamp, 2013) 
 
6.10. Introduction of alternative methods of decision making 
 
Democratization of nuclear energy would also require changing traditional decision-making 
models. Characteristics of nuclear energy imply a series of steps of central and definitive 
decision-making. As nuclear energy itself is a symbol of power, related management and 
operational steps are also expected to be powerful. Alternative methods of should build on 
segmentation and diversification of arriving at decisions (Vári, 2009). 
 
1. Optimization of decision-making would allow consideration of all possible factors. 
Decisions themselves would not be driven by the energy - economy agenda, but facilitate 
equal consideration of all relevant factors.  
 
2. The policy of small decisions accommodates the acknowledgment that in the case of a 
complex issue, a decision-by-decision approach is more compatible with the constant changes 
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in the environment. Combined with the inclusion of a multitude of factors, this prudent 
approach reduces the risks of erroneous decision-making. As totality is not accepted during 
the process, compromises become acceptable and turn into valued elements of the process. 
 
3. Observance of the communitarian principles could be further supported through the 
maximization of the consideration of local opinions. The politically originated principle of 
‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ has a valid meaning in the case of nuclear development 
projects as well. 
 
In conclusion, consideration and adaptation of elements of democratization of nuclear energy 
would generate decisions based on discussions, instead of decision-based discussions. 
Presence and involvement of all stakeholders needs to equilibrate inadequacy in access to 
information. Involvement of important segments of stakeholders, facilitation of grounded 
decision-making, and empowerment of the public could all be managed through the creation 
of digital platforms for nuclear communication. The advanced use of internet in combination 
with adaptation of elements of e-democracy could lead to a higher quality discourse on 
nuclear energy and to the democratization of the nuclear agenda. 
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orange circle: government black square: licensees  green squares: NGOs   blue triangles: others 
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ANNEX 3 
Distribution of articles by geographical focus 
 
Red color indicates articles with international relevance only, green indicate articles of 
Hungarian focus, while yellow articles bear both Hungarian and international context. 
Content 2012 2013 total 
Iran 
the nuclear program of the country and the various international attempts to set up 
control  
17 35 52 
Paks expansion 
plans related to the expansion of the Paks NPP 
5 20 25 
Japan 
national parliamentary elections with the issue of nuclear energy and the Fukushima 
disaster of 2011 in focus 
17 6 23 
Egypt 
political fights and the role of El-Baradei, former DG of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency 
17 - 17 
Protocol 
‘colorful’ articles of lesser relevance  
5 12 17 
nuclear strategy 
strategic announcements about Hungarian nuclear development plans and actions 
- 16 16 
Paks life cycle extension 
preparation and acceptance of Paks life cycle extension 
5 5 10 
energy policy 
plans and execution of a the Hungarian energy policy 
10 - 10 
nuclear energy cooperation 
agreement and talks between Hungary and other countries 
- 10 10 
safety of NPPs 
accounts and developments related to safety of nuclear power plants in Hungary and 
internationally 
9 - 9 
domestic politics 
news related to discussions in the Parliament and of parties related to the use of 
nuclear energy  
8 1 9 
Germany 
the topic of nuclear energy in relation to the federal elections in 2013 
3 2 5 
nuclear energy management 
nuclear waste management site and transportation 
2 3 5 
energy security 
security of energy supply 
1 4 5 
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Mexico 
news related to the theft of an uranium rich container 
- 5 5 
North Korea 
use of nuclear energy for energy production and for military purpose 
4 - 4 
opinion poll 
polls researching public perception of nuclear energy 
- 4 4 
Israel 
program for the civilian and military use of nuclear energy  
3 - 3 
uranium and radiation 
treatment of the natural resource 
- 3 3 
Syria 
the potential nuclear capacity of the country 
2 - 2 
energy price 
examination of nuclear energy and energy prices 
2 - 2 
NATO 
military exercise 
2 - 2 
climate policy - 2 2 
European Parliament 
EP MP opinions on nuclear energy 
- 2 2 
Vietnam 
education of nuclear experts in Hungary 
1 - 1 
international politics 
overview of previous year and nuclear energy from that perspective 
1 - 1 
culture 
critical film review with mention of nuclear energy 
1 - 1 
Korea - 1 1 
energy efficiency 
news about saving energy 
- 1 1 
France 
debate about the future of NPPs in France 
- 1 1 
India 
news about the Indian NPPs 
- 1 1 
spying 
nuclear issues in the US spying case 
- 1 1 
support 
supporting development of other areas 
- 1 1 
Slovakia 
nuclear plans of Slovakia 
- 1 1 
TOTAL 115 137 252 
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ANNEX 4 
 
Perceptions on the need of Paks expansion and the need for a referendum 
Independent, representative poll 
 
- In your view, is there a need to build 2 further reactors in the Paks NPP? 
Definitely not 
Rather not 
Rather yes 
Definitely yes 
Don’t know 
 
- Do you believe you have enough information about the expansion of the Paks NPP? 
No, and I don’t find it important to learn more about it 
No, and I would be interested in learning more abut the economic and financial aspects 
No, and I would be interested in learning more abut the technical aspects 
No, and I would be interested in learning more abut the environmental aspects 
No, and I would be interested in learning more abut the political aspects 
Yes 
Don’t know 
 
 
3. Do you think that, similarly to other countries, expansion about the Paks NPP should 
be decided on a referendum? 
Yes because this in issue that is highly relevant to all of us 
Yes because this is gigantic investment the burden of which we will all share 
Yes because I would like to have my say what the source of our electric energy should be 
No because this issue is too complicated 
No because experts can decide much better on this 
No because anyway this is decided by the politicians 
Don’t know  
 
 
 
 
